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NOTES
Bills and Notes-Recovery by Payee Against Drawee Bank on
Checks Paid Over Forged Endorsement
In the recent case of Modern Homes Constr. Co. v. Tryon Bank
& Trust Co.,1 the North Carolina Supreme Court wiped away an
old and inconsistent holding in the area of bills and notes' and laid
the legal cornerstone for related future litigation. The case involved
the drawer of a check who had contracted with the plaintiff-payee
to have a shell home built. Upon completion of the home the draw-
er, along with the plaintiff's agent, who was not authorized to en-
dorse his principal's checks, went to the drawee bank. There the
drawer made out a check to the plaintiff corporation for the amount
due and gave it to the agent who endorsed it, "Modern Homes
Construction Company by Ray Durham."'3  When the assistant
cashier objected to cashing the check, the drawer told him, "This
man is Modern Homes Construction Company, and you cash it for
me,"4 which the bank did. The agent absconded and the payee
brought suit against the drawee bank. The bank moved for and
received a nonsuit at the close of plaintiff's evidence. The plaintiff
appealed. The court reversed and indicated that if the plaintiff were
to recover on retrial it would have to be on the theory of conversion
rather than on either acceptance or negligence as averred in their
complaint.
Prior to the present case, North Carolina had allowed recovery
by a payee in similar circumstances on the theory of acceptance. 5
This theory had survived even though the Negotiable Instruments
Law (NIL) was adopted in 18996 and specifically required that
1266 N.C. 648, 147 S.E.2d 37 (1966).
* The legal issue in the case is presently covered by Negotiable Instru-
ment Law enacted in North Carolina as N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 25-1 to -199
(1953). Effective midnight, June 30, 1967, the Uniform Commercial Code,
enacted as N.C. GEN. STAT. 25-1-101 to -10-107 (1965), will govern the
law of bills and notes. Where applicable the Code will be cited in addition
to current statutes.
S266 N.C. at 650, 147 S.E.2d at 39.
'Ibid.
'Dawson v. National Bank, 197 N.C. 499, 150 S.E. 38 (1929); Dawson
v. National Bank, 196 N.C. 134, 144 S.E. 833 (1929).
' See note 2 supra.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
an acceptance be in writing.7 The acceptance cases had erroneously
been based upon North Carolina General Statutes section 25-1448
(NIL section 137), which deems a drawee to have accepted a bill
if the drawee destroys it or refuses within twenty-four hours to
return it. But this section is concerned with bills that are "delivered
for acceptance" and not with those, as is the situation at bar, that
are presented for payment. As noted the inappropriate application
of the above section ignores the requirement of North Carolina
General Statutes section 25-1399 (NIL section 132) that an "accep-
tance ...be in writing and signed by the drawee." The rejection
of the unsound and widely criticized 0 acceptance theory places
North Carolina with the majority of jurisdictions, which treat the
drawee's actions as a conversion." The result is the same but the
theory is different.
In applying the theory of conversion it is important to under-
stand that the check made out to the holder-payee is not merely
evidence of a promise to pay, but that it is property2 and carries
incidents of ownership by the payee. The value of the property is
prima facie the face value of the check."3 Thus, when a bank takes
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-139 (1953).
"'Where a drawee to whom a bill is delivered for acceptance destroys
the same or refuses within twenty-four hours after such delivery, or within
such other period as the holder may allow, to return the bill accepted or
nonaccepted to the holder, he will be deemed to have accepted the same."
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-144 (1953).
0 "The acceptance of a bill is the signification by the drawee of his assent
to the order of the drawer. The acceptance must be in writing and signed
by the drawee. It must not express that the drawee will perform his promise
by any other means than the payment of money." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-139
(1953).
"0 See 25 ILL. L. Rav. 343 (1930) ; 7 N.C.L. Rav. 191 (1929) ; 38 YALE
L.J. 1143 (1929).
"' See Annot., 137 A.L.R. 874 (1942) ; Annot., 69 A.L.R. 1076 (1930);
9 C.J.S. Banks & Banking § 343 nn.87 & 88 (1938); BRANNAN, NEGOTI-
ABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 189 (7th ed. 1948); BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES
§ 146 (2d ed. 1961); 4 ARK. L. REv. 219, 220 (1950).
" Louisville & N.R.R. v. Citizens' & Peoples' Nat'l Bank, 74 Fla. 385,
77 So. 104 (1917). For an example of the result when a court fails to recog-
nize the property aspect of the check itself, see, Gordon Fireworks Co. v.
Capital Natl Bank, 236 Mich. 271, 210 N.W. 263 (1926), where the con-
version theory was rejected because "the bank did not convert funds of
plaintiff." (Emphasis added.)
"Modern Homes Constr. Co. v. Tryon Bank & Trust Co., 266 N.C.
at 653, 147 S.E.2d at 41; State v. First Nat'l Bank, 38 N.M. 225, 3 P.2d
728 (1934); BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 60 (7th ed. 1948).
The applicable Uniform Commercial Code provision is N.C. GEN. STAT. §
25-3-419(2) (1965).
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a check from an unauthorized person and makes payment to that
person, even in the normal course of business and unwittingly, the
bank is exercising unauthorized control over the payee's property
and withholding it from its rightful owner. A tort arises in favor
of the payee against the converting drawee.
Although Modern Homes Constr. Co. v. Tryon Bank & Trust
Co. was remanded and must be retried, 4 the court's particularly
thorough opinion establishes a firm base upon which business, banks,
attorneys, and lower courts can rely in future transactions.' 5
It is also important to note that the holding is consistent with
the newly adopted Uniform Commercial Code which becomes effec-
tive midnight, June 30, 1967.16 Under the Code, payment over a
forged endorsement is specifically covered and is treated as a con-
version.' The theoretical change from acceptance to conversion is,
therefore, also a fortunate step that will enable a smoother transi-
tion to the Uniform Commercial Code as well as offer sounder law
until it is effective. PHILIP G. CARSON
Constitutional Law-Due Process-Delay Between Offense and Arrest
The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the sixth amend-
ment,' but this right becomes operative only upon indictment.2 In
", There are questions of fact and collateral issues which could result in
a verdict for either the plaintiff or defendant in the particular case of
Modern Homes Constr. Co. v. Tryon Bank & Trust Co. I.e., the drawer is
deceased and his estate closed. There was a considerable time lapse between
payment by the drawee bank to the absconded agent and the commencement
of the payee corporation's action.
1 Regardless of the outcome in a particular case, the court is perfectly
clear and definite in its adoption of the conversion theory.
1" N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 25-1-101 to -10-107 (1965). The Uniform Com-
mercial Code is treated in The Uniform Commercial Code in North Caro-
lina-A Symposium, 44 N.C.L. Rnv. 525 (1966). See also 2 N.Y. LAW
REVISION COMM'N, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1079 (1955);
Scope, Purposes and Functions of the Code, 16 ARK. L. Rnv. 1 (1961-62);
Comment, Allocation of Losses from Check Forgeries Under the Law of
Negotiable Instruments and the Uniform Commercial Code, 62 YALE L.J.
417, 471 (1953).
""N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-419 (1965). Faris, Commercial Paper, 44
N.C.L. Rzv. 598, 621 (1966), notes that the Uniform Commercial Code
"will" force a change from North Carolina's acceptance theory to the con-
version theory. The article was being printed when the court initiated the
change before the Code forced it.
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy ... trial. . . ." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
' "[I]f there is unnecessary delay in bringing a defendant to trial, the
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several recent cases the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia has wrestled with the problem of prejudice to a defen-
dant caused by delay between the time of the offense and the time of
indictment.' In Ross v. United States,4 where such delay had oc-
curred, the court reversed a conviction for a narcotics violation and
established a rule that is disturbingly vague, yet one that cannot be
ignored by law enforcement officials.
On May 10, 1962, Ross allegedly sold some narcotics to an
undercover police officer who, in order to protect his anonymity,
did not swear out a complaint until his undercover activities had
terminated seven months later.5 At trial this officer was the only
witness against Ross, and his testimony was given with the aid of
notes made at the time of the offense. Ross contended that he did
not remember the events of May 10 and was therefore unable to
refute the officer's testimony.
The court reversed Ross's conviction on appeal, holding that
"there was an undue subordination of appellant's interests which
should not, at least in a record as barren of reassuring corrobora-
tion as this one, result in a sustainable conviction."0
In dissent, Circuit Judge Danaher chastized the majority for
finding a "lack of 'reassuring corroboration,' ,,7 asserting that they
had ignored their recent decision in Wilson v. United States' where
uncorroborated testimony was held to be sufficient to support a
conviction. It would appear that the majority, while obviously aware
court may dismiss the indictment.... ." FED. R. CRIm. P. 48b. See Hardy v.
United States, 343 F.2d 233, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Reece v. United States,
337 F.2d 852, 853 (5th Cir. 1964); Mack v. United States, 326 F.2d 481,
486 (8th Cir. 1964); Nickens v. United States, 323 F.2d 808, 809 (D.C.
Cir. 1963).
'Hardy v. United States, supra note 2; Wilson v. United States, 335
F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Redfield v. United States, 328 F.2d 532 (D.C.
Cir. 1963); Nickens v. United States, supra note 2. The court has con-
sidered such delay as denial of procedural due process under the fifth
amendment. See Ross v. United States, 349 F.2d 210, 211 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
Hardy v. United States, supra at 234.
'349 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
GThe statute of limitations for this offense is five years. 75 Stat. 648
(1961), 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1964).
'349 F.2d at 212. Defendant had appealed on the grounds of violations
of fifth and sixth amendment rights. Id. at 211. As in cases of delay after
indictment, see note 24 infra, defendant must allege that he was prejudiced.
7349 F.2d at 216.
8 335 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
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of Wilson,' found the lack of corroboration prejudicial only when
considered with the delay, rather than prejudicial in itself.
In 1844 an English court indicated that delay between offense
and arrest resulted in prejudice to the defendant, although the
statute of limitations had not run.' No United States court clearly
recognized the problem until 1955," and even now such delay would
probably not be grounds for dismissal in any jurisdiction in the
United States except the District of Columbia Circuit.'
2
In 1963 the District of Columbia Circuit indicated that it might
condemn such delay even though the statute of limitations had not
run.' The court, in a footnote, recognized that "delay between
offense and prosecution could be so oppressive as to constitute a
denial of due process."'"
Balancing the policy objectives of effective law enforcement 5
on the one hand and due process on the other, the Ross court dis-
'349 F.2d at 211, 212 (citing dissent from denial of rehearing in Wilson).
" The Queen v. Robins, 1 Cox Crim. Cas. 114 (1844). Defendant was
charged with bestiality, an offense forbidden by statute. The charge had
been made within the two-year statute of limitations.
" Petition of Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183 (D. Md. 1955). Finding it unneces-
sary "to decide how far rights under the speedy trial provision of the
Sixth Amendment" go, the court considered a seven-month detention before
charges were filed in conjunction with other deprivations of the defendant's
right to a speedy trial. Id. at 202. A student note had recognized the prob-
lem three years before this case was decided. Note, 5 STAN. L. REV. 95
(1952).
1 Other circuit courts have held, by circuit, as follows: United States
v. Simmons, 338 F.2d 804, 806 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 983
(1965) (delay in arrest does not violate rights); Reece v. United States,
337 F.2d 852, 853 (5th Cir. 1964) (right to speedy trial arises after prose-
cution instituted); Hoopengarner v. United States, 270 F.2d 465, 469 (6th
Cir. 1959) (delay between offense and arrest is controlled by statute of
limitations); United States v. Jakalski, 267 F.2d 609, 612 (7th Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 362 U.S. 936 (1960) (statute of limitations controls institu-
tion of prosecution); Mack v. United States, 326 F.2d 481, 486 (8th Cir.
1964) (sixth amendment does not apply until indictment is filed); Venus
v. United States, 287 F.2d 304, 307 (9th Cir. 1960) (statute of limitations
controls time in which indictment must be returned); Wood v. United
States, 317 F.2d 736, 740 (10th Cir. 1963) (delay before arrest not grounds
for dismissal); United States v. Fraidin, 63 F. Supp. 271, 279 (D. Md.
1945) (prosecution limited only by statute of limitations). The First, Third
and Fourth Circuits have not ruled directly on this question. Research re-
veals no state that has considered the problem.
"Nickens v. United States, 323 F.2d 808 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
1
, Id. at 810 n.2.
"The problems in enforcement of narcotics laws have been commented
upon extensively. E.g., Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the
Criminal Process, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 562-73 (1960); Note, The Law of
Entrapment in Narcotics Arrests, 38 No=R DAME LAw. 741 (1963).
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cussed the specific circumstances"' of the case with regard to the
necessity for and prejudice resulting from the delay. According to
the prosecution, the delay was necessary to protect the anonymity
of the undercover officer." The court found that the delay was
unnecessary, being influenced by testimony showing this particular
officer had made few new contacts in his last months of under-
cover work."8 Thus the delay could be considered unjustified. Of
course this conclusion was made from hindsight, whereas the de-
cision of the police not to expose the agent was made in anticipation
of further contacts.
Juxtaposed with this policy of allowing some delay for effective
law enforcement was the policy of protecting the rights of the ac-
cused. Delay could have been doubly injurious to him; his memory
was dimmed by time'9 and, perhaps more important, he was charged
en masse with all of the agent's contacts.20  The danger of an
erroneous charge or mistaken identification had been expressed by
Judge Wright, dissenting in Powell v. United States :21
I suggest that it defies human experience for any man, partic-
ularly a new policeman, to remember and to identify with absolute
conviction the particular 102 [51 in Ross] faces, as distinguished
from hundreds of others, that passed through his mind, many on
just one occasion, during the kaleidoscope of his months-long
undercover investigation. Indulging the unlikely assumption that
he can remember the 102 particular faces, to suggest that he can
allocate each face to the appropriate time and place shown in
his diary offends credulity 22
Considering these circumstances, the Ross court found "(1) a
purposeful delay of seven months between offense and arrest, (2) a
" These circumstances are as follows: (a) defendant alleged and showed
prejudice, 349 F.2d at 212; (b) the delay was purposeful, id. at 213(Quaere: Is the intent to delay determinative in the finding of prejudice?) ;
(c) the time lapse was seven months, ibid. (Quaere: Would a shorter time
lapse rebut an allegation of prejudice?); (d) defendant was charged with
fifty-one other persons, id. at 212; (e) the officer testified from notes and
admitted his dependency upon them, id. at 214; (f) the officer was the only
prosecuting witness, id. at 211; and (g) only one transaction had been made
between officer and defendant, ibid. Observe that the prejudice implicit in
all factors except (b) and (c) would be lessened by more positive identifi-
cation.
1349 F.2d at 212.
18 Id. at 212 n.1.
'l Id. at 214.20 Id. at 213 n.2.
21352 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
22Id. at 710.
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plausible claim of inability to recall or reconstruct the events of the
day of the offense, and (3) a trial in which the case against appel-
lant consists of the recollection of one witness refreshed by a note-
book."2 3 The statute of limitations was rejected as the exclusive
criterion for determining when an indictment must be made.2
The court was faced with a problem of abuse of procedural due
process. 5 It justified its decision not to be limited by the statute
of limitations by relying upon a combination of three interrelated
factors: (a) purposeful delay; (b) prejudice caused by this delay,
evidenced by defendant's professed inability to remember ;26 and (c)
lack of corroboration or more positive testimony, evidenced by the
single prosecuting witness' reliance upon his notes."
Although describing the delay as purposeful, it is apparent that
the court meant an unjustified purposeful delay. In Ross, this was
indicated by the failure of the police to prosecute when they had
all the information necessary but delayed prosecution in order to
protect the undercover agent's anonymity. The police were not
using the period within the statute of limitations to solve crimes
or apprehend criminals but to delay prosecutions and provide under-
cover agents with more freedom of action. This delay is an under-
lying cause of both the prejudice proved by the defendant and the
unreliable identification made for the prosecution. Yet if the police
justified their delay,2 8 assuming the statute of limitations had not
run, it is doubtful that the court would give much weight to defen-
dant's allegations of prejudice.
The initial factor for the court's consideration was the defen-
23 349 F.2d at 215. The similarity between these findings and the factors
the Second Circuit considers when faced with delay in prosecuting after
indictment should be noted. Those factors are "the length of delay, the rea-
son for the delay, the prejudice to defendant, and waiver by the defendant."
United States v. Fay, 313 F.2d 620, 623 (2d Cir. 1963).
" 349 F.2d at 215, where the court holds that the length of delay should
not be "controlled exclusively by the applicable statute of limitations."
" "[A] due regard for our supervisory responsibility for criminal pro-
ceedings . . . requires . .. reversal." Id. at 216.
20 The prejudice found by the court was the defendant's inability to
remember. The prejudice that results from the officer's failure to recall was
considered a problem of corroboration, or more accurately a lack of more
positive testimony.
2 Corroboration may be used to refer to substantiating testimony as
provided by a corroborating witness. The court used corroboration to refer
to the sufficiency of the identification of the defendant.
" The court did not consider what situations might justify delay. Would
delay caused by an overworked staff be justified? Would delay in the hope
that an addict might lead an investigator to the supplier be justified?
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dant's allegation of prejudice, since if prejudice is not alleged and
shown, there would be no need for further deliberation. The proof
necessary to sustain this allegation will vary with the circumstances
of the defendant and the case. As the delay increases, the court
could more readily find that the defendant has been prejudiced by
a loss of memory. In Ross the defendant was "so circumstanced
that there would appear to be very little to differentiate one day
from another, especially as they begin to recede into the past.""
Prejudice could also result from the death of a defense witness or
the destruction of documents during the unjustified delay. However,
even if prejudice is found, it would seem that the court's ultimate
decision should not be based solely upon that finding but upon the
totality of the evidence, including both the length of delay and the
quality of the prosecution's evidence. Thus a defendant having
proved an absolute inability to remember would not be acquitted in
the face of positive identification.
It appears that the decision in Ross could be justified on the
ground of the prosecution's failure to present convincing evidence
concerning the identity of the defendant rather than the denial of
procedural due process. The court was apparently loath to modify
its holding in Wilson v. United States80 that one officer's testimony
was sufficient for a conviction. Consequently it found a different
reason to reverse the conviction of Ross. In so doing the court
seemed to establish a new multi-factor approach to situations in
which there has been delay in the initiation of prosecution after
the case for the prosecution was complete.
No final conclusions can be drawn from Ross. If the rationale
of the court were applied to offenses upon which no statute of
limitations runs, a court might well find unjustified delay in prose-
cutions after a period of years to be prejudicial as a matter of law.
In such a situation even positive identification by a witness might
be disregarded by a court.
It seems certain that the court could have reached the same result
in Ross by modifying Wilson and declaring the evidence to be in-
sufficient to support a conviction. Instead, the court, discussing the
:' 349 F.2d at 213.
335 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1964). Such modification would define a
minimum standard for sufficiency of identification and testimony concern-
ing the offense. The testimony of one agent could still be sufficient; how-
ever, it would have to meet this standard to result in conviction.
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problem of unjustified delay, began an inquiry that may have further
constitutional implications. Unjustified delay before arrest may
come to be forbidden as a violation of due process under the fifth
or the fourteenth amendment just as such delay between arrest and
trial is now forbidden by the sixth amendment.
Ross v. United States lacks the clarity necessary -to preserve
certainty in the law. Though the objectives of the court could
better be achieved by relying upon a ground other than delay, law
enforcement agencies should heed the warning that the statute of
limitations is not inviolate if it appears that prosecution was un-
justifiably delayed.
GEORGE CARSON, II
Constitutional Law-Due Process-Incompetence of Defense Counsel
The petitioner in Schaber v. Maxwell' was convicted of murder
and sentenced to death. At arraignment the presiding judge had
entered an oral plea of not guilty on his behalf. Petitioner waived
trial by jury, electing to be tried by a three-judge state court.2
At the trial, the attorneys appointed to represent petitioner had
virtually conceded that he was guilty of the acts alleged and, through
their opening statement, indicated that they were relying solely upon
the defense of insanity; yet they failed to enter a written plea of
not guilty by reason of insanity required by Ohio law, without
which the accused is conclusively presumed to have been sane at the
time of the commission of the alleged offense.3 After conviction
and sentence, petitioner applied for a writ of habeas corpus in the
federal district court alleging that counsel's failure to comply with
the Ohio statute constituted incompetence and thus deprived him
of effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by due process of law."
'348 F.2d 664 (6th Cir. 1965).
'OHiO REv. CODE ANNO. 2945.05 to -.06 (Page 1954).
' "A defendant who does not plead not guilty by reason of insanity is
conclusively presumed to have been sane at the time of the commission of
the offense charged." OHIo REv. CODE ANNo. § 2943.03 (E) (Page 1954).
Section 2943.04 provides that all pleas other than guilty or not guilty shall
be in writing, subscribed by defendant or his counsel, and shall immediately
be entered upon the court record.
'Petitioner had exhausted his remedies in the state courts of Ohio. The
Supreme Court of Ohio denied a petition for habeas corpus on the grounds
that incompetence of counsel was a matter which must be raised on appeal.
Schaber v. Maxwell, 348 F.2d 664, 667 n.3 (6th Cir. 1965).
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The district court denied the application for the writ on the ground
that the oral plea of insanity had in fact been accepted by the trial
court. On petitioner's appeal to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit, it was held that the trial court did not accept
the oral plea; consequently there had been no adjudication of peti-
tioner's sanity.
In reversing petitioner's conviction the court held that
under the facts and circumstances of this case we are of the
opinion that petitioner was deprived of due process of law at his
trial in the state court.... because of the failure of his counsel to
file a written plea of 'not guilty by reason of insanity' and the
conclusive presumption of sanity in the absence of a written
plea.5
The right to counsel as guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth
amendments means effective assistance of counsel in the prepara-
tion of the accused's case." The term "effective assistance of coun-
sel" is generally used in two different senses. In a procedural sense,
there must be timely assignment of counsel to allow an opportunity
to prepare an adequate defense.7 In addition courts use the term
"effective assistance of counsel" in the sense of the quality of the
defense actually rendered.' The principal case well demonstrates the
problems created by claims of ineffective assistance of counsel pred-
Id. at 673.
'E.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). See Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). A distinction must be made between those
cases where there is a denial of the right to counsel and those cases where
there was representation by counsel, but for some reason the representation
was ineffective or inadequate.
'The concept of effective assistance of counsel is used to describe a
procedural requirement, i.e., that assignment of counsel be effective to allow
useful participation in the preparation and trial of the defendant's case. See,
e.g., Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271 (1945) (assignment must be timely made
to allow preparation); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940) (denial of
consultation privilege makes appointment a sham); Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45 (1932) (appointment of entire county bar not effective).
' The term effective assistance is used to evaluate the quality of the
defense representation rendered. When the defendant attacks his conviction
alleging that trial counsel had a conflict of interests, the substance of the
attack would seem to be that the conflict of interests lowered the quality of
the representation rendered. See, e.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60(1942) (accused's defense rendered less effective). But see Mitchell v. United
States, 259 F.2d 787 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1958) (pro-
cedural requirement, not quality of defense rendered). See generally Waltz,
Inadequacy of Trial Defdnse Representation as a Ground for Post-Convic-
tion Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 289 (1964).
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icated upon charges that defense counsel in a criminal case was in-
competent.9
The Supreme Court has never undertaken to establish a standard
of quality for defense counsel in criminal cases, but the lower
federal and the state courts have enunciated various standards of
quality required by the Constitution."0 It would seem that to sub-
stantiate a claim of incompetence, the defendant must allege acts
or omissions by counsel that are the result of insufficient knowledge
of the law or facts of the case. A decision by counsel when he
lacks a sufficient knowledge of the facts or law of the case that a
reasonable inquiry would have produced is manifestly incompetent.11
In Turner v. Maryland' defense counsel apparently made no in-
vestigation of the facts or law involved in the case. The defendant's
conviction was reversed because appearance without study or prepa-
ration for useful participation in the trial is not a satisfaction of
the constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. In
Application of Tomich13 the defendant was convicted on the basis
of evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure because counsel
failed to make a pre-trial motion to suppress as required by state
law. The court held that the mistake of counsel required "the find-
ing that petitioner was without the 'effective' assistance of counsel
that is guaranteed by the Constitution." '14 The defendants in Lunce
v. Overlade'5 were represented by counsel who was completely un-
acquainted with the law of the jurisdiction. Counsel did not chal-
lenge the sufficiency of the affidavit, which apparently did not charge
the crime for which the defendants were tried and convicted; further-
more, he failed to save his exceptions. In reversing the conviction,
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held, that "the record
made by Ohio counsel in his defense of petitioners irrefutably
demonstrates that he was so ignorant of Indiana law and procedure
'See generally, 78 HARv. L. Rav. 1434 (1965); 49 VA. L. REv. 1531(1963).10E.g., Pineda v. Bailey, 340 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1965) (defense with
zeal); Hickock v. Crouse, 334 F.2d 95 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 982 (1965) (defense with all counsel's skill); Willis v. Hunter, 166
F.2d 721 (10th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 848 (1948) (defense by
able lawyer).
" Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 978 (1963).
12303 F.2d 507 (4th Cir. 1962).
1221 F. Supp. 500 (D. Mont. 1963), aff'd 332 F.2d 987 (1964).
1 id. at 505.
"244 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1957).
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that it was virtually impossible for him to protect or even to assert
petitioners' rights."' 6 Defense counsel in Poe v. United States
17
advised the defendant not to take the witness stand because counsel
believed certain statements by the defendant could be used to im-
peach him. In fact, the statements were inadmissible and could not
have been so used. The district court for the District of Columbia
in reversing the conviction said, "where the defense is substantially
weakened because of the unawareness on the part of defense counsel
of a rule of law basic to the case, the accused is not given the
effective representation guaranteed him by the Constitution.' 18
Petitioner's allegation of incompetence in Scliaber v. Maxwell would
seem to come within this category. Counsel elected to rely on the
defense of insanity, but did not have an adequate knowledge of the
applicable state law, with the result that petitioner was conclusively
presumed to be sane.
Courts are generally reluctant to allow claims charging that
counsel was incompetent.' 9 There is a presumption that counsel is
effective and competent,2 ° and mere general criticism of the at-
torney's conduct is insufficient to substantiate a claim of incompe-
tence. The defendant must allege with particularity the acts or omis-
sions alleged to constitute incompetence. 2 ' This burden is further
complicated by the general proposition that acts of counsel involving
judgment or trial strategy cannot be asserted as incompetence. 22
10Id. at 110.17233 F. Supp. 173 (D.D.C. 1964).
18 Id. at 178.
" See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 267 F.2d 813 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 889 (1959) (petition fabricated with aid of cell-mates).
20 Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955).2 1E.g., Gilpin v. United States, 252 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1958) (allega-
tion of general incompetence insufficient); United States ex rel. Weber v.
Ragen, 176 F.2d 579 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 809 (1949)
(allegation of old age insufficient) ; United States v. Helwig, 159 F.2d 616(3d Cir. 1947) (allegation of inexperience not sufficient).
"2The acts of counsel that are considered to be within the ambit of
counsel's judgment are too numerous to be listed here. See, e.g., Johnson
v. United States, 333 F.2d 371 (10th Cir. 1964) (failure to object to illegal
confession); Tompa v. Virginia ex rel. Cunningham, 331 F.2d 552 (4th
Cir. 1964) (failure to call particular witnesses); Rivera v. United States,
318 F.2d 606 (9th Cir. 1963) (failure to request bill of particulars); Snead
v. Smyth, 273 F.2d 838 (4th Cir. 1959) (failure to object to jury instruc-
tions); United States v. Duhart, 269 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1959) (failure to
use one of several available defenses); Sweet v. Howard, 155 F.2d 715(7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 950 (1949) (failure to seek change
of venue); Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir. 1945), cert. denied,
325 U.S. 889 (1945) (advice to plead guilty).
INCOMPETENCE OF COUNSEL
However, where counsel makes several erroneous decisions in trial
tactics that result in a total failure to present the cause of the accused,
courts will find that degree of incompetence necessary to constitute
a violation of due process.13 For example, election between various
available defenses is normally considered a matter of trial strategy,
but where the defense actually rendered is highly insubstantial in
relation to those not offered, doubt will be cast on the hypothesis
that counsel made a competent and intelligent choice.24 Thus, in
general it is said that a tactical decision by counsel, to come within
the immunity referred to above, must be based on an informed pro-
fessional opinion.25 In addition, the convicted defendant must show
prejudice resulting from counsel's incompetence or demonstrate the
result of the trial might have been different except for the incom-
petent conduct.26 Some courts apparently extend the burden of
proof even further and require the defendant to prove that coun-
sel's conduct was so incompetent that it amounted to a breach of
counsel's duty to represent faithfully his clientY.1 In any event the
defendant must prove the incompetence of counsel made the trial
a sham,28 a farce or mockery of justice,29 or the equivalent of no
defense at all."0 In short the defendant must prove an extreme case.
" For example, where defense counsel failed to object to a coerced con-
fession, failed to use certain witnesses, and offered no evidence, the court
found incompetence that violated due process. Each of these could be con-
sidered a tactical decision, but the aggregate of the decisions constituted a
total failure to present the cause of the accused. Jones v. Huff, 152 F.2d
14 (D.C. Cir. 1945).24 E.g., Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 978 (1963).
"For example, the decision not to argue the case to the jury would
normally be a matter of trial tactics, but where the decision is the result
of counsel's determination that his conscience would not allow him to argue
the case, the court will find incompetency constituting a denial of due
process. Johns v. Smyth, 176 F. Supp. 949 (E.D. Va. 1959).
"E.g., United States v. Duhart, 269 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1959); Ander-
son v. Bannan, 250 F.2d 654 (6th Cir. 1958) (per curiam); DuBoise v.
North Carolina, 225 F. Supp. 51 (E.D.N.C.), aff'd, 338 F.2d 697 (4th
Cir. 1964).
'" E.g., Bouchard v. United States, 344 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1965), Ken-
nedy v. United States, 259 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
994 (1959).
" E.g., United States ex rel. Mitchell v. Thompson, 56 F. Supp. 683
(S.D.N.Y. 1944).
"E.g., Rivera v. United States, 318 F.2d 606 (9th Cir. 1963) ; O'Malley
v. United States, 285 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1961); United States v. Wight,
176 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1949).
" E.g., Turner v. Maryland, 303 F.2d 507 (4th Cir. 1962); Lunce v.
Overlade, 244 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1957).
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In considering claims of incompetent counsel, some courts draw
a distinction between retained and appointed counsel.8" The major-
ity of courts recognizing the distinction hold that ineptness and
incompetency of the retained attorney is imputed to the defendant
and the client is bound by the acts of the attorney unless he re-
pudiates them in open court." However, those courts that base the
distinction on the agency rationale recognize that the rule has no
application when it is made to appear that the defendant is unac-
quainted with criminal procedure and is ignorant of his rights.
83
It would seem there is little valid basis for the rule since the excep-
tion should apply in almost every instance. Even the intelligent and
educated laymen will have only limited skill in the science of law and
the intricacies of criminal procedure. Some courts refuse relief
where counsel is retained, on the theory that incompetent acts of
retained counsel are not state action and thus there is no violation
of the fourteenth amendment.84 But when the incompetence of the
attorney results in an unfair trial, it would seem that the trial and
the subsequent conviction constitute sufficient state action within the
prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment.85
Regardless of whether counsel is appointed or retained, courts
considering claims of incompetence are confronted with the same
basic problems. In both situations, the ultimate consideration is
whether the acts of counsel deprived the defendant of a fair trial.
The standards applied by the courts should assure relief in those
cases where counsel's incompetence has resulted in a substantial
failure to present the accused's case. Every court considering claims
of incompetence is confronted with the difficult task of determining
how many errors counsel can make in a case before the defendant
is deprived of a fair trial." By its very nature, this must be an
"
1 E.g., United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 203 F.2d 407 (3d Cir.
1952), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 865 (1953); Tompsett v. Ohio, 146 F.2d 95
(6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 869 (1945); Ex parte Haumesch, 82
F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1936); See, Annot., 74 A.L.R.2d 1390 (1960).
" E.g., Tompsett v. Ohio, 146 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324
U.S. 869 (1945).
"Id. at 98.
"E.g., United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 203 F.2d 407 (3d. Cir.
1952), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 865 (1953).
" It is well understood that private acts do not violate the fourteenth
amendment, but where the state judicial machinery adds impetus to that con-
duct, there is state action sufficient to violate the fourteenth amendment.
See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).




ad hoc determination with a consideration of the facts and circum-
stances in each case. While the courts must assure relief in those
cases where there has been a denial of the effective assistance of
counsel, they also must attempt to provide a solution that will avoid
burdening the courts with full-scale hearings on frivolous and in-
adequately supported claims of incompetence."7
The reviewing courts must judge counsel's conduct by some ex-
ternal, standard. If the convicted defendant alleges that counsel
made an error of law, the courts can more objectively determine if
the conduct was incompetent. However, when the defendant alleges
counsel made an error in trial tactics, as is most frequently the
case, the courts are required to apply a highly subjective test and
view counsel's conduct retrospectively. By its very nature, advocacy
is an art that is difficult to appraise. For the present, it would seem
that the fair trial standard, coupled with the requirements of alleg-
ing particular acts and showing prejudice, is the most satisfactory
solution. It would seem that where counsel has committed a clear
error of law, the defendant will have little difficulty in alleging the
particular act and proving resulting prejudice. 8  The courts should
continue to apply rigid standards in attacks on counsel's tactics and
judgment. The best trial lawyers often disagree on the proper
strategy for a given case, and this variance of views on profes-
sional technique should not be deemed incompetence. It has been
suggested that in any case where the trial judge is aware that coun-
sel is conducting the trial in an incompetent manner, he should permit
substitution of counsel and declare a mistrial if the defendant so
desires.39 However, it would seem more desirable for the court to
87 For example, one convict alleged his trial counsel was incompetent
because counsel was delinquent in payment of his State Bar dues at the
time of trial. White v. Beto, 322 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
376 U.S. 925 (1964).
" It can be argued that the requirements of alleging particular acts of
incompetence and showing prejudice place an undue burden on the incar-
cerated prisoner who frequently drafts his on petition for post-conviction
relief. However, the indigent defendant will usually have access to the
assistance of appointed counsel on request. See Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial
Defense Representation as a Ground for Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal
Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. Rv. 289, 296 (1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-220(1965) (providing for counsel to indigents proceeding under post-convic-
tion statute).
,Lumbard, The Adequacy of Lawyers Now in Criminal Practice, 47J. Amd. JUD. Soc'y 176, 181 (1964). But see United States ex rel. Darcy
v. Handy, 203 F.2d 407 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 865 (1953)
(indicating such intervention might be a violation of the defendant's right
to develop his defense).
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advise counsel of his mistakes and allow a recess for counsel to
correct his errors. For example, in the Schaber case, the court said:
"[I]n this case the mistake of counsel in a sense may have been
induced by the failure of the trial court to indicate in any way that
"140a written plea was necessary ... .
Incompetence charges have a potentially detrimental effect on
counsel. In those cases where the charge is sustained, counsel's
professional reputation suffers even though his performance in the
case may be no indication of his general level of professional capac-
ity. Even where the charge of incompetence is unsupported, counsel
may be professionally embarrassed and inconvenienced by the neces-
sity of appearing in court to defend his actions. The courts there-
fore recognize that in addition to their duty to protect an accused
from an unfair trial, they also have a duty to protect lawyers from
unwarranted claims of incompetence. 41 Courts are fearful that fre-
quent claims of incompetence will make lawyers reluctant to enter the
criminal bar or accept court assignments.42 The threat of charges
of incompetence may deter counsel from taking those calculated risks
that are normally equated with good advocacy.
The ultimate solution to alleviating the problems raised by claims
of incompetent counsel may lie with the organized bar. There is
general recognition that the criminal bar is inadequate for the de-
manding task of properly representing criminal defendants, partic-
ularly indigents.4 3 The public tends to disparage the criminal law-
yer, which may explain the reluctance of members of the bar to enter
criminal work to any extent greater than absolutely necessary."
Bar associations should expend every effort to increase the status
of the -criminal bar in the view of the public and the profession.
Only when there is an ample number of qualified members of the
bar, interested and participating in criminal defense, can the supply
of competent counsel meet the needs of the accused defendants for
40 348 F.2d 664, 673 (6th Cir. 1965).
'
1 E.g., DuBoise v. North Carolina, 225 F. Supp. 51 (E.D.N.C.), aff'd,
338 F.2d 697 (4th Cir. 1964). The courts generally recognize that an
attack on the attorney's competence waives the attorney-client privilege and
will permit counsel to defend his actions and testify as to understandings
reached between counsel and client. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 167
F. Supp. 102 (E.D. Va. 1957), aff'd, 260 F.2d 574 (4th Cir. 1958).
,2 Gray v. United States, 299 F.2d 467, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
"Lumbard, The Adequacy of Lawyers Now in Criminal Practice, 47




adequate representation. In the majority of cases the erring lawyer
is reputable and professionally competent; he has merely committed
error that made him ineffective in the disputed case. It would seem
obvious that disciplinary action is warranted only if the perfor-
mance of the attorney is such that it reflects on the integrity of
the profession. Assuming that decisions in recent years are indica-
tive of the trend, courts will become more objective and more de-
manding as to the quality of representation required by the Consti-
tution. The organized bar should begin now to take steps that will
aid the courts in formulating an adequate and workable standard.
The efforts of the bar have been highly successful in solving prob-
lems for providing counsel to indigent defendants. It can be as-
sumed that they will be successful in devising objective standards
in evaluating the defense rendered in a given case.
DAviD S. ORCUTT
Constitutional Law-Religious Segregation of Public Schools-The
Wearing of Distinctive Religious Garb by Public School Teachers
While Teaching
In Moore v. Board of Educ.1 a parent-taxpayer sought a declar-
atory judgment to the effect that defendant school board's method
of operating three of the schools in the district violated the first
amendment and Ohio constitutional prohibitions2 against the estab-
lishment of religion. Also, a declaratory judgment was sought
against the placement plan, the effect of which was to create three
schools totally Catholic and one predominantly non-Catholic, on the
ground that it was a denial of equal protection of the law under the
fourteenth amendment as applied in Brown v. Board of Educ.3
Prayer for an injunction to prohibit these practices was joined with
the request for declaratory relief. The plaintiff further sought an
injunction against the, wearing of religious garb by nuns while
teaching in public schools on the ground that it introduced sectarian-
ism into the schools.
The court held that there was a governmental establishment of
religion and issued an injunction accordingly, stating that the total
effect of all of defendant's practices was to use public school funds
'4 Ohio Misc. 257, 212 N.E.2d 833 (C.P. 1965).
2 OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 7. See note 23 infra.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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for the operation of parochial schools. 4 The court, however, did
not grant injunctive relief against the religious segregation effect-
uated by the placement plan, holding that Brown v. Board of Educ.
was not applicable." The court also refused to enjoin the practice
of wearing religious garb by public school teachers while teaching,
stating that such practice did not convert the school where they
taught into a sectarian institution."
The court is no doubt correct in its determination that there
had been an establishment of religion. Taking into consideration
the total effect of the defendant's released time program and other
practices, no other result could have been reached on this issue.'
It is felt that the court adequately discussed this aspect of the case
in its opinion; consequently, it will not be further considered in
this note.
In determining that Brown v. Board of Educ.' was not appli-
cable, the court found lack of evidence that religious segregation
adversely affected the students' motivation to learn or that the stu-
dent in the segregated school received educational opportunities sub-
stantially inferior to those of the nonsegregated school. It will be
recalled that the court in Brown reacted to a large volume of evi-
dence showing the psychological, sociological, and economic impact
that racially segregated schools have on the Negro child. Similar
evidence might have been introduced in the principal case.9 But even
'4 Ohio Misc. at 271-77, 212 N.E.2d at 842-45.
Id. at 268-69, 212 N.E.2d at 83940.
8 d. at 269-71, 212 N.E.2d at 840-41.
"These practices included (1) providing a released-time religious pro-
gram one hour per day, five days per week, with religious instruction given
by the classroom teachers at a Catholic church nearby; (2) determination
of attendance at the several schools on basis of religion rather than geog-
raphy, supposedly under a parental choice plan; (3) allowing pupils from
outside the district to attend such schools with tuition paid by their parish;
and (4) renting from the Roman Catholic Church for ninety-nine years at a
rental of one dollar per year the properties upon which three of the schools
were constructed. Id. at 268-77, 212 N.E.2d at 839-45.
R347 U.S. 483 (1954).
, The usual makeup of the Catholic parochial school encompasses students
from all ethnic and cultural backgrounds. FICHTER, PAROCHIAL SCHOOL:
A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY 451 (1958). Therefore, it could be reasoned that
religious segregation is not detrimental to the students' education. However,
parochial schools have been criticized as contributing to a divisiveness in
America and promoting religious bigotry. If so, they may be considered to
have adverse effects upon the students. See McCLUSKEY, CATHOLIC VIEW-
POINT ON EDUCATION 36-38 (1959). See also Thomas, Voluntary Religious
Isolation--Another School Segregation Story, 40 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 347
(1959).
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without such evidence, it is submitted that Brown should apply.
Brown, in its broader meaning, seems to stand for the proposition
that the Constitution does not permit artificial classifications by the
state whether they be made on the basis of race, color, status, or
religion. These factors are said to be constitutionally irrelevant;1O
consequently, any classification founded upon them should be a vio-
lation of equal protection of the laws.1
Congress categorized these classifications as unlawful in the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.12 It would seem that the practices of the
defendant school board violate this act." The act defines desegre-
gation as the assignment of students to public schools "without
regard to their race, color, religion, or national origin.
The statute has no provision requiring any proof of equal or un-
equal facilities or that the students' motivation to learn has been
impaired in any way. The inference seems to be that the classifica-
tion itself is a violation of equal protection. Assuming the consti-
tutionality of the relevant provisions of the act, the Moore court
should have taken cognizance of them and stricken down the place-
ment plan.
The religious garb question turns on the legality of the religious
segregation. If the garbed teacher instructs only those of his own
religion, as in Moore, then the objections to the garb would seem
to have little merit.' 5 But since the religious segregation would
10 Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 184 (1941) (Jackson, J., con-
curring).
" Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF.
L. Rzv. 341, 353 (1941). A case very similar to Moore on its facts is
Harfst v. Hoegen, 349 Mo. 808, 163 S.W.2d 609 (1942). There the Missouri
Supreme Court found religious segregation of public schools to be a viola-
tion of complete religious freedom and did not consider the equal protection
argument. The court did, however, recognize the unconstitutionality of the
religious classification. See also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 558
(1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). "[I]f this statute of Louisiana [requiring
racial segregation] is consistent with the personal liberty of citizens, why
may not the state require the separation ... of Protestants and Roman Cath-
olics?" (Emphasis added.) Justice Harlan's dissent is essentially the view
espoused by the Supreme Court today. The present Court, if faced with re-
ligious segregation, would probably answer his rhetorical question in the
negative.
1278 Stat. 240, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1964).
1878 Stat. 248, 42 U.S.C. 2000c-6(a) (1), (2) (1964).
14 78 Stat. 246, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c(b) (1964). (Emphasis added.)
" But see Harfst v. Hoegen, 349 Mo. 808, 163 S.W.2d 609 (1942), indi-
cating that religious garb and insignia are impermissible in the school even
when the garbed teacher and his pupils are of the same faith.
RELIGIOUS SEGREGATION 109119661
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
seem to be unconstitutional, the garb question will here be treated
as though the classroom were religiously integrated.
The court followed what it stated to be the majority rule: the
wearing of religious garb by public school teachers while teaching
cannot be prevented in absence of a statute or regulation expressly
prohibiting it.'" The religious garb question seems to place two
highly regarded constitutional provisions-the guarantee of free ex-
ercise of religion and the prohibition against governmental establish-
ment of religion-in opposition to each other." If a teacher is dis-
missed because of his religious dress, such dismissal would seem
tantamount to denying him free exercise of his religious beliefs.
However, to allow the teacher to wear his religious habit in the
public school could be to favor one religion over others and thus
to "establish" the favored religion.'"
The leading case for the majority view is Hysong v. Gallitzin
Bourough School Dist."a There it was held that to deny teachers
4 Ohio Misc. at 469-70, 212 N.E.2d at 841. Quaere: If the teacher
has a constitutionally protected right to teach while wearing the garb, would
not a statute or regulation prohibiting it be unconstitutional?
"Both provisions are set out in U.S. CONST. amend. I: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof . . . ." These provisions are made applicable upon the
states through U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105, 108 (1943). All states have somewhat similar provisions.
See PFEFFER & BAUM, MEMORANDUM ON DISPLAY OF CROSSES, CRUCIFIXES,
CRECHES, AND OTHER RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS ON PUBLIC PROPERTY 2 (1957).
"8 See notes 20-23 infra and accompanying text. "It is only necessary
that the practice or enactment have the net effect of placing the official
support of the local or national government behind a particular denomina-
tion or belief." Reed v. Van Hoven, 237 F. Supp. 48, 53 (W.D. Mich.
1965). (The emphasis is that of the court.)
" 164 Pa. 629, 30 At. 482 (1894). It is to be noted that Hysong
represents the majority in absence of statute or regulation. Several juris-
dictions have prohibited the practice by statute or regulation, and the trend
seems to be moving in this direction. BUTTS, THE AMERICAN TRADITION
IN RELIGION AND EDUCATION 197-99 (1950). See NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-
1274 (1958); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-47-29 (1959); ORE. REV. STAT. §§
342.650-.655 (Supp. 1965), applied in 1926-28 ORE. Ops. ATrry GEN. 237.
But see WIs. STAT. ANN. § 40.435 (1957), which seems to indicate that
garbed nuns can be hired as public school teachers. This statute is discussed
by Boyer, Religious Education of Public School Pupils in Wisconsin, 1953
WIs. L. REV. 181, 214.
Even the Hysong case was overturned by PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §
11-1112 (1962), which was upheld in Commonwealth v. Herr, 229 Pa. 132,
78 Atl. 68 (1910). Adhering to the Hysong rule are City of New Haven v.
Town of Torrington, 132 Conn. 194, 43 A.2d 455 (1945); State ex rel.
Johnson v. Boyd, 217 Ind. 348, 28 N.E.2d 256 (1940); Rawlings v. Butler,




employment because of their distinctive religious dress would be to
impose a high penalty upon one for a particular religious belief.
The dissent felt that such teachers could be excluded in that "the
common schools cannot be used to exalt any given church or
sect .... ,2O The leading case for the minority is Knowlton v. Baum-
hover,21 which expressly adopted the dissenting opinion in Hysong.
The Baumhover principle was later more explicitly set forth in
Zellers v. Huff.2 2 This court said that
the wearing of religious garb and religious insignia must be
henceforth barred, during the time the Religious are on duty as
public school teachers. . . . Not only does the wearing of re-
ligious garb and insignia have a propagandizing effect for the
Church, but by its very nature it introduced sectarian religion
into the school.23
North Carolina has no case, statutory, or administrative law relative to
religious garb in public schools. Public school authorities in North Caro-
lina could apparently regulate the dress of teachers by analogy to a recent
North Carolina Attorney General's opinion that school authorities could
require students to conform to "a sensible personal appearance" or face
expulsion. Greensboro Daily News, Sept. 25, 1965, p. 1, col. 1.
164 Pa. at 661, 30 Atl. at 485.182 Iowa 691, 166 N.W. 202 (1918).
2255 N.M. 501, 236 P.2d 949 (1951).
Id. at 525, 236 P.2d at 964. (Emphasis added.) Huff should have
been strong authority for the Moore court in that the applicable sections
of the constitutions of Ohio and New Mexico are nearly identical. Huff
was based in part upon N.M. CONST. art. 2, § 11, forbidding that any
"preference be given by law to any religious denomination or mode of
worship." OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 7, provides that "no preference shall be
given, by law, to any religious society .... .
The Huff court relied extensively upon O'Connor v. Hendrick, 184 N.Y.
421, 77 N.E. 612 (1906), that upheld an administrative regulation pro-
hibiting the wearing of religious garb by public school teachers while teach-
ing. The court in O'Conmor said:
[T]he effect of the costume worn by these sisters of St. Joseph at all
times in the presence of their pupils would be to inspire respect if not
sympathy for the religious denomination to which they so manifestly
belong.
Id. at 428, 77 N.E. at 614 (1906).
See also Outcalt v. Hoefler, (unreported), Logan County Dist. Court,
Colo. (Aug. 1952), cited in Boyer, supra note 19, at 227 n.156; Harfst v.
Hoegan, 349 Mo. 808, 163 S.W.2d 609 (1942); State ex tel. Pub. School
Dist. v. Taylor, 122 Neb. 454, 240 N.W. 573 (1932).
See generally BOLES, THE BIBLE, RELIGION, AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
157-59 (1963); DIERENFIELD, RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
84-85 (1962); PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 412-27 (1953);
TORPEY, JUDICIAL DOCTRINES OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS 258-60 (1948). For a
close look at the church-state problems of Kentucky in education, see COL-
LIER, EDUCATION, RELIGION, AND THE KENTUCKY COURT or APPEALS(1960).
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There is merit to the Baumhover-Huff doctrine. The Moore
court, while indicating that the dress of the sisters did denote their
membership in a religious sect, felt that the garb itself did not teach
and that it merely represented "modesty, unworldliness, and an un-
selfish life."'24 It is true that the garb does not "teach" in the
traditional sense. Even courts adhering to the Hysong doctrine
would not allow the oral interjection of religious dogma into the
classroom by the teacher.25 Yet speech is only one form of com-
munication. In West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnett20 the
Supreme Court observed that "symbolism is a primitive but effec-
tive way of communicating ideas."27 Going further, the Court said
"the Church speaks through the Cross, the Crucifix, the altar and
shrine, and clerical raiment. Symbols of State often convey politi-
cal ideas just as religious symbols come to convey theological
ones."
28
The establishment clause is said to require a complete wall of
separation between church and state, thus compelling governmental
neutrality in regard to religion.29 It would seem difficult to main-
tain this neutrality if public school teachers are allowed to bring
their religion into the classroom by way of their religious habit.
The school is second only to the family in the development of the
child's personality, and the teacher plays an important role in the
influence of the school."0 Children seem to identify with the teacher
and to take on his characteristics.31 The result could be an inclina-
"'4 Ohio Misc. at 270, 212 N.E.2d at 841.
"2 See, e.g., Rawlings v. Butler, 290 S.W.2d 801, 804 (Ky. 1956). It is
difficult to believe that a nun could teach without openly interjecting her
religion into the classroom. See CUSHING, THE MISSION OF THE TEACHER
(1962).( 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
'
71d. at 632.8 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
"There is no Constitutional language per se calling for "a wall of
separation." This phrase was first used by Jefferson years after the adop-
tion of the first amendment. He declared its purpose was to create a wall
of separation. See Comment, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 73, 82 n.66 (1963). The
courts have quoted him extensively. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421 (1962); Illinois e-- rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203(1948); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
" BAUGHMAN & WELSH, PERSONALITY: A BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 226-35(1962). See also BERENDA, THE INFLUENCE OF THE GROUP ON THE JUDG-
MENTS OF CHILDREN (1950).
'
1 Amatora, Similarity in Teacher and Pupil Personality, 37 J. oF
PSYCHOLOGY 45 (1954). Cf. POUNDS & BRYNER, THE SCHOOL IN AMERICAN
SOCIETY 271 (1959). It seems that the younger the child is, the greater
influence the teacher has upon him. See BERENDA, op. cit. supra note 30.
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tion to favor the religion of the teacher, especially if the teacher
constantly keeps his or her religion before the child by means of
symbolic dress.
This problem could take on added complexity if the student
were of agnostic parentage or if the parents were adamantly op-
posed to the religion represented by the teacher. A somewhat
parallel situation was presented in Abington School Dist. v.
Schemp. 2 There the Supreme Court was in part concerned about
the well-being of the nonbelieving students who were subjected to
Bible reading as authorized by a state statute.3" The Court indicated
that the child who sought exemption from the Bible readings would
be treated as an "odd ball" and would be under peer group pressure
to conform to the beliefs of the majority. 4 Ohio has an education
statute requiring mandatory school attendance that in a sense creates
a captive audience for the teacher. 5 If the nonbelieving student
could be psychologically impaired by pressures resulting from the
daily recitation of the Bible, could not the conflicting pressures from
the home, from the group, and from the teacher clothed in religious
paraphenalia have at least an equal effect upon the student?
Apparently there has been no federal litigation regarding the
wearing of religious garb by public school teachers while teaching.36
If such litigation should occur, it is hoped that the Supreme Court
would follow its present trend requiring a complete separation of
church and state and adopt the minority rule, barring the wearing
of religious garb. Such rule would avoid favoritism of any religion
and could also alleviate any possible harmful effects to the students.
Tommy W. JARRETT
The Missouri Supreme Court in Berghorn v. Reorganized School Dist., 364
Mo. 121, 132, 260 S.W.2d 573, 578 (1953) (per curiam), said "children
of grade school age are under-developed and are particularly susceptible to
the influence of their teachers and surroundings and the actions of the
children with whom they are associated."
82 374 U.S. 203 (1963). See Hanft, The Prayer Decisions, 42 N.C.L.
REv. 567 (1962).
"
8PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 15-1516 (1962).
"374 U.S. at 289-91 nn. 68 & 69.
OirIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3321.03-.04 (Supp. 1965).
"The only time this problem has ever been encountered within the
federal government was by virtue of a regulation promulgated by the Com-
missioner of Indian Affairs in 1912. This regulation prohibited the wearing
of religious insignia and garb by teachers employed in the Indian schools.
A public controversy ensued, and President Taft permanently revoked the
regulation. See JoHNsoN & YOST, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
119-22 (1948).
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Constitutional Law-Retroactivity of Constitutional Decisions
In 1965, the United States Supreme Court in Griffin v. Cali-
fornia,' held that comment by the prosecutor or judge on the ac-
cused's silence at a state trial is violative of the fifth amendment as
applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment. In 1966,
in Tehan v. United States,2 the Court held that this no-comment
rule would not be applied retroactively to judgments that became
final prior to the 1965 opinion. How then do we reconcile the
application of one constitutional principle to pre-1965 criminal judg-
ments with the application of a different constitutional principle to
post-1965 judgments?
Under the common-law view, the question of whether to apply
a new judicial decision retroactively did not arise. The judge's role
was merely to declare the law, not to change it. If a prior decision
mistakenly declared the law, then a subsequent overruling decision
declared it to be no law.' Consequently, under this "declaratory
theory" the law remained constant; any overruling decision was, of
necessity, applied retroactively.
The inequities arising from strict adherence to the declaratory
theory led to several exceptions to the rule, especially where prospec-
tive limitation was deemed necessary to do fairness to a party.4
With general acceptance of the view that the court has discretion
to determine whether an overruling decision should operate retro-
actively or be limited prospectively,' the problem has become one of
line-drawing rather than one of across-the-board adoption of any
one theory.' The same development is also evident in decisions hold-
1380 U.S. 609 (1965).
* _ U.S.-, 86 Sup. Ct. 459 (1966).
"For if it be found that the former decision is manifestly absurd or
unjust, it is declared, not that such a sentence was bad law, but that it was
not law; that is, that it is not the established custom of the realm, as has
been erroneously determined." 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 70.
'See Note, 43 VA. L. REv. 1279, 1281, 1290 (1957).
' This is a case where a court has refused to make its ruling retroac-
tive, and the novel stand is taken that the constitution of the United
States is infringed by the refusal. We think the federal constitution
has no voice upon the subject. A state in defining the limits of ad-
herence to precedent may make a choice for itself between the princi-
ple of forward operation and that of relation backward.
Great No. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932).




However, there seems to have been an implied adoption of the
declaratory theory when the overruling decision expanded constitu-
tional protections accorded the criminally accused, i.e., when fairness
to a party seemed to support retroactive application. This implied
adoption resulted from a refusal by the Court to face squarely the
issue.8
In Eskridge v. Washington Prison Bd.,' in 1958, the Court, in
a per curiam decision, applied the rule that indigents on appeal must
be provided transcripts ° to a 1935 case with no discussion of the
retroactivity issue.
Again, in Norvell v. Illinois," the Court side-stepped the prob-
tutes judicial legislation. See, e.g., James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213,
224-25 (1960) (separate opinion of Black, J.).
" Compare, Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425 (1886), with Chicot
County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940). In
Norton, it was stated:
An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no right; it imposes
no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal
contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.
Norton v. Shelby County, supra at 442.
In Chicot County the same question was discussed as follows:
The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, [of
unconstitutionality] is an operative fact and may have consequences
which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased
by a new judicial declaration. . . . Questions of rights claimed to
have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have
finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of
the nature both of the statute and its previous application, demand
examination.
Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, supra at 374.
'Individual justices had foreseen the retroactivity problems in this area
and had urged the Court to take a stand. In Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956), which declared that due process required making necessary tran-
scripts available to indigents on appeal, Justice Frankfurter spoke for express
consideration of the issue as follows:
The Court ought neither to rely on casuistic arguments in denying
constitutional claims, nor deem itself imprisoned within a formal,
abstract dilemma. The judicial choice is not limited to a new ruling
necessarily retrospective, or to rejection of what the requirements of
equal protection of the laws, as now perceived, require. For sound
reasons, law generally speaks prospectively.... In arriving at a new
principle, the judicial process is not impotent to define its scope and
limits. . . . We should not indulge in the fiction that the law now
announced has always been the law and, therefore, that those who did
not avail themselves of it waived their rights. It is much more con-
ducive to law's self-respect to recognize candidly the considerations,
that give prospective content to a new pronouncement of law.
Griffin v. Illinois, supra at 25-26.
357 U.S. 214 (1958).
10 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
11373 U.S. 420 (1963).
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lem. Following Griffin v. Illinois, in which the Court declared that
due process required making necessary transcripts available to in-
digents on appeal, Illinois had, by statute, provided for free tran-
scripts to all indigents convicted prior to or after Griffin, but granted
the court authority to deny a petition for transcripts if the court
reporter be dead or unable to furnish the record. Norvell had been
convicted in 1941 and, because he could not afford transcripts, failed
to pursue an appeal. In 1956 he requested transcripts and was re-
fused because the reporter had died. No one could read the re-
porter's shorthand notes, and the trial testimony could not otherwise
be reconstructed. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the
denial of a new trial on the ground that Norvell had a lawyer at
the trial and failed to pursue his remedy at that time. This un-
reasoned modification of what had been done summarily in Esk-
ridge was attacked by Justices Goldberg and Stewart in a vigorous
dissent.
Griffin was a constitutional decision vindicating basic Fourteenth
Amendment rights and is no more to be restricted in scope or
application in time than other constitutional judgments. This,
it seems to me, is the clear import of this Court's decision in
Eskridge v. Washington .... 12
An opportunity to meet the retroactivity question was again
avoided in Pickelsimer v. Wainwright,3 where the Court summarily
applied with no discussion, Gideon v. Wainwright"4 retroactively.
This remained the situation until a decison finally spoke to the
issue and established the framework within which subsequent argu-
ments for retroactivity in this field are to be evaluated. The decision
in Linkletter v. Walker;1r5 it held that the Mapp v. Ohio'G exclu-
sionary rule would not be applied retroactivelyY7
After noting that "heretofore, without discussion, we have ap-
"Id. at 425 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
13375 U.S. 2 (1963). Justice Harlan dissented in Pickelsimer on the
ground that the Court should address itself expressly to the problem of
retroactivity.
1' 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (indigent's right to counsel declared).
10381 U.S. 618 (1965).
10 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding illegally-seized evidence not admissible
at trial).
" It should be noted that the exclusionary rule was not limited to com-
plete prospective application; it was applied to the Mapp case itself as well
as to all cases pending on appeal at the time Mapp was decided.
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plied new constitutional rules to cases finalized before the promulga-
tion of the rule,"' 8 the Court proceeded to enumerate the factors
upon which it was now going to base its line drawing.
Once the premise is accepted that we are neither required to
apply, nor prohibited from applying, a decision retrospectively,
we must then weigh the merits and demerits in each case by look-
ing to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and
effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard
its operation. 19
The main thrust of the opinion seems to have centered on the
purpose argument. Viewed on this level, the exclusionary rule is
necessary merely as an effective deterrent to illegal police action.
Consequently, retroactive application of the rule would not serve
to further the purpose of the rule, nor could it restore "the ruptured
privacy of the victims' homes and effects."2
Continuing this pragmatic approach, the Court noted the terrible
impact retroactive application would have upon the judicial ma-
chinery. The Court's concern for the problems inherent in new
trials in which witnesses and evidence may be unavailable and with
the increased burden upon trial dockets seems reminiscent of the
Norvell result. However, the Court apparently incorporated an ad-
ditional factor into its administration of justice argument, i.e., the
fact that in Linkletter "there is no likelihood of unreliability or coer-
cion present .. .""' The Court's statement that "to thus legitimate
such an extraordinary procedural weapon that has no bearing on
guilt would seriously disrupt the administration of justice"2 2 would
seem to imply that if the procedure had a "bearing on guilt," the
administration of justice would not be deemed disrupted by retro-
active application. The net result seems to be that hardship on the
judiciary becomes a relevant argument for prospective limitation
only if it is first determined that the newly announced constitutional
" 381 U.S. at 628.
10 Id. at 629.
20 Id. at 637.
" Id. at 638. This emphasis on the reliability of the guilt-determining
process seems also to have played an important part, independent of the other
criteria, in providing a ground for distinguishing the Gideon and Griffin
line of cases, which had applied new rules retroactively in situations where
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principle has no bearing on the reliability of the guilt-determining
process. Such a distinction seems very dubious.m
Finally, the Court gave some credence to the fact that the states
had relied upon the Wolf v. Colorado24 decision holding the exclu-
sionary rule was not required by the fourteenth amendment. In
speaking of the states' "vested interest" in sustaining prior decisions,
the Court relied upon cases involving individual interests, 25 even
though it would seem very difficult to view the states as having a
vested interest in keeping a man incarcerated.
Justice Black's dissent in Linkletter warrants mention here be-
cause it was adopted by him in Tehan. In attacking what he con-
sidered to be discrimination against Linkletter solely because his
trial proceeded more swiftly than did Miss Mapp's, Justice Black
noted his failure to understand "why those who suffer from the
use of evidence secured by a search and seizure in violation of the
Fourth Amendment should be treated differently from those who
have been denied other guarantees of the Bill of Rights."2" In
attacking the purpose argument, he noted that the exclusionary rule
is more than a mere punishment against police officers ;27 it is also
a right accorded the accused,2 8 a right that the Mapp decision itself
"8 Gideon itself did not rely upon any showing of prejudice resulting
from the denial of counsel. Currier, Tivie and Change in Judge-Made
Law: Prospective Overruling, 51 VA. L. REv. 201, 270 (1965). Unfortu-
nately, the Court seems to have equated "fairness of trial" with the reli-
ability of the guilt-determining process. It stated: "Finally, in each of the
- areas in which we have applied our rule retrospectively the principle
that we applied went to the fairness of the trial-the very integrity of the
fact-finding process." 381 U.S. at 639.
24338 U.S. 25 (1949).
"
5See 381 U.S. at 627.
" Id. at 646. In support of his position that there should be no such
distinction, justice Black relied upon the following language from Mapp:
[W]e can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise.
Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other
basic rights secured by the Due Process Clause, we can no longer
permit it to be revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the
name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961). (Emphasis added.)
"7 The inference I gather from these repeated statements is that the
rule is not a right or privilege accorded to defendants charged with
crime but is a sort of punishment against officers in order to keep
them from depriving people of their constitutional rights. In passing
I would say that if that is the sole purpose, reason, object and effect
of the rule, the court's action in adopting it sounds more like law-
making than construing the Constitution.
381 U.S. at 649.
8 This was the position taken by the Ninth Circuit.
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had recognized might lead to the release of some criminals. 9 On
the increased burden retroactive application might place upon the
judicial system, Justice Black merely stated his view that the argu-
ment is no more applicable to Linkletter than it was in the decisions
growing out of Gideon and Griffin v. Illinois. In conclusion, Justice
Black addressed himself to the reliance argument as follows:
No State should be considered to have a vested interest in keep-
ing prisoners in jail who were convicted because of lawless con-
duct by the State's officials. Careful analysis of the Court's
opinion shows that it rests on the premise that a State's assumed
interest in sustaining convictions obtained under the old repudi-
ated rule outweighs the interests both of that State and of the
individuals convicted in having wrongful convictions set aside.30
Notwithstanding these objections, 1 the majority opinion in
Linkletter seems to establish the following criteria for determina-
tion of retroactivity.
(1) Line drawing will be applied on the question of retroactivity
to decisions broadening the constitutional rights of criminal defen-
dants.
(2) The relevant factors to be considered in drawing the line
are the degree of state reliance upon the prior rule, the purpose of
the newly announced rule, the effect retroactive application would
have upon the attainment of this purpose and the effect of retro-
activity upon the efficient administration of justice.
(3) If the new rule does not go to the "fairness of the trial-
We agree that the underlying policy objective of the doctrine of ex-
clusion is to deter. The doctrine of exclusion is nevertheless a Con-
stitutional privilege of the victim, and its status as such is not altered
by identification of its purpose.
California v. Hurst, 325 F.2d 891, 895 (9th Cir. 1963).
" "In some cases this will undoubtedly be the result .... The criminal
goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can de-
stroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws,
or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
30 381 U.S. at 652-53.
"An additional objection has been voiced by some commentators that
the retroactivity problem is an "illusion." Relying upon the language of
the federal habeas corpus statute that the writ is available to state prisoners
who are "in custody in violation of the Constitution of the United States,"
28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (3), these writers argue that the petition puts in issue
only present confinement under present standards and that the legality of
the initial incarceration is in no way relevant. See United States v. Fay,
333 F.2d 12, 25 (2d Cir. 1964) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Meador, Habeas
Corpas and The "Retroactivity" Illusion, 50 VA. L. REv. 1115 (1964).
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the very integrity of the fact-finding process,"8 2 then it seems that
it will not be applied retroactively.
Putting aside the propriety of the Linkletter rule, was it, as
announced, properly applied in the Tehan situation?
In Twining v. New Jersey,3' it was held that the federal consti-
tution did not require the states to accord criminal defendants the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Then, in 1963,
over fifty years later, Twining was overruled, and it was held that
the privilege against self-incrimination is protected by the four-
teenth amendment against abridgment by the states.3 4 Two years
later, Griffin v. California3 5 held that the fifth amendment forbade
comment on the accused's silence.
Griffin is important to the analysis of Tehan for its statement
of the basis upon which the no-comment rule is established. The
Court seems to have made it clear that allowing comment had a
direct bearing upon the integrity of the guilt-determining process.
It is not every one who can safely venture on the witness stand,
though entirely innocent of the charge against him. Excessive
timidity,. nervousness when facing others and attempting to ex-
plain transactions of a suspicious character and offenses charged
against him will often confuse and embarrass him to such a de-
gree as to increase rather than remove prejudices against him.
It is not every one, however honest, who would, therefore, will-
ingly be placed on the witness stand.36
The Court in Griffin also viewed the comment rule as a "remnant
of the 'inquisitorial system,' ",17 and as an attempt, while recogniz-
ing the accused's privilege against self-incrimination with one
breath, to penalize its assertion with the next. 8
The Court in Tehan was quick to note these multi-purposes of
2 381 U.S. at 639.
--211 U.S. 78 (1908).
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1963).
*"380 U.S. 609 (1965).8 Id. at 613.
87 Id. at 614. The Court disposed of the argument that the jury will
infer guilt from silence even though no comment be allowed as follows:
"What the jury may infer, given no help from the court, is one thing.
What it may infer when the court solemnizes the silence of the accused
into evidence against him is quite another." Ibid.
"8 "It [comment] is a penalty imposed by the courts for exercising a
constitutional privilege. It cuts down on the privilege by making its asser-
tion costly." Ibid.
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the rule against compulsory self-incrimination. 9 Equally swiftly,
it identified the "basic purpose" behind the privilege to be the pres-
ervation of the accusatorial system, stating that the basic purposes
of the privilege "do not relate to protecting the innocent from con-
viction."40 Then, by what appears to be somewhat doubtful reason-
ing, the Court stated that since all the states had granted the
testimonial privilege against self-incrimination prior to Griffin, any
variations in the application of the privilege "did not go to the basic
purposes of the federal privilege."'i Finally, the Court stated that
as the privilege related to "our respect for the inviolability of the
human personality,"42 retroactive application could not remedy the
already consummated intrusion. Thus, since the privilege is "not
an adjunct to the ascertainment of truth,"4 3 but merely represents
values reflecting our concern for the "right of each individual to
be let alone," 44 the Court apparently viewed itself as clearly within
the Linkletter rationale.
4 5
" The Court, in a footnote, quoted at length from a 1964 opinion written
by Justice Goldberg:
It [privilege against self-incrimination] reflects many of our funda-
mental values and most noble aspirations: our unwillingness to subject
those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation,
perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than
an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incrimi-
nating statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses;
our sense of fair play . . . ; our respect for the inviolability of the
human personality and of the right of each individual "to a private
enclave where he may lead a private life," . . . ; our distrust of self-
deprecating statements; and our realization that the privilege, while
sometimes "a shelter to the guilty," is often "a protection to the
innocent."
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).0Tehan v. United States, - U.S. -, 86 Sup. Ct. 459, 464 (1966).
"Ibid. But see Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965), where
it is stated: "For comment on the refusal to testify is a remnant of the
'inquisitorial system of criminal justice,' . . . which the Fifth Amendment
outlaws."
4Tehan v. United States, - U.S. - , 86 Sup. Ct. 459, 465 (1966).
'8 Ibid.
"Ibid.
The impact of retroactive application upon the administration of justice
in those states that had relied upon Twining v. New Jersey, apparently six
in number in 1960, was felt to be "so devastating as to need no elaboration."
U.S. - , 86 Sup. Ct. at 467. It should be noted, however, that in
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947), five justices felt that the fifth
amendment forbade comment; but, Justice Frankfurter believed the fifth
not applicable to the states through the fourteenth and thus made the
majority for holding the comment practice constitutional. Consequently, re-
liance upon Twining would appear, at least no more warranted than was
the reliance upon Wolf v. Colorado.
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That which Linkletter implied, Tehan has apparently confirmed,
i.e., the approach to retroactivity in decisions expanding the consti-
tutional rights of the criminally accused is to be pragmatic with
emphasis on the practical reverberations in light of the one domi-
nant objective sought by the new rule. Such an approach, at least
in the Tehan situation, does not seem appropriate.
The mere fact that the declaratory theory has been discarded
would not seem adequate reason for completely ignoring one of the
apparent considerations behind the rule. Professor Mishkin has ex-
pressed the role of the declaratory theory as follows:
[T]he 'declaratory theory' expresses a symbolic concept of the
judicial process on which much of courts' prestige and power
depend. This is the strongly held and deeply felt belief that
judges are bound by a body of fixed, overriding law, that they
apply that law impersonally as well as impartially, that they exer-
cise no individual choice and have no program of their own to
advance.... [T]his symbolic view of courts is a major factor in
securing respect for, and obedience to, judicial decisions. If the
view be in part myth, it is a myth by which we live and which
can be sacrificed only at substantial cost; consider, for example,
the loss involved if judges could not appeal to the idea that is 'the
law' or 'the Constitution'-and not they personally-who com-
mand a given result.46
It would seem that when constitutional rights are in issue-
when the rights in issue are pregnant with the ethical judgments
that are involved in due process and fair trial discussions-the
appropriateness of this declaratory theory concept is strengthened.41
Society, with its sense of the eternalness and all-inclusiveness of
ethical judgments, is likely to view any overruling decision as an
admission of past error, rather than as a creative exercise of the
judicial power to adopt to changed conditions 4s--that which is due
process for Mr. Griffin should also be due process for Mr. Tehan.
Consequently, the values of equality of treatment and the image of
justice, if not controlling in such situations, merit, it would seem,
at least some recognition by the Court in its line-drawing exercise.40
" Mishkin, The High Court, The Great Writ, and The Due Process of
Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REv. 56, 62 (1965).
" See Comment, 16 RUTGERS L. REv. 587 (1962).
"8 Currier, Time and Change in Judge-Made Law: Prospective Over-
ruling, 51 VA. L. REv. 201, 257 (1965).
' See Ibid.
[Vol. 441104
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Considerations of stability, reliance and the efficiency of the admin-
istration of justice seem insufficient in themselves to support arbi-
trarily drawing a line between cases pending and those finally
decided.5
Nevertheless, it might be argued that the Linkletter result is
supportable upon the policy for finality of judgments as it reflects
concern for the efficient administration of justice. Thus, retro-
activity would be applied only when the new constitutional standard
was intended to improve the reliability of the guilt-determining
process.5 Since the exclusionary rule was deemed to be not so
conceived, the refusal to allow collateral attack on the prior judg-
ment through habeas corpus is, it is argued, justified.52
Assuming that this rationale is that which was intended by the
purpose and judicial administration arguments of Linkletter, the
standard still seems improperly applied in Tehan. By construing
"purpose" to mean "dominant objective," the Court, in Tehan, ap-
parently ignored the Griffin statements that the no-comment rule
did serve, among other purposes, to assure the reliability of the
guilt-determining process. 53 Where Linkletter had drawn a distinc-
tion between the right to counsel and the right to be protected against
illegal search and seizure, Tehan has now apparently drawn a dis-
tinction between the various elements of the single right against
compulsory self-incrimination dependent solely upon what is per-
ceived to be the dominant purpose of the individual element of the
privilege in issue. It is submitted that in treating the no-comment
rule as unrelated to the reliability of the guilt-determining process
and in giving controlling weight to considerations of dominant ob-
jective, reliance and judicial efficiency, the Court in Tehan reached
an unwise result and in broadening the already doubtful base of
"0 See Mishkin, supra note 46, at 72-76.
" See Id. at 87.
"2 It would seem at least arguable that since across-the-board retroac-
tivity might stifle the development of new legal principles, some such basis
for line drawing is warranted.
"' Although Professor Mishkin agreed with the Linkletter result, he be-
lieved that Tehan required retroactive application.
Yet, though other factors may predominate, unless the court is willing
to treat the asserted purpose of assuring the reliability of the guilt-
determining process as insubstantial-which would seem virtually im-
possible in the face of Griffin v. California-the present requirements
would ... be applicable to all past convictions.
Id. at 94.
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Linkletter allowed practical considerations to overcome considera-
tions of justice and equality.
Fairness of trial would seem not to depend solely upon the ac-
curacy of the ultimate determination of guilt or innocence. As Miss
Mapp, Mr. Gideon and Mr. Griffin were deprived of certain elements
of the ritual to which we refer as a "fair trial," so also was Mr.
Tehan deprived. On this ground, there appears to be no distinc-
tion. Neither would a valid distinction between Mr. Gideon and
Mr. Tehan seem permissible on the ground of accuracy of verdict.
Consequently, the Tehan result appears to be based upon an
argument geared to support a preconceived decision against retro-
activity, pleaded as a purpose argument but actually sounding in
flooding the courts. In so extending the pragmatic approach, the
Court has apparently lost sight of the remaining relevance of the
theoretical approach based upon equality for persons similarly
situated, equal protection of the laws and the often crucial image
of judicial fairness.
How then do we reconcile the application of one constitutional
principle to pre-1965 criminal judgments with the application of a
different principle to post-1965 judgments? In Mr. Tehan's case,
we can do so neither upon the basis of precedent nor of sound
judicial policy.
ROBERT 0. KLEPFER, JR.
Corporations-1965 Amendment to the North Carolina Business
Corporation Act
The following comments concern the changes in the North
Carolina Business Corporation Act of 1955, Chapter 55 of the
General Statutes, made by the 1965 General Assembly.
I. INSPECTION RIGHTS
Section 55-38 was amended by adding a new provision blocking
shareholders of banks from inspecting "deposit records or loan rec-
ords of a bank customer, except upon order of a court of competent
jurisdiction for good cause shown."' This enactment obviously re-
sponds to the effort in Cooke v. Outland2 to reach such records,
'N.C. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 609, adding new subsection (i) to N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 55-38 (1965).
265 N.C. 601, 144 S.E.2d 835 (1965).
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although the legislation is not retroactive and thus does not affect
that litigation. Although the new provision was doubtlessly moti-
vated by the banking community's alarm over shareholder access
to corporate records-and thus to some degree reflects the disposi-
tion of banks to curtail the information available to shareholders-
it nevertheless achieves a sound balancing of the interests of share-
holders on the one hand and of depositors and borrowers on the
other in subjecting to court supervision the right of shareholders to
obtain certain classes of documents.
The amendment does not generally affect the application of the
inspection-right provisions of the corporation law to banks nor does
it eliminate the shareholder's right to inspect deposit and loan rec-
ords. What it does is to remove two types of corporate documents
from the phrase "books and records of account" which, under the
corporation law, may be inspected as of right by any shareholder,
with the corporation carrying the burden of proving that the share-
holder has no proper purpose.3 It is doubtful that records of loans
and deposit, which do have a confidential aspect, should be avail-
able as of right, with a penalty imposed on the bank officer who
refuses to furnish them. However, Cooke v. Outland, the decision
that this statute overturns for the future, had correctly read the
phrase "books and records of account" to include such bank records
instead of adopting a strained construction of the statute that would
put them outside this inclusive category.
The effect of the amendment, then, is to throw loan and deposit
records into the category of documents which may be inspected
only on court order and on proof by a shareholder of his proper
purpose.4 Stated otherwise, the confidential character of the records
overrides a shareholder's inspection as of right, but the documents
may be available after a court has determined the shareholder's
reasons and objectives. In contrast to the "proper purpose" stan-
dard generally applicable under section 55-38(f), the new test is
framed in terms of "good cause shown." It is to be assumed, al-
though the statute is not clear on this, (1) that the shareholder
bears the burden of proving good cause, and (2) that "good cause"
is a stricter standard than "proper purpose." Perhaps the difference,
if any, is that "proper purpose" focuses more on a shareholder's
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-38(b) (1965).
'See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-38(f) (1965).
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motive and purposes, while "good cause" directs attention to objec-
tive factors and the reasonableness of the request.
II. COMPULSORY DIVIDENDS
Section 55-50 authorizes holders of at least twenty per cent of
the shares of any stock class to compel payment of up to one-third
of the "net profits" for a given accounting period, "allocable to
[shares of] that class." 5 This statutory procedure for forcing divi-
dends is in addition to, rather than in lieu of, traditional equity
jurisdiction to compel declaration of dividends unreasonably with-
held." In 1965 subsection 55-50(i) was amended to make the pro-
vision inapplicable to "any corporation having total assets of one
million dollars ($1,000,000) or more and whose shareholders num-
ber seven hundred and fifty (750) or more."7 The evident purpose
is to relieve larger corporations from possibly vexatious suits by
shareholders seeking larger dividends, not to mention the fact that
a compulsory dividend policy such as the statute prescribes would
by exceedingly inconvenient to these corporations (as well as many
others not so exempted). The author of this comment has criticized
the compulsory dividend provision and welcomes any effort directed
at removing the specific mathematical formula which makes divi-
dend payments automatically enforceable and substituting as the
exclusive test the sound "equitable" rule that directors may not
withhold dividends unreasonably or for some unlawful purpose.,
In one respect, the new statute is a curiosity. Its language is
obviously derived from section 12(g) (1) (A) of the federal Securi-
ties Acts Amendments of 1964.0 The major thrust of the far-reach-
ing amendments is to extend the protection" hitherto available only
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-50(i) (1965). With certain limitations, the
general rule is that the amount of dividends that must be paid is the differ-
ence between the amount paid during the relevant accounting period and
one-third of "net profits" for that period allocable to shares of the class
seeking the additional payout. "Net profits" receives a special definition
in the first sentence of section 55-50(i.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-50(j) (1965).
'N.C. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 726.
'See Folk, Revisiting the North Carolina Corporation Law, 43 N.C.L.
REv. 768, 843-45 (1965).
' Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78l(g) (1) (A) (1964).
10 Briefly stated, the 1964 amendments require corporations subject to
the act to register their securities with the Securities Exchange Commis-
sion, § 12(g) (1); to make periodic reports to the SEC, § 13; to conform
to federal standards as to proxy solicitation or, if proxies are not solicite.,
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to shareholders of corporations whose securities are listed on a
national securities exchange to all corporations (with exceptions)
meeting certain specific statutory standards as to asset size and
number of shareholders. These corporations are the large "over-
the-counter corporations," that is, corporations whose shares are
traded more or less regularly on securities markets maintained by
brokers and dealers.'1 Cannon Mills and Lance, Incorporated, are
examples of local corporations in this category. The federal law
took effect in two stages: Initially it applied to corporations with
$1,000,000 dollars or more of assets whose equity securities of any
class are held of record by at least 750 persons ;12 a year later it
became applicable to corporations with 500 shareholders of record,
the asset test remaining unchanged.'3
The North Carolina statute is obviously intended to afford the
compulsory dividend exemption to corporations subject to the fed-
eral requirements, or at least one infers so from the close similarity
of language. Curiously enough, the state amendment is framed so
that it applies only to those corporations that immediately became
subject to the federal statute, that is, corporations with 1,000,000-
dollar assets and 750 shareholders, but not to those that are now
subject to the more expansive coverage of the statute-those with
500 to 750 shareholders. It is difficult to see why state law would
make this distinction. Presumably if corporations with 750 or more
shareholders can safely be left to manage their dividend policies,
subject only to the "equitable" test, those with 500 to 750 share-
holders equally can be trusted. The point is simply that the North
Carolina amendment makes an irrational cut.'4 Since it chose not
to go all the way and eliminate the compulsory dividend provision
but instead seemingly aped the federal definition, it would have been
more sensible to make the state law exemption coterminous with
to furnish shareholders with information comparable to that going out with
proxy statements, § 14. The provision for recovering short-swing profits
by insiders now applies to officers, directors, and 10% shareholders of cor-
porations subject to the act. § 16.
"1 This, incidentally, is a definition recognized in the North Carolina
Business Corporation Act. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-73(b) (1965).
12 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 781(g) (1) (A) (1964).
1" Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 781(9) (1) (B) (1964).
"This is not to say that the federal test of 500 shareholders is more
rational. Any such cut-off point is bound to be arbitrary, and a good case
can be made for cutting it at a lower figure such as 200 or 300 shareholders.
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the federal provision. Moreover, the North Carolina amendment
is ambiguously worded. Unlike the federal provision which specifies
500 or 750 shareholders "of record"-a provision now interpreted
by Securities Exchange Commission regulation'--the North Caro-
lina statute leaves the matter open, so that one does not know whether
or not to count the beneficial owners of shares held of record by a
nominee. Thus if a broker owns of record shares for twenty-five
customers it is uncertain whether this counts as one or as twenty-
five shareholders. Absent some strongly persuasive reason to the
contrary, to the extent corporate rights and obligations depend upon
counting shareholders, the test should refer to shareholders of rec-
ord. Otherwise, the corporation is inconvenienced in trying to get
information concerning beneficial owners and may in fact never be
able to obtain it.'
Thus, this faultily drafted amendment should be corrected in at
least two respects: (1) it should exempt corporations with 500
(rather than 750) shareholders, and (2) it should specifically refer
to shareholders of record. It would be better, however, to delete
all of section 55-50(i) and leave compulsory dividends to the tradi-
tional equity test rather than to erect an automatically applicable
formula, even though it is limited to relatively small corporations.
III. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
Section 55-14 'T and section 55-142s detail the procedure for
corporations, domestic and foreign respectively, to change their
registered office or agent or both, by executing and filing a statement
of the change. Since many corporations are represented by a single
agent, either an attorney or a corporation service company, it is
worthwhile to authorize a simple method by which the agent itself
may file a single document reflecting the change of the corporation's
registered office to a different address. A 1965 amendment", adding
a new subsection (e) to section 55-14 (domestic corporations) and
1 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7492, January 5, 1965.
" In a different context, the Supreme Court of Delaware recently stated
that "the corporation is entitled to confine itself to dealing with registered
stockholders in intracorporate affairs such as mergers; it should avoid be-
coming involved in the affairs of registered stockholders vis-A-vis beneficial
owners. . . ." Olivetti Underwood Corp. v. Jacques Coe & Co., 217 A.2d
683, 686 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1966).
'
7 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14 (1965).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-142 (1965).
10 N.C. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 298.
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a new subsection (d) to section 55-142 (foreign corporations) per-
mits the agent to handle this matter. It is of limited interest, but
of considerable utility to agents serving corporations by furnishing
a registered office and agency.
A 1965 amendment20 added, to the tail-end of the Uniform
Stock Transfer Act, a new section 55-97.1 authorizing stock trans-
fer through transfers and pledges of shares within a central deposi-
tory system, such as the New York Stock Exchange has available
through its Clearing Corporation. The provision is identical with
section 8-320 of the Uniform Commercial Code which was adopted
when the Code was enacted in North Carolina.21 Since the Code
will be effective July 1, 1967, it is difficult to see why the same
language was added to the corporation law, especially as a dangling
appendix to the soon-to-be-repealed Stock Transfer Act, unless pos-
sibly it was intended to make immediately effective this new and
sophisticated mode of transfer.
ERNEST L. FOLK, III*
Corporations-Stock Options-Validity and Federal Tax
Requirements
The stock option plan as an incentive device for key corporate
personnel has come into widespread use. Although the prime factor
for the growth of such plans in the corporate community has been
the favorable tax treatment of the proceeds, compliance with the
requirements of the Internal Revenue Code provisions,' necessary
to obtain capital gains rates, is not per se sufficient to insure the
validity under state law of a plan challenged by a minority stock-
holder.2 Thu.s, a corporation seeking to adopt an option plan must
20 N.C. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 843..
21N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-8-320 (1965).
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
"INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 421-425.
".[S]ince, under the Internal Revenue Code, the favored position with
respect to options granted as part of compensation to corporate offi-
cials can be obtained only if the options are exercised while in the
corporation's employ, the result will be to persuade the optionees to
remain in the corporation's employ. Even if the inferences . . . are
justified, they are dependent entirely upon the present state of the
federal taxing policy and, as such, too insecure in nature to be re-
garded as a condition of the stock option plan designed to insure
that the corporation will receive the contemplated benefit.
Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, 33 Del. Ch. 69, 77, 90 A.2d 652, 657(Sup. Ct. 1952).
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recognize the requirements of local corporation statutes' as well as
the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code if the plan is to achieve
its desired effect.
4
The courts have been reluctant to prescribe a set of minimum
requirements' by which a corporation can insure the plan will not
be invalidated if attacked as a waste of corporate assets6 or as un-
reasonable compensation. It is clear that there must be at least legal
consideration to the corporation for the grant of the options." Ac-
quiring and retaining key personnel' and securing contracts of em-
ployment' are the two most common benefits received by the corpo-
ration, and the presence of either is usually deemed sufficient
consideration to support the grant of the options.
The Delaware courts have abandoned testing the validity of
stock options solely on the basis of legal consideration in the con-
' Controversy resulting from the issuance of stock option plans by cor-
porations upon the approval of the board of directors and stockholders in-
volves the internal affairs of the corporation and is therefore governed by
the laws of the state of the corporation's origin. E.g., Gaynor v. Buckley,
318 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1963); Beard v. Elster, 39 Del. Ch. 153, 160 A.2d
731 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
' Stock options may be granted for reasons other than the receipt of
capital gains rates. For a discussion of the tax treatment of "non-statutory"
stock options, those not specifically sanctioned by the Internal Revenue Code,
see generally Edwards, Executive Compensation: The Taxation of Stock
Options, 13 VAND. L. REv. 475 (1960). See also 44 GEO. L.J. 426 (1956);
35 N.C.L. Rav. 160 (1956).
'No rule of thumb can be devised to test the sufficiency of the condi-
tions which are urged as insurance that the corporation will receive
the contemplated benefit. The most that can be said is that in each
case there must be some element which, within reason, can be ex-
pected to lead to the desired end. What that element may be can well
differ in each case.
Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, 33 Del. Ch. 69, 76, 90 A.2d 652, 657
(Sup. Ct. 1952).
Where a gift or waste of corporate assets is concerned, shareholder
ratification is not effective against the protest of a minority stockholder.
Shareholder ratification to be effective in these circumstances must be
unanimous. Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 591 (1933). Accord, Kaufman v.
Shoenburg, 33 Del. Ch. 211, 91 A.2d 786 (Ch. 1952); Rosenthal v. Burry
Biscuit Corp., 30 Del. Ch. 299, 60 A.2d 106 (Ch. 1948).
'5 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CoRPoRATIoNs § 2143 (Rev. ed. 1952)
[hereinafter cited as FLETCHER].
Rosenthal v. Burry Biscuit Corp., 30 Del. Ch. 299, 60 A.2d 106 (Ch.
1948); 5 FLETCHER § 2142.
'See Wise v. Universal Corp., 93 F. Supp. 393 (D. Del. 1950); Olson
Bros. v. Englehart, 211 A.2d 610 (Del. Ch. 1965); Sandier v. Schenley
Indus., Inc., 32 Del. Ch. 46, 79 A.2d 606 (Ch. 1951); Eliasburg v. Standard
Oil Co., 23 N.J. Super. 431, 92 A.2d 862 (Ch. 1952).
10 See Wyles v. Campbell, 77 F. Supp. 343 (D. Del. 1948); Forman v.
Chesler, 39 Del. Ch. 484, 167 A.2d 442 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
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tract sense, adopting instead a rule based on benefit to the corpora-
tion. The rule, first announced in the leading case of Kerbs v. Cali-
fornia Eastern Airways,:" has been stated as follows:
Each stock option must be tested against the requirements that it
contains conditions, or that surrounding circumsances are such,
that the corporation may reasonably expect to receive the con-
templated benefit from the grant of the options, and there must be
a reasonable relationship between the value of the benefits pass-
ing to the corporation and the value of the options granted.12
The presence of the legal consideration is partial but not conclusive
assurance that the corporation will receive the benefit it expects to
gain from the issuance of the options.
In the Kerbs case a stock option plan was adopted by an inter-
ested board, five of the eight directors ultimately benefiting under
the plan. The proposal, approved by a majority of the stockholders,' 3
provided that the options were to be exercisable at any time within
a five-year period and, in addition, could be exercised for a period
of six months after the termination of the optionee's employment.
In invalidating the plan, challenged by a minority shareholder as
being without consideration to the corporation, the court found the
fact that the optionee could have resigned and still exercised his
option rights in toto did not reasonably insure that the corporation
would receive the contemplated benefit-the retention of the services
of the employee.
Although Kerbs stood on a lack of consideration to the corpora-
tion, the Delaware court indicated that, had consideration been
present, it would investigate the reasonable relationship between the
value of the options granted and the value of the services rendered
even where the plan had been ratified by a majority of the stock-
holders. 4 This approach, which amounts to judicial review of the
1133 Del. Ch. 69, 90 A.2d 652 (Sup. Ct. 1952); Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d
839 (1954). See generally Dean, Employee Stock Options, 66 HAR. L. REV.
1403 (1952). See also Dwight, Employee Stock Options: The Clydesdale
Rule, 52 CoLum. L. REv. 1003 (1952); 62 YALE L.J. 84 (1952).1 Olson Bros. v. Englehart, 211 A.2d 610, 612 (Del. Ch. 1965).
1" Ratification by a majority of the stockholders cures any voidable defect
in the action of the board of directors and is effective for all purposes
unless the action of the directors constitutes a gift of corporate assets or
is ultra vires, illegal, or fraudulent. See Keenan v. Eshleman, 23 Del. Ch.
234, 2 A.2d 904 (Sup. Ct. 1938); 5 FLETCHER § 2139.
"" Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, 33 Del. Ch. 69, 75, 90 A.2d 652,
656 (Sup. Ct. 1952). See note 13 supra.
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business judgment of the directors, was even more evident in
Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp.,'5 decided simultaneously with
Kerbs. In reversing summary judgment for the defendant corpora-
tion, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the interested board
must satisfy the court that the option was as favorable a bargain
to the corporation as if the directors had been dealing with outsiders.
On rehearing, however, the court rested the burden of proof as to
the reasonable relation between the values of the options granted
and benefits received on the directors only absent shareholder ratifi-
cation, noting that such approval would not preclude a judicial in-
quiry into the adequacy of consideration to the corporation where
the board of directors was interested.16
The term "consideration" as used in the Kerbs and Gottlieb
decisions is somewhat misleading, since it is apparent that there
must be something more than the proverbial "peppercorn." In Beard
v. Elster,17 the Delaware Supreme Court clarified the meaning of
consideration as applied to stock options, noting that the use of this
term in Kerbs
was possibly ill-advised since it is regarded, apparently, by some
as a measurable quid pro quo .... It, of course, by the very
nature of things cannot be that. It is incapable of measurement
except in terms of business judgment that the plan will spur em-
ployees on to greater efforts which in the long run will benefit
the corporation.' 8
The Beard case, a pivitol decision in this area, applied to stock
options the traditional Delaware policy of generously recognizing
1 33 Del. Ch. 82, 90 A.2d 660 (Sup. Ct. 1952), on reargument, 33 Del.
Ch. 177, 91 A.2d 57 (Sup. Ct. 1952); 101 U. PA. L. REv. 407.
" On a motion for summary judgment by the defendants in a stockhold-
er's action, the burden of proof, absent shareholder ratification, is on the
interested directors to show to the court's satisfaction that the directors
did, in fact, act in utmost good faith and exercised scrupulous fairness. The
plaintiff does not have the burden of coming forward with further evidence
to demonstrate that there was a genuine issue of material fact relating to
the question of fairness until the moving defendant has discharged his
burden of negating the plaintiff's claim of unfairness. If the stockholders
ratified the plan,- the burden of proof on the directors is reduced to showing
that the terms of the plan were not so unbalanced as to amount to waste
or that the question is such a close one factually as to fall within the realm
of sound business judgment. Alcott v. Hymen, 40 Del. Ch. 449, 208 A.2d
501 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
1739 Del. Ch. 153, 160 A.2d 731 (Sup. Ct. 1960); 2 BosToN COLLEGE
INDUSTRIAL & COmmERCIAL L. REv. 405 (1961); 6 How. L.. 213 (1960).
'a1d. at 160, 160 A.2d at 736.
1114 [Vol. 44
19661 STOCK OPTIONS 1115
the business judgment of the directors. Prior to Beard the Delaware
courts had not clearly recognized incentive as sufficient benefit to
the corporation to support an option.19 However, the courts had
viewed incentive as the motivation for granting options but had
required a showing that existing conditions or circumstances rea-
sonably insured that the corporation would, in fact, receive the con-
templated benefit.2" Rather than conclude that incentive was not
sufficient benefit to the corporation, the court placed the burden of
proof on the objector to show that there was no reasonable relation
between the values of the options granted and the services ren-
dered.2' Absent such a showing, the proper solution was to accept
the bona fide business judgment of the directors.22
This view was carried to its logical conclusion in Olson Bros., v.
Englehart.23 The interested board of a derelict corporation, termed
an "empty shell' 2 by the court, adopted an option plan later ratified
by a majority of the stockholders. The court upheld the validity of
the options even though several directors seeking to exercise them
were no longer employed by the corporation. The fact that the
directors had remained with the corporation until their services were
no longer required vindicated the sound business judgment of the
board.25 As the objector had failed to demonstrate conclusively that
the value of the options had no reasonable relation to the value of
the services rendered,28 the court accepted the directors' decision.
1 See Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 82, 90 A.2d 660 '(Sup.
Ct. 1952); Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, 33 Del. Ch. 69, 90 A.2d
652 (Sup. Ct. 1952); Rosenthal v. Burry Biscuit Corp., 30 Del. Ch. 299,
60 A.2d 106 (Ch. 1948).
:0 See Kaufman v. Shoenburg, 33 Del. Ch. 211, 91 A.2d 786 (Ch. 1952).
91 See note 16 supra.
"After the Kerbs and Gottlieb decisions, Delaware amended its statute
making directors' decisions as to consideration for the issuance of options
conclusive absent actual fraud. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 157 (Supp. 1964).
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-46(f) (1965). But see Frankel v. Donovan,
35 Del. Ch. 443, 120 A.2d 311 (Ch. 1956).
"-211 A.2d 610 (Del. Ch. 1965).
'Orzeck v. Englehart, 41 Del. Ch. 223, 195 A.2d 375 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
2 It appears that if the optionee remains in the corporation's employ
until the contemplated benefit has passed to the firm, the court will uphold
the option by the application of a test of "hindsight," despite an absence of
conditions insuring its receipt. See Olson Bros. v. Englehart, 211 A.2d 610,
615 (Del. Ch. 1965); Beard v. Elster, 39 Del. Ch. 153, 165, 160 A.2d 731,
738 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
26 The issue was "in the twilight zone where reasonable businessmen,
fully informed, might differ." Beard v. Elster, 39 Del. Ch. 153, 165, 160
A.2d 731, 738 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
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While state law controls the validity of stock options challenged
by minority stockholders, it has been noted that the tax benefits
gained by compliance with the Internal Revenue Code provisions
often motivate the adoption of a plan. In 1964, Congress, recogniz-
ing the abuses inherent under the old restrictive stock option provi-
sions but convinced that stock options could provide incentive to key
personnel, made radical amendments now appearing as sections 421
through 425 of the Code.2" The former restrictive stock option pro-
visions are now found in section 424 and, with certain exceptions,
relate only to options granted prior to January 1, 1964.29 The quali-
fied stock option3" is intended by Congress to replace the former re-
stricted stock option as an incentive to personnel whose individual
efforts influence the fortunes of their firm.3 ' This plan is to be
distinguished from the employee stock purchase plan,3 2 required to
be made available to all employees on a basis that does not discrimi-
nate in favor of supervisory or highly compensated personnel, 3
although both plans receive the favorable tax rates previously ac-
corded the restricted stock option.
Although the new rules of the 1964 Revenue Act have sub-
stantially increased the technical difficulties of devising and exercis-
ing options,34 the amended provisions have eased the burden of
drafting a plan that complies with both state law and the Code
requirements. The statute requires the existence of a written plan
ratified by the stockholders, 5 which insures that they are apprised
of and approve the plan.38 This ratification would then seem to be
sufficient in questions concerning the burden of proof as to the
= INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 421-425.
28 See generally Baker, Employee Stock Option Plans Under the Revenue
Act of 1964, 20 TAx L. REv. 77 (1964).
" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 424(c) (3).
" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 422.31H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (1963); S. REP. No. 830,
88th Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1964).
2 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 423.
" INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 423(b) (4) (D).
" See Rubenfeld, Qualified Stock Options: Some Developing Problems
Under the 1964 Revenue Act, 21 J. TAXATION 140 (1964). See also Baker
supra note 28.
88 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 422(b) (1).
In order to ratify effectively an option plan adopted by an interested
board, shareholders must be given reasonably full information as to its ad-
vantages and disadvantages and ratification extends only to things about
which the shareholders are informed. See Gaynor v. Buckley, 318 F.2d 432
(9th Cir. 1963); Kaufman v. Shoenburg, 33 Del. Ch. 211, 91 A.2d 786
(Ch. 1952).
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reasonable relation between the options granted and the benefits
received under state law.37 Too, the requirement that the option
price be the fair market value of the stock at the time the option
is granted38 reduces the compensatory nature of the option and is
additional evidence of reasonableness.
Under the new tax provisions, the employee must remain in the
corporation's employ at all times from the date of the granting of the
option until a date three months before its exercise.3' If the option
complies with the statute in this respect, it would seem by implication
to meet the requirements of state law that there be a valid contract of
employment or other device to retain the continued services of the
optionee as long as this is sufficient benefit to the corporation under
the Kerbs test.4 It would also seem to negate the court's argument
in Kerbs that compliance with the Code provisions does not reason-
ably insure the corporation will receive the contemplated benefit."
However, if the corporation is best to insure the continued services
of the optionee, the plan should provide that the options granted may
be exercised in installments spaced over the entire period of the op-
tion, in no event more than five years from the date of the grant of
the option.'
The new Internal Revenue Code provisions have forced firms
to decide whether favorable tax rates are the primary reason for
granting options. If so, the plan must recognize and comply with
the Code requirements. Having complied with the tax statute the
corporation still may exercise broad discretion as to the conditions
that it may impose on the enjoyment of options by executives, but
that must be included to insure benefit to the corporation as re-
quired by state law. A balancing of interests must be considered;
for if too many restrictions are imposed on the employee's enjoy-
ment of that right, the purpose of the plan, employee incentive, may
well be defeated.
JOHN VAN LINDLEY
See note 16 supra, as to the burden of proof.
"INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 422(b) (4).
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 422(a) (2).
40 See note 12 supra, and accompanying text.
"See note 2 supra.
'2 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 422(b) (3). See, e.g., Gruber v. Chesapeake
& 0. Ry., 158 F. Supp. 593 (N.D. Ohio 1958).
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Criminal Law-Appellate Review of Legal but Excessive Sentences
In 1907 England recognized the right of a felon to seek review
of his conviction,1 thus giving full effect to a slowly developed con-
cept2 that has now become so firmly entrenched in our system of
jurisprudence that few would question its value. However, the de-
velopment may not yet have ended, for the merits of appellate re-
view, so obvious and unquestioned when applied to pre-conviction
proceedings, are still accorded surprisingly little recognition when
applied to the equally crucial proceedings after conviction. Thus,
the defendant, whose rights are so amply protected while he stands
accused, is deprived of the most basic of all safeguards when it
comes to the sentence he must serve.' The paradoxical nature of
this "deliberate abandonment of the legal norm after conviction"4
is readily apparent, but in the United States5 only a minority of the
jurisdictions provide for appellate review of legal but excessive
sentences.
The position of the North Carolina Supreme Court on this
matter was reiterated in State v. Stubbs' where the defendant was
convicted of committing the "crime against nature" in violation of
section 14-177 of the North Carolina General Statutes. 7 In a vain
attempt to obtain appellate review of his sentence of imprisonment
for not less than seven nor more than ten years, he contended that
this was cruel and unusual punishment. But the court, concluding
'Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, 7 Edw. 7, c. 23, § 3.
' The vox populorumn is final. Such was true of the early Roman law,
as well as early common law. Indeed, the English common law was
exceedingly slow in recognizing any judicial review in criminal cases.
When appellate review was finally recognized, it was not a matter of
right, but was permitted only upon consent of the Crown. Not until
1705 did review upon request become permissible in cases involving
misdemeanors ....
Mueller, Penology on Appeal: Appellate Review of Legal but Excessive
Sentences, 15 VAND. L. REv. 671, 672 (1962).
' Sobeloff, A Recommendation for Appellate Review of Criminal Sen-
tences, 21 BROOKLYN L. REV. 2 (1954).
' Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing Pro-
cess, 75 HRv. L. REV. 904, 919 (1962).
' The United States is the only country that allows "a single judge to
set a minimum sentence at his own dictate." Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals judicial Conference, Appellate Review of Sentences, 32 F.R.D. 249,
269 (1962).
6266 N.C. 295, 145 S.E.2d 899 (1966).
TN.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1953).
ills [Vol. 44
EXCESSIVE SENTENCES
that the sentence was within the limits authorized by statute,' per-
sisted in its traditional approach and held that when "punishment
does not exceed the limits fixed by the statute, it cannot be con-
sidered cruel and unusual punishment in a constitutional sense."'
North Carolina's refusal to review legal but excessive sentences
is unquestionably the same rule presently applied by the federal
courts. Under the Act of 1879 the old circuit courts held that the
statutory authority "to pronounce final sentence and to award execu-
tion thereon"'" gave them the power to render a sentence different
from that of the district court." But when the circuit courts of
appeal were created, the view was adopted that the omission of the
crucial language repealed the old law by implication in spite of some
suggestions that the power was preserved by cross reference to the
Act of 1879." The statutory authority "to affirm, modify . .. or
reverse" still exists,'" but this provision has been largely ignored14
with the result that "since 1891, federal upper courts have unswerv-
ingly denied themselves the power to revise sentences on appeal."' 5
The most searching judicial examination of the federal position
is perhaps that of Judge Frank in the case of United States v.
Rosenberg.'6 Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were convicted of deliver-
ing information to Russia and sentenced to death under section
thirty-two of the United States Code, title fifty.' In stating his
reasons for the use of maximum punishment the trial judge dis-
played something less than detached objectivity by holding the de-
fendants responsible for causing the Korean War and altering the
'At the time of his conviction the statute authorized a sentence of not
less than five nor more than sixty years. A subsequent amendment, how-
ever, deemed the offense a felony and provided for a fine or imprisonment
in the discretion of the court. Thus, the sentence was well within the limits
of the statute under which Stubbs was convicted but, assuming that the
new statute will not be construed as providing for specific punishment and
will therefore be limited to a maximum punishment of ten years under N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-22, it approached the maximum allowable at the time of
appeal. State v. Blackmon, 260 N.C. 352, 132 S.E.2d 880 (1963).
'266 N.C. 295, 298, 145 S.E.2d 899, 902 (1966).
" Act of March 3, 1879, ch. 176, § 3, 20 Stat. 354.
"United States v. Wynn, 11 Fed. 57 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1882); Bates v.
United States, 10 Fed. 92 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1881).
" United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 604 n.25 (2d Cir. 1952).
"28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1964).
"United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 605 (2d Cir. 1952).
"Id. at 604 n.25.
"195 F.2d 583 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838 (1952).
"Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, title I, § 2, 40 Stat. 218-19 (now 18
U.S.C. 794 (1964)).
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course of history."8 In spite of the severity of the sentence and the
somewhat shaky basis proffered, Judge Frank felt compelled to
reject the argument that section 2106 of the Judicial Code granted
the power to modify sentences on appeal. Were this a case of first
impression, he reasoned, the section would require serious consider-
ation, but because "for six decades federal decisions ... have denied
the existence of such authority, it is clear that the Supreme Court
alone is in a position to hold that Sec. 2106 confers authority to
reduce a sentence which is not outside the bounds set by a valid
statute."' 9 In addition an eighth amendment argument was rejected
because, even assuming that a sentence under a constitutional statute
could be held cruel and unusual, there were no circumstances in the
case to justify a holding that this sentence shocked the conscience
and sense of justice of the community. It is necessary, Judge Frank
said, "to treat as immaterial the sentences given (or not given) to
the other conspirators,2" and also to disregard what sentences this
court would have imposed or what other trial judges have done in
other espionage or treason cases. For such matters do not ade-
quately reflect the prevailing mood of the public."'"
The United States Supreme Court has never interpreted section
2106 in regard to the modification of sentences on appeal but it
has expressed a disinclination to enter this area. In Gore v. United
States2 the defendant received multiple sentences for an offense
consisting of a single sale of narcotics. Relying on the intent of
Congress and rejecting a double jeopardy argument, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's opinion for the Court upheld the sentences declaring
that the proper apportionment of punishment was within the do-
8 "I consider your crime worse than murder. Plain deliberate con-
templated murder is dwarfed in magnitude by comparison with the
crime you have committed. In committing the act of murder, the
criminal kills only his victim .... But in your case, I believe your
conduct... has already caused, in my opinion, the Communist aggres-
sion in Korea, with the resulting casualties exceeding 50,000 and who
knows but that millions more of innocent people may pay the price
of your treason. Indeed, by your betrayal you undoubtedly have
altered the course of history to the disadvantage of our country."
United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 605-06 n.28 (2d Cir. 1952).19Id. at 605-06.
" It is, perhaps, worthy of note that one of the conspirators, Sobell, was
sentenced to thirty years imprisonment (id. at 590) and that another who
had helped bring "to justice the arch criminals in this nefarious scheme"
received only a fifteen year sentence (id. at 606 n.28).
21 Id. at 609.
357 U.S. 386 (1958).
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main of penology and peculiarly a question of legislative policy.
Equally so, he continued, "are the much mooted problems relating
to the power of the judiciary to review sentences. First the English
and then the Scottish Courts of Criminal Appeal were given power
to revise sentences, the power to increase as well as the power to
reduce them .... This Court has no such power.
23
One case in the federal courts stands alone in this area. United
States v. Wiley2" involved five defendants, four of whom pleaded
guilty to an indictment for possession of stolen goods under sec-
tion 659 of the United States Code, title eighteen. Of these four
the ringleader, a four-time convicted felon, received a two-year
sentence and the other three, each of whom had a prior record,
received sentences of one year and a day. On the other hand Wiley,
who elected to stand trial, was convicted and sentenced to three
years even though he was, as the trial judge admitted, only a minor
participant. On appeal the Second Circuit Court of Appeals re-
manded the case for resentencing and observed, "Our part in the
administration of federal justice requires that we reject the theory
that a person may be punished because in good faith he defends
himself when charged with a crime. . . . It is evident that the
punishment imposed . . . on Wiley was . . . only in part for the
crime for which he was indicted."2 5
The situation in the federal courts, then, appears somewhat
static for the time being but there are some indications of develop-
ment in the states. No less than ten states have, between 1843 and
1964, provided express statutory authorization for appellate review
of sentences.2 6 In those jurisdictions, of course, no real problem is
encountered though a few of the courts, Arizona and Illinois for
example, proclaim that sentences will be modified only for abuse
of discretion." In only two states, New Jersey 8 and Tennessee, 9
23 Id. at 393.2'278 F.2d 500 (1960).
'
5 Id. at 504.
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1717(B) (1956); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV.§ 51-196 (Supp. 1963); HAWAII REv. LAWS § 212-14 (Supp. 1960); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 19-2821 (1948); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 121-9 (Smith-
Hurd 1964); IoWA CODE ANN. § 793.18 (1946); MASS. ANN. LAws ch.
278, § 28(B) (1956); NED. Rav. STAT. § 29-2308 (1956); N.Y. CODE
CRIM. PROC. § 543; ORE. REv. STAT. § 138.050 (1964). Iowa was the first
state to adopt such a statute. IOWA REv. STAT. § 47-75 (1843).
2 State v. Cuzick, 97 Ariz. 130, 397 P.2d 629 (1964); People v. Hobbs,
56 Ill. App. 2d 93, 205 N.E.2d 503 (1965). But see State v. Monks, 96
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have the courts assumed the power completely without the aid of
statute. But by far the more typical are the states with ambiguous
statutes granting the appellate courts the authority to "reverse, af-
firm, or modify the judgment"30 of the lower courts. Only a few
courts in states of this type have used the statutes to modify sen-
tences 1 but their example points up the potential for change in a
large number of states where the power is not now exercised.8 2
In North Carolina the supreme court is given statutory author-
ity in any case to "render such sentence . . . as on inspection of
the whole record it shall appear to them ought in law to be ren-
dered .... ,,"1 Although that provision appears plain enough on its
face, a search of the cases indicates that it has never been seriously
considered as a basis for the modification of sentences on appeal.
Instead, the arguments discussed by the court have repeatedly been
based either on cruel and unusual punishment or on abuse of dis-
cretion.
The court in more recent cases has made some effort, not ap-
parent in the early cases, to separate the two arguments . 4 If any
distinction can be drawn here, it would seem to be that no sentence
within the statutory limits can be considered cruel and unusual but
that a sentence within the discretion of the trial judge can be re-
viewed where there is palpable abuse. However, such a distinction
does not seem particularly valuable analytically for in either in-
stance the contention urged must ultimately be the same; i.e., under
the circumstances of the case the sentence is a greater penalty than
ought to have been imposed. In studying the cases, then, it is help-
Ariz. 354, 395 P.2d 711 (1964); State v. Evard, 55 Ill. App. 2d 270, 204
N.E.2d 777 (1965).
28 See, e.g., State v. Hall, 87 N.J. Super. 480, 210 A.2d 74 (Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1965).
20 See, e.g., Brooks v. State, 187 Tenn. 361, 215 S.W.2d 785 (1948).
"ARK. STAT. ch. 27, § 2144 (1947).
'1 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Garramone, 307 Pa. 507, 161 At. 733(1932).
" 1962 survey shows the number of states in which the question is
undecided as twenty-two, but of the fifteen listed as denying the power by
case law eight are shown to have statutes of the ambiguous type. Mueller,
supra note 1, at 688-97.
"3 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7-11 (1953). Also worthy of consideration is the
language of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7-10 (1953): "The Supreme Court has juris-
diction to review, upon appeal . . . any matter of law or legal inference."
"Compare State v. Welch, 232 N.C. 77, 59 S.E.2d 199 (1950), with
State v. Hamby, 126 N.C. 1066, 35 S.E. 614 (1900).
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ful to look at all of those in which this basic contention has been
made.
Although the contention has been rejected in almost every in-
stance regardless of the argument used, the precedent is not as firm
as the pat language of the court implies, for the early cases, later
cited as authority for denying the power of review, actually left
the question open. Thus, in one of the earliest cases in which the
contention was urged, the court found that a statute permitting the
sheriff to collect the fine of an indigent defendant by renting him
to the highest bidder was not open to the criticism that the punish-
ment was "too severe or not of an usual kind." But the court did
recognize that punishment open to that criticism would raise a ques-
tion about their power to review it.3 5 The question raised, however,
appeared to be resolved by State v. Driver8" where the court held
clearly that a five-year sentence for wife beating was cruel and un-
usual and that there could be no such anomaly as an "unconstitu-
tional judgment of an inferior Court affecting the liberty of the
citizen, not the subject of review by the Court of Appeals, where
every order or judgment involving a matter of law or legal inference
is reviewable !""7
The cases following Driver involved relatively short sentences,
typically two years or less, and rarely provided the court with an
opportunity to invoke that holding. However, the possibility was
not foreclosed for in each case the court found reason to point out
either that the discretion had not been abused or that the sentence
did not err on the side of severity.3 8 Undeniably, the question was
still open in 1914 for in State v. Lee,3 9 where the conviction of a
Negro boy for robbery of eleven cents was reversed for error in
the charge, the court said that while it was unnecessary to decide
the extent of their power to review the judge's discretion, a nine-
year sentence was not commensurate with such an offense. Again,
State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. 144 (1838).
'°78 N.C. 423 (1878).
Id. at 427.
"B See, e.g., State v. Dowdy, 145 N.C. 432, 58 S.E. 1002 (1907); State
v. Farrington, 141 N.C. 844, 53 S.E. 954 (1906); State v. Rippy, 127 N.C.
516, 37 S.E. 148 (1900); State v. Hamby, 126 N.C. 1066, 35 S.E. 614
(1900); State v. Apple, 121 N.C. 584, 28 S.E. 469 (1897); State v. Reid,
106 N.C. 714, 11 S.E. 315 (1890); State v. Miller, 94 N.C. 904 (1886);
State v. Pettie, 80 N.C. 367 (1879).
166 N.C. 250, 80 S.E. 977 (1914).
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in State v. Woodlief4 ° where the sentence was only thirty days, the
court said, "We are not prepared to say that this Court cannot
review the judge as to the quantum of punishment, even where
there is a limit set to the exercise of his discretion; but if the right
exists, we will not do so except in a plain case. ... 41
In spite of this precedent the court in 1929 dismissed the con-
tention out of hand. In State v. Daniels42 the court in a per curiam
opinion held, apparently for the first time, that a sentence authorized
by law "cannot be held to be 'cruel or unusual.' 3 However, not
one of the four cases cited in support of this proposition had failed
to consider the possibility of reviewing sentences and certainly none
of them had foreclosed it.4 4 Four years later the court went so far
as to cite Woodlief and State v. Jones45 for a similar holding."
Since the court said in Jones that there was nothing in the record
to show abuse of discretion and in Woodlief that the quantum of
punishment might be reviewed in a proper case, the authority is at
least questionable. But the language, once used, was soon followed
and in 1940 the error was compounded when in State v. Brackett"
the court cited Daniels for the same easy rule.
In the next twenty years there was from time to time a slight
recognition that some limitation existed but on the whole the prec-
edent was taken as established.4" For example, where a defendant
sought review of a sentence for obtaining money by false pretenses,
the court answered that authorized punishment could not be cruel
and unusual and that the discretion of the trial judge could be re-
viewed "only in case of manifest gross abuse."49 But the possibility
of gross abuse occurring seems to have diminished considerably
40172 N.C. 885, 90 S.E. 137 (1916).
"Id. at 891, 90 S.E. at 140.
"197 N.C. 285, 148 S.E. 244 (1929).
"Id. at 286, 148 S.E. at 244.
"State v. Dowdy, 145 N.C. 432, 58 S.E. 1002 (1907); State v. Farring-
ton, 141 N.C. 844, 53 S.E. 954 (1906) ; State v. Pettie, 80 N.C. 367 (1879);
State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. 144 (1838).
"181 N.C. 543, 106 S.E. 827 (1921).
"State v. Fleming, 202 N.C. 512, 163 S.E. 453 (1932).
'7218 N.C. 369, 11 S.E.2d 146 (1940).
"'See, e.g., State v. Downey, 253 N.C. 348, 117 S.E.2d 39 (1960) ; State
v. Lee, 247 N.C. 230, 100 S.E.2d 372 (1957); State v. Welch, 232 N.C. 77,
59 S.E.2d 199 (1950) ; State v. White, 230 N.C. 513, 53 S.E.2d 436 (1949) ;
State v. Richardson, 221 N.C. 209, 19 S.E.2d 863 (1942); State v. Parker,
220 N.C. 416, 17 S.E.2d 475 (1941); State v. Wilson, 218 N.C. 769, 12
S.E.2d 654 (1941).
" State v. Stansbury, 230 N.C. 589, 55 S.E.2d 185 (1949).
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when the court decided State v. Wright in 1964.50 In that case the
defendant forged a check for only a small amount but was sentenced
to prison for seven to ten years. The court noted that no more than
ten years could be given for a check large enough to break a bank,
quoted Woodlief to point out that there is a limit to the trial judge's
discretion, but then concluded, "If the sentence is disproportionately
long, the Governor and the Board of Paroles have ample authority
to make adjustment. This Court, lacking such authority, must af-
firm the judgment."51
Thus, the rule in North Carolina and the majority of jurisdic-
tions in this country is, undeniably, no appellate review of legal
sentences. But a potential for change exists. In many jurisdictions,
including North Carolina, there is statutory authority available to
a willing court. And in North Carolina and the federal courts there
is a precedent, however thin, that can be argued in a proper case.
Also, proposed congressional bills indicate forthcoming legislative
scrutiny." Further, the recently established principle of applying
the eighth amendment to the states53 and the correlative tendency
to examine sentences more closely5 4 suggests that reluctant state
courts and legislatures may yet be prodded by the federal courts.
An example of this possibility occurred recently in the Sixth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals when a state prisoner, sentenced to life im-
prisonment without possibility of parole under an habitual criminal
statute, sought federal habeas corpus on the ground that the sen-
tence was so excessive as to constitute cruel and unusual punish-
ment. The district judge relied on precedent established before
Robinson v. California to reject the contention but the circuit court
of appeals, while instructing the petitioner to exhaust his state
remedies, held that reliance on such authority was no longer ade-
quate. 55
Perhaps the strongest argument for the appellate review of legal
sentences is the opportunity it provides for the establishment of a
jurisdiction-wide sentencing policy that would reflect current penol-
ogy. Under the present rule it is manifest that the "courts are
::261 N.C. 356, 134 S.E.2d 624 (1964).
Id. at 358, 134 S.E.2d at 625.
52 S. 2722, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
See Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963) (dissenting opinion);
Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (1966), 44 N.C.L. REV. 818.
" Goss v. Bomar, 337 F.2d 341 (6th Cir. 1964).
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governed by individual and varying philosophies of crime control
rather than by an orderly and consistent approach for the judiciary
as a whole." 6 Thus, in North Carolina a trial judge remains free
to follow such maxims as the one cited by the supreme court in
1925, "The deterrence theory is the kingdom of the criminal law."' 7
But, quite aside from differences in active philosophies, the more
frightening, though hopefully more rare, possibility exists for arbi-
trary and emotional judgments or simple mistake."s This is not to
suggest that all discretion should be taken from the trial judge but
rather that the objective should be "to provide a technique whereby
discretion shall be allowed ample creative scope and yet be subject
to some degree of discipline."5 Without such discipline trial judges
are left in a lonely position indeed and respect for the law on the
part of those who come under its scrutiny suffers.
MARTIN N. ERWIN
Criminal Law-Nolle Prosequi With Leave-Possibility of Abuse
On February 24, 1964, an Orange County grand jury indicted
Peter Klopfer for a trespass that had occurred on January 3, 1964.
The defendant entered a plea of not guilty during a special criminal
session of Orange County Superior Court in March, 1964. The
jury was unable to agree on a verdict, and a mistrial was declared.
The defendant was ordered to return for retrial during the same
session, but the case was not reached at this time. Approximately
one year later the solicitor indicated to the defendant's attorney
that he intended to have a nolle prosequi1 with leave entered. At
" Bennett, The Sentence-Its Relation to Crime and Rehabilitation, 1960
U. ILL. L.F. 500.
= State v. Swindell, 189 N.C. 151, 155, 126 S.E. 417, 418 (1925).
In Stubbs it should be noted that the trial judge obviously intended to
fix the sentence on the lower end of the permitted scale. In view of the
fact that the old statute allowed a fifty-five year range of discretion, almost
any factor could have caused him to add two. years to the minimum. It is
at least open to speculation that under the new statute the sentence would
have been fixed at the lower end of the new scale, yet under the existing
system the judicary must leave the correction of its mistakes to other
branches of government.
"' Second Circuit Court of Appeals Judicial Conference, Appellate Re-
view of Sentences, 32 F.R.D. 249, 273 (1962).
'Nolle prosequi will hereinafter be abbreviated as nol. pros.
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the April, 1965, session, the defendant in open court opposed the
entry of a no!. pros. with leave to the trespass charge. The court
indicated its approval of a nol. pros. with leave, but the solicitor
then asked that the case be retained in its trial docket status. The
case was not listed on the trial calendar for the August, 1965, ses-
sion, and the defendant filed a motion to ascertain its status. The
case was considered during the August, 1965, session, and the
solicitor's motion for entry of a nol. pros. with leave was allowed
over the defendant's objection. The defendant appealed, contending
that the entry of a nol. pros. with leave under the circumstances
of the case deprived him of the right to a speedy trial secured to
him by the constitutions of North Carolina and the United States.
The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the solicitor and the
trial judge followed customary procedure in entering the nol. pros.
with leave and that their discretion was not reviewable under the
facts disclosed by the record.2
It is well settled in North Carolina that the entry of a nol. pros.
is not an acquittal and does not bar a subsequent prosecution of the
defendant for the same offense.3
A nol. pros. in criminal proceedings is nothing but a declaration
on the part of the prosecuting officer that he will not at that
time prosecute the suit further. Its effect is to put the defendant
without day; that is, he is discharged and permitted to leave the
court without entering into a recognizance to appear at any other
time . . . but it does not operate as an acquittal, for he may
afterwards be again indicted for the same offense, or fresh pro-
cess may be issued against him upon the same indictment, and
he may be tried upon it.4
The solicitor or prosecuting officer normally decides when a nol.
pros. will be entered. The solicitor has a discretionary power with
respect to a nol. pros., and he is responsible for its proper exercise.5
The court will not usually interfere with the decisions of the solici-
tor unless his power is used oppressively.' However, since the
State v. Klopfer, 266 N.C. 349, 145 S.E.2d 909, cert. granted, - U.S.
(1966).
See, e.g., State v. Smith, 170 N.C. 742, 87 S.E. 98 (1915); State v.
McNeill, 10 N.C. 183 (1824).
'State v. Thornton, 35 N.C. 256, 257-58 (1852). See Wilkinson v.
Wilkinson, 159 N.C. 265, 266, 74 S.E. 740, 741 (1912).
'State v. Thompson, 10 N.C. 613 (1825).
6Ibid.
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solicitor acts under the control of the court,' the entry of a nol. pros.
is always subject to final approval and assent of the court.'
Where a nol. pros. has been entered, neither the solicitor nor
the clerk can order an arrest order issued without permission of
the court.' This restraint is placed on the power of the solicitor to
issue new process in order to prevent any abuse or oppression. 10
However, this restriction can be circumvented by the judge's dis-
cretionary entry of leave with the nol. pros.: leave may be given
by the court at the time the nol. pros. is entered empowering the
solicitor to issue another capias when and if he deems it proper to
do soi without further permission of the court. A nol. pros. with
leave authorizes the clerk to issue a new arrest order at the request
of the solicitor."2
There are basically three legitimate uses for the nol. pros. or
the nol. pros. with leave in North Carolina.
(1) There is a statutorily prescribed use of a nol. pros. with
leave in all criminal actions where an indictment has been pending
for two terms of criminal court, the defendant has not been appre-
hended, and a nol. pros. has not been entered.'3
(2) The solicitor may enter a nol. pros. with or without leave
against one or more multiple defendants in a case in order to obtain
testimony against co-defendants.' 4
'State v. Conly, 130 N.C. 683, 684, 41 S.E. 534, 540 (1902); State v.
Moody, 69 N.C. 529, 531 (1873).
'N.C. Att'y Gen. Ruling, Letter of Oct. 7, 1953.
' State v. Smith, 129 N.C. 546, 547, 40 S.E. 1 (1901); State v. Thornton,
35 N.C. 256, 258 (1852).
"
0 Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 159 N.C. 265, 267, 74 S.E. 740, 741 (1912);
State v. Thornton, 35 N.C. 256, 258 (1852).
"1 State v. Smith, 129 N.C. 546, 547, 40 S.E. 1 (1901).121d. at 547, 40 S.E. at 1. N.C. Att'y Gen. Ruling, Letter of Feb. 18,
1947.
"SN.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-175 (1965):
A nolle prosequi "with leave" shall be entered in all criminal actions
in which the indictment has been pending for two terms of court and
the defendant has not been apprehended and in which a nolle prosequi
has not been entered, unless the judge for good cause shown shall
order otherwise. The clerk of the superior court shall issue a capias
for the arrest of any defendant named in any criminal action in
which a nolle prosequi has been entered when he has reasonable
ground for believing that such defendant may be arrested or upon the
application of the solicitor of the district. ...
1' See, e.g., State v. Bullard, 253 N.C. 809, 810, 117 S.E.2d 722, 723
(1961) (defendant's objection to solicitor's entering a nol. pros. against
another defendant in order to obtain testimony against objecting defendant
overruled); State v. Ammons, 204 N.C. 753, 758, 169 S.E. 631, 633 (1933)
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(3) A nol. pros. with or without leave may be entered by the
solicitor if he finds available evidence insufficient to support a con-
viction. 15
The North Carolina court has said that if the trial judge thinks
it proper to grant leave at the time the nol. pros. is entered, it does
not see why he may not do so.' However, the court clearly implies
that the use of the nol. pros. with leave should be limited to cases
where it is "necessary to so use it as to bring offenders to trial
and justice.' 17
Since the entry of a nol. pros. does not terminate the prosecu-
tion on the indictment, the court has held that the two-year statute
of limitations for misdemeanors is tolled.' Thus it does not matter
when the trial takes place provided the bill of indictment was sea-
sonably returned.' 9
The defendant in State v. Klopfer contended that the entry of
the nol. pros. with leave was an arbitrary refusal by the state to
prosecute the charge pending against him and, as such, deprived
him of his right to a speedy trial.2"
(entry of nol. pros. with leave in the presence of the jury as to some
defendants not prejudicial to the remaining defendants).
1 State v. Furmage, 250 N.C. 616, 622, 109 S.E.2d 563, 568 (1959)
(discretionary power solicitor may exercise prior to prosecution).
"o State v. Smith, 129 N.C. 546, 548, 40 S.E. 1 (1901).17 Id. at 547-48, 40 S.E. at 1. The defendant in Klopfer was not at
large, nor was the state attempting to elicit testimony against any co-defen-
dants. The only apparent legitimate basis for entering the noL. pros. with
leave was a lack of sufficient evidence to convict the defendant. However,
there was no indication that all possible evidence concerning the alleged
offense was not at hand during the eighteen months between indictment
and the entry of the not. pros. with leave. The defendant did not deny his
act, but contended that any trespass conviction in this case would be con-
trary to recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court. See note
20 infra. At least one state court has held that the court should refuse to
allow a not. pros. to be entered where the defendant is entitled to an ac-
quittal. State v. Deso, 110 Vt. 1, 1 A.2d 710 (1938).
1 State v. Williams, 151 N.C. 660, 661, 65 S.E. 908, 909 (1909).
' Id. at 661, 65 S.E. at 909; N.C. Att'y Gen. Ruling, Letter of Nov. 6,
1941.
2- 266 N.C. 349, 350, 145 S.E.2d 909, 910 (1966). The motion in Klopfer
objected to the entry of a nol. pros. with leave and asked that the case be
permanently concluded. The motion contended
that the continued pendency of said charge against the defendant is
causing substantial and recurring problems in regard to the defen-
dant's scheduling lecture and conference trips outside the State of
North Carolina and trips outside the United States in connection
with research projects of the defendant, said defendant being a Pro-
fessor of Zoology at Duke University and said research projects
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Article I, section 35 of the Constitution of North Carolina
provides:
All courts shall be open; and every person for an injury done
him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy
by due course of law, and right and justice administered without
sale, denial or delay.2'
The North Carolina court has asserted that the right of a per-
son accused of a crime to a speedy trial is a right guaranteed to all
people basing their system of jurisprudence on the principles of
common law.22 In State v. Patton23 the court said that the right
to a speedy trial has been guaranteed since the Magna Carta and
is embodied in the sixth amendment and in the North Carolina
Constitution. The right to a speedy trial is expressly designed to
prohibit arbitrary and oppressive delays that might be caused by
the prosecution.24 In State v. Lowry 2' the North Carolina court
found federal protection of the right to a speedy trial unnecessary
since the "fundamental law" of North Carolina fully secures to a
defendant the right to a speedy trial. The determination of whether
a speedy trial is afforded has to be determined in the light of the
circumstances of each case, and the court has discretion in deciding
what is a fair and reasonable time. 6
The Supreme Court of the United States has not held expressly
that the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial is made mandatory
in state proceedings. However, the court has held that most of the
other sixth amendment rights are binding on the states through the
fourteenth amendment,"7 and at least one lower federal court has
including projects for the Defense Department of the United States
Government ....
The defendant's motion asserted that prosecution of the trespass offense
was barred by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Blow v.
North Carolina, 379 U.S. 684 (1965), and Hamm v. City of Rock Hill,
379 U.S. 306 (1964).
"
1 Emphasis added. This section applies to both criminal and civil ac-
tions. See, e.g., State v. Pope, 257 N.C. 326, 330, 126 S.E.2d 126, 129(1962); State v. Godwin, 216 N.C. 49, 59, 3 S.E.2d 347, 352 (1939). See
N.C. CoNsT. art. I, § 17.
22 State v. Webb, 155 N.C. 426, 429, 70 S.E. 1064, 1065 (1911).
2 260 N.C. 359, 363, 132 S.E.2d 891, 894 (1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
956 (1964).
21 Id. at 364, 132 S.E.2d at 894.
"2263 N.C. 536, 542, 139 S.E.2d 870, 874 (1965).
"Ibid. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-10 (1965), requiring speedy trial or
discharge on commitment for felony.
27 See, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (confrontation of
NOL. PROS. WITH LEAVE
held that the federal guarantee of a speedy trial applies to the
states.
28
There is something of a practical conflict between the right of
a defendant to a speedy trial and the use of a nol. pros. with or
without leave, and it is obvious from the nature of the nol. pros.
with leave28 that it presents possibilities of abuse if granted indis-
criminately by the court. This is especally so where it is employed
on the grounds of lack of sufficient evidence for conviction.3 A
flaw in the scheme of criminal procedure that has the potential of
denying a defendant the right to a speedy trial is pointed out by
the situation in Klopfer. It would seem to be a practical and realistic
solution to the problems of both the state and the defendant to
require the solicitor, when his application for permission to enter
a nol. pros. with leave is challenged by the defendant, to show just
cause for such an entry that has the effect of indefinitely suspending
the prosecution and tolling the statute of limitations. 31 The time
required for this simple, and doubtless infrequently needed, pro-
cedure would be negligible, but the effect would be to insure the
protection of a defendant's right to a speedy trial while leaving the
legitimate usefulness of the nol. pros. with leave unimpaired. 2
prosecuting witness); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (counsel
prior to trial); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (counsel at
appellate level); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (counsel at
trial).
28 Suit v. Ellis, 282 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1962). Contra, Phillips v. Nash,
311 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1962); Maryland v. Kurek, 233 F. Supp. 431 (D.
Md. 1964).
"' See notes 11 and 12 supra. The nol. pros. without leave does not pre-
sent the potentiality of misuse that is present where leave is granted with-
out a showing of good cause.
To prevent abuse, the power of the solicitor to issue new process upon
the same bill is checked and restrained by the fact that a capias, after
a nol. pros. does not issue, as a matter of course, upon the mere will
and pleasure of the officer, but only upon permission of the court,
which will always see that its process is not abused to the oppression
of the citizen....
Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, .159 N.C..265, 267, 74 S.E. 740, 741 (1912).
" This situation opens the door to potential harassment of the defen-
dant by the prosecution. In cases where a nol. pros. without leave is entered
this possibility is practically precluded.
21 See notes 3, 18 & 19 supra.
"In order for a defendant to obtain a continuance to have additional
time to prepare for trial, the reasons for such delay must be fully estab-
lished. The court has indicated that it is desirable, if not necessary, that
an application for a continuance be supported by an affidavit showing suffi-
cient grounds for the continuance. See State v. Gibson, 229 N.C. 497, 501,
50 S.E.2d 520, 523 (1948); State v. Banks, 204 N.C. 233, 237, 167 S.E.
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The question of whether a speedy trial has been afforded a
defendant is a determination that must be made on a case-by-case
basis,"3 but it is important to provide a safeguard in advance where
practicably possible so that this issue will not arise.
J. TROY SMITH, JR.
Damages-Contractual Limitation of Liability
If a purchaser of real estate is required to put up a good faith
deposit before the sale is confirmed, he may provide in the sales
contract that if he fails to purchase the property, the deposit shall
be forfeited to the seller as liquidated damages. If the purchaser
does default, what damages will the seller be able to obtain if the
property is later sold at such a low price that the difference between
the original and second sale prices is greater than the amount of
deposit that the buyer forfeited? A court has the following alterna-
tives :'
(1) To treat the stipulated sum retained as liquidated damages
and limit the plaintiff's (seller's) recovery to that amount regard-
less of whether the actual damages suffered were more or less.
Designating the sum liquidated damages primarily benefits the plain-
tiff (seller) by entitling him to his pre-estimation of his probable
damages upon a showing of the breach without the necessity of
proving actual damages and incidentally benefits the defendant
(buyer) by setting his minimum and maximum liability.
(2) To treat the stipulated sum retained as a penalty and allow
the plaintiff (seller) to recover his provable actual damages sus-
tained because of the breach. Designating the sum a penalty pri-
marily benefits the defendant (buyer) by placing upon the plaintiff
(seller) the additional burden of establishing his actual damages,
which are almost always lower, and incidentally benefits the plain-
tiff (seller) by removing the maximum limit to liability of the
defendant (buyer).
851, 852 (1933); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-176, -177 (1953), -175 (Supp.
1965). The requisite of good cause that a defendant must show to obtain
a continuance apparently is not required in actual practice of a solicitor
when he seeks a nol pros. with leave.
"' See note 26 supra.
'For a general discussion of these alternatives, see 5 WILUSTON, CON-
TRAcTS §§ 781A, 790 (3d ed. 1961).
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(3) To treat the stipulated sum retained as a contractual limita-
tion of liability to an agreed maximum and allow the plaintiff (sell-
er) to recover his actual damages proved up to but not in excess of
the limitation. Designating the sum a contractual limitation of
liability exclusively benefits the defendant (buyer) by setting his
maximum liability in case of a breach, leaving actual damages in a
lesser amount to be established by the plaintiff (seller).
These alternatives were recently illustrated in City of Kinston
v. Suddreth.' There a buyer forfeited a 4000-dollar deposit when
he failed to comply with his bid. When the property later sold at
a 5000-dollar "loss," the seller sued the buyer for the 1000-dollar
difference. The seller's position was that the contract provision was
a penalty which the court would not enforce, thus permitting a re-
covery of actual damages. The buyer demurred on the ground that
the seller could recover no more than the agreed amount which the
parties denominated liquidated damages. The court sustained the
defendant's demurrer by interpreting the contract provision as a
valid contractual limitation of liability to an agreed maximum in-
stead of a liquidated damage clause or a penalty clause.
Contractual limitations of liability are not innovations in North
Carolina law. Although not favored and construed strictly, con-
tracts exempting a party from liability for his own negligence have
been upheld.3 Moreover, contractual modifications of liability, that
is, insurance limits in the event of intentional death, are valid.4
If liability can be eliminated or modified, the parties to a contract
ought to be able to limit their liability to an agreed maximum
amount, leaving actual losses in a lesser amount to be determined by
the ordinary rules and principles of damages. In fact, writers gen-
erally recognize the validity of contracts limiting liability,5 and
North Carolina, with the aid of a federal statute, has allowed a
telegraph company to limit its liability in case of faulty transmis-
266 N.C. 618, 146 S.E.2d 660 (1966).
SHall v. Sinclair Refining Co., 242 N.C. 707, 89 SE.2d 396 (1955).
Cf. Miller's Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Parker, 234 N.C. 20, 65 S.E.2d 341(1951).
'Williford v. Southern Fire Ins. Co., 248 N.C. 549, 103 S.E.2d 804
(1958); Daily v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 208 N.C. 817, 182 S.E. 332
(1935).
E.g., 5 CoRiB, CONTRA-CTS § 1068 (1964); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 781A (3d ed. 1961); RESTATEMENT, CoNTRCrs § 339(1), comment g
(1932).
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sions.0 The principal case stands with these decisions as a recogni-
tion of freedom of contract.
The importance of the decision, however, is that it establishes
North Carolina as one of the few jurisdictions to consider an at-
tempt to limit liability through a liquidated damage provision.' To
call a liquidated damage clause a limitation of liability clause re-
quires a willingness on the part of the court to interpret the contract
because the two doctrines are inconsistent, differing both in intent
and in effect.' A provision for liquidated damages is an attempt
by the parties to pre-estimate the actual loss; if it is found to be
valid,9 the plaintiff must plead and prove only the breach. The
stipulated amount is then awarded whether the actual loss is greater
or less.'0 On the other hand, a limitation of liability clause is an
attempt by one of the parties to limit his maximum liability; if it
is valid," the plaintiff must still plead and prove his damages after
establishing a breach. If the actual damages are less than the limited
amount, the plaintiff takes only the amount proved; if more, he
takes the limited figure.' 2
Of course in construing a clause the parties' characterization of
it in the contract is no more controlling than where courts have been
called upon to construe a liquidated damage clause to be a penalty.1
' Compare Meadows v. Postal Tel. & Cable Co., 173 N.C. 240, 91 S.E.
1009 (1917) with Young v. Western Union Tel. Co., 168 N.C. 36, 84 S.E.
45 (1915).
"Fritz, "Underliquidated" Damages as Limitation of Liability, 33 TEXAS
L. REv. 196 (1954).
8 See authorities note 5 mipra.
'Two tests are generally applied to determine the validity of a liqui-
dated damages clause: if, judging from appearances at the time of
making the contract, (1) the actual damages in case of breach are
difficult to ascertain, and (2) the stipulated amount is reasonably
proportional to the actual damages, the clause is generally valid.
47 IOWA L. REv. 964, 965-66 (1962).
"e Compare Better Food Mkts., Inc. v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 40 Cal.
2d 179, 253 P.2d 10 (1953) (less) with Community Home Improvement
Co. v. Turner, 80 N.Y.S.2d 629 (1947) (greater).
" While most authorities agree that limitation clauses are generally
valid, there are no broad guides comparable to the two tests used in
establishing the validity of liquidated damages clauses. There appears
to be a general willingness to allow parties to protect themselves by
limiting their liability to a reasonable amount.
47 IOWA L. REv. 964, 967 (1962).Western Union Co. v. Nestor, 309 U.S. 582 (1940).
A provision has been construed a limitation of liability even though
designated "liquidated damages," American Dist. Tel. Co. v. Roberts & Son,
219 Ala. 595, 122 So. 837 (1929), and though designated a "penalty,"
Cellulose Acetate Silk Co. v. Widnes Foundry, [1933] A.C. 20 (H.L. 1932).
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Rather, courts interpreting clauses dealing with the parties' re-
medial rights have looked to the entire agreement-its scope, pur-
pose and subject matter.'4 In this manner courts have seized upon
the situation of the parties and the clause's express language of
limitation, that is, liability limited and fixed at a specified amount' 5
or not liable beyond a specified amount,'6 to construe the clause as a
limitation of liability even though the specified amount was desig-
nated as liquidated damages. Other courts, despite the ever-present
dicta that an underestimation is just as condemned as an overesti-
mation of damages and will not be enforced,' 7 have upheld the
stipulated sum, which was much less than the actual damages, as a
valid liquidated damage clause.' To accomplish the same result
achieved through a valid limitation of liability provision, these latter
courts had to adopt the foresight point of view and fictionalize the
probabilities as they must have appeared to the parties at the time
they contracted.' 9
The North Carolina court definitely picked the firmer foundation
to achieve the result desired. But in deciding that the provision
of the defendant's contract was a valid limitation of liability, the
court has taken the final step in formulating a rule for the defen-
dant's (promisor's) bar.2" The initial step is revealed in prior North
Carolina decisions, which, in almost every instance where no actual
damages existed2' or the actual damages sustained were less than the
stipulated amount,2 2 the buyer has not been held to his promise
even though the parties designated the sum liquidated damages. The
courts in this state have been very receptive to the argument that
the stipulated sum is not a reasonable pre-estimate of probable
damages but is merely "a punishment, the threat of which is de-
5 STAN. L. Rlv. 822, 826 & n.17 (1953).
"- American Dist. Tel. Co. v. Roberts & Son, 219 Ala. 595, 122 So. 837
(1929).1 Western Union Co. v. Nestor, 309 U.S. 582 (1940).
' See Fritz supra note 7, at 214.
18 Atkinson v. Pacific Fire Extinguisher Co., 40 Cal. 2d 192, 253 P.2d
18 (1953); Better Food Mkts. v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 40 Cal. 2d 179,
253 P.2d 10 (1953). Cf. Stone, Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 234
U.S. 270 (1914); Owen v. Christopher, 144 Kan. 765, 62 P.2d 860 (1936).
'" See note 7 supra at 217-18.
2 5 CoRIN, CONTRACTS § 1060 (1964); 5 STAN. L. Ray. 822, 826-27
(1953).
2" E.g., Crawford v. Allen, 189 N.C. 434, 127 S.E. 521 (1925); Disosway
v. Edwards, 134 N.C. 254, 46 S.E. 501 (1904).2 E.g., Wheedon v. American Bonding & Trust Co., 128 N.C. 69, 38 S.E.
255 (1901); Thoroughgood v. Walker, 47 N.C. 16 (1854).
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signed to prevent the breach, or as security . . . to insure that the
person injured shall collect his actual damages."23  In fact, there
is authority to say that North Carolina would judge the clause from
a hindsight point of view, in which the actual loss suffered will be
regarded as of great, if not controlling, importance to the decision
whether or not the clause was an acceptable attempt to estimate
the loss in advance.14 The Suddreth decision is certainly in keeping
with the desire of the court to shield the defendant "from an absurd
or oppressive claim which is entirely disproportionate to the actual
damage he has caused," 5 because with the limitation of liability
interpretation, a plaintiff will never be able to recover more than
his actual damages.
The next step in the evolution of the "defendant's rule" is to
deny the ability of a plaintiff to assert affirmatively that the stipu-
lated sum is unjust. Despite the apparent inequity, the court in the
principal case indicates that the result of the case would be the
same even if the plaintiff's contention that the clause is a penalty
is accepted because the North Carolina measure of damages, where
a liquidated damages clause is deemed a penalty, is the compensa-
tion for the actual loss, not exceeding the penalty named." The
court's authority for such a proposition is merely dictum, 27 and no
North Carolina cases have been found following this rule. More-
over, the decisions allowing a recovery in excess of the stipulated
amount of a performance bond, declared a penalty,28 were not men-
tioned by the court in Suddreth.
In spite of this, the court in the principal case adopted a rule
for the defendant that combines the past disfavor with a liquidated
2 Definition of "penalty" contained in MCCORMIcK, DAMAGES § 146
(1935).24 See Thoroughgood v. Walker, 47 N.C. 16 (1854), where it was stated
that "if the sum agreed on by the parties is to be construed liquidated
damages, as the terms import, then the defendant will be bound to pay a
greater sum for a less, which cannot be, as that, according to all the cases,
is a penalty." Id. at 22.
" City of Kinston v. Suddreth, 266 N.C. 618, 620, 146 S.E.2d 660, 662
(1966).Id. at 621, 146 S.E.2d at 662.
" The dictum was taken from Wheedon v. American Bonding & Trust
Co., 128 N.C. 69, 71, 38 S.E. 255, 255 (1901), which involved actual dam-
ages that were less than the stipulated sum.
21 Peeler v. Peeler, 202 N.C. 123, 162 S.E. 472 (1932); Barber-Paschal
Lumber Co. v. Boushall, 168 N.C. 501, 84 S.E. 800 (1915); Rhyne v.




damages interpretation when the actual loss is less than the stipu-
lated amount with a disfavor with a "true" penalty interpretation
when the actual loss is greater than the stipulated amount. Even
so, the upholding of a limitation of liability provision is of no
real consequence if this is indeed what the parties contracted for.
It is, however, of consequence when a court takes this final step
for a defendant with the ease exhibited in Suddreth. For example,
one of the justifications for construing a liquidated damages clause
as a penalty is the rule of construction that the ambiguities of a con-
tract will be construed against the responsible party.29 Normally
a liquidated damages clause is inserted by the plaintiff (promisee)
to avoid litigation on the issue of damages. Here, the defendant-
buyer (promisor) inserted the provision. The clause is also ambigu-
ous since it contained no additional words of limitation on which
other courts have placed such heavy reliance in construing a liqui-
dated damages clause to be a limitation of liability clause.30 And
yet, the court interpreted the contract in the defendant's favor and
stated that he "intended to limit the amount of damages which
could be recovered against him in the event he did not purchase
the property. Whatever the [plaintiff] may have intended, that was
the effect of the contract which it accepted.""1 Moreover, the will-
ingness on the part of the court to support its interpretation of the
contract by stressing the intention of one party is inconsistent with
prior cases dealing with modification and elimination of liability.
3 2
Such freedoms of contract have been upheld only with reservations,
such as equality of bargaining position and notice of the limitation
and its consequences to the promisee.33 In the principal case, it ap-
pears that these reservations were replaced by the defendant's intent.
5 WILLISTON, CoNTAcrs § 621 (3d ed. 1961).
SO See notes 15 & 16 supra.
31266 N.C. at 621, 146 S.E.2d at 663.
See notes 3 & 4 supra.
See Miller's Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Parker, 234 N.C. 20, 65 S.E.2d
341 (1951), indicating that contracts exempting a party from liability may
or may not be enforced depending on the nature and subject matter of the
contract, relation of the parties, presence or absence of equality of bargain-
ing power and attendant circumstances. This is to say nothing of the
clauses limiting liability that have been struck where a party tries to excuse
a willful or gross breach of duty or excuse a public duty that are cited in
5 STAN. L. REV. 822, 825 (1953). Also see Note, 47 IOWA L. REv. 964
(1962), which recognizes the uncertainty of the enforceability of contractual
limitations of liability and tries to articulate a standard for them with
special emphasis on disclaimers in consumer goods sales under the Uniform
Commercial Code.
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Contractual limitations of liability have their place in the law
as when the promisee accepts the additional risks and is compen-
sated for them. But the freedom of contract should not exist for
only one party to the contract.
DAVID A. IRVIN
Domestic Relations-Voluntary Nonsuit in Custody Action
In a civil action in North Carolina the plaintiff may obtain a
voluntary nonsuit if the defendant has not asserted some claim or
cross-action arising out of the same transaction entitling him to
affirmative relief.1 In Griffith v. Griffith,2 the North Carolina Su-
preme Court has held that the plaintiff should be allowed a nonsuit
in a proceeding involving the custody of a child when the defendant
does not answer the complaint.
The plaintiff instituted an action for alimony without divorce
under section 50-16 of the General Statutes' and requested custody
'E.g., Ashley v. Jones, 246 N.C. 442, 98 S.E.2d 667 (1957); McLean
v. McDonald, 173 N.C. 429, 92 S.E. 148 (1917); Francis & Brother v.
W. J. & J. G. Edwards & Co., 77 N.C. 271 (1877). A counterclaim 'is
defined by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-137 (1953) and is "broader in meaning
than set-off, recoupment, or cross-action, and includes them all, and secures
to defendant the full relief which a separate action at law, or a bill in
chancery, or a cross-bill would have secured on the same state of facts."
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 200 N.C. 251, 253, 156 S.E. 515, 516 (1931).
The rule had a counterpart in equity where the plaintiff was not allowed to
have his rule dismissed when the defendant claimed a set-off. March v.
Thomas, 63 N.C. 87 (1868). The counterclaim must arise out of the same
transaction as the plaintiff's cause of action in order to bar the nonsuit.
Olmsted v. Smith, 133 N.C. 584, 45 S.E. 953 (1903). See generally 2
MCINTOSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1645 (2d ed.
1956).2265 N.C. 521, 144 S.E.2d 589 (1965).
8 In a proceeding instituted under this section, the plaintiff or the
defendant may ask for custody of the children of said parties, either
in the original pleadings or in a motion in the cause. Whereupon, the
court may enter such orders in respect to said custody as might be
entered upon a hearing on a writ of habeas corpus issued for the
purpose of determining the custody of said children. Such request
for custody of the children shall be in lieu of a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, but it shall be lawful for the custody of said children
to be determined upon a writ of habeas corpus, provided the petition
for said writ is filed prior to the filing of said pleadings or motion
for such custody in the cause instituted under this section.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16 (Supp. 1965). In addition to this statute, custody
may be determined in North Carolina by way of habeas corpus proceedings
when the parents are separated but not divorced under N.C. GEN. STAT. §
17-39 (1953); by habeas corpus proceedings generally under N.C. GEN.
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of the two children of the marriage. The defendant did not answer
the complaint, but appeared in court pursuant to a show cause order
and testified as a witness. The court found that each parent was a
suitable custodian for the children, but in their best interest ordered
that they be placed in the custody of the plaintiff.
The request for alimony pendente lite was denied, but the de-
fendant was required to pay 450 dollars per month for support of
the children and 500 dollars for attorney's fees.
After these orders had been entered, the plaintiff moved for a
voluntary nonsuit that was denied, and she appealed. The court
reversed the judgment, holding that since the defendant had asserted
no claim for affirmative relief, the nonsuit should have been allowed.
Section 50-16 authorizes the court to make orders respecting
custody "as might be entered upon a hearing on a writ of habeas
corpus" under section 17-39 where "at any time after the making of
such orders the court or judge may, on good cause shown, annul,
vary, or modify the same." Adjudications for custody are never
final,4 but the court retains jurisdiction until the child reaches his
majority.5 Another superior court may not alter the order, however,
unless a change in circumstances is shown.' To allow the plaintiff
STAT. § 17-39.1 (Supp. 1965)_; as an incident to a divorce action under
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13 (1950); by the juvenile branch of the superior
court when neither of the parents is seeking custody under N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 110-21 (1960); or by a domestic relations court under N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7-103 (1953). See generally LEE, 3 NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW §
222 (3d ed. 1963); LIGON, NORTH CAROLINA CASES AND MIATERIALS ON
FAmILY LAW 203-13 (1962).
'Bunn v. Bunn, 262 N.C. 67, 136 S.E.2d 240 (1964). Cf. Cleeland v.
Cleeland, 249 N.C. 16, 105 S.E.2d 114 (1958). There it was held that a
custody decree in another state does not preclude a North Carolina court
from determining custody rights. See Blankenship v. Blankenship, 256 N.C.
638, 124 S.E.2d 857 (1962).
In Weddington v. Weddington, 243 N.C. 702, 92 S.E.2d 71 (1956) the
plaintiff instituted a divorce action and filed a motion for custody of one of
the children. After receiving notice of the motion, the defendant took the
child out of the jurisdiction. The court held that since any proceeding
involving the custody of a child is in rem, the court is without power to
make an order awarding the child's custody if he is not within the juris-
diction. See generally 3 LEE, op. cit. supra note 3, § 226.
' Weddington v. Weddington, note 4 supra. Cf. Blankenship v. Blanken-
ship, note 4 supra, where it was held that the court in which an action for
alimony pendente lite is brought retains jurisdiction to award custody of
the children over another court in which the husband has brought an action
for absolute divorce.
'A judgment awarding custody is based upon the conditions found
to exist at the time it is entered. The judgment is subject to such
change as is necessary to make it conform to changed conditions when
19661 ,1139
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to take a voluntary nonsuit after a custody order has been made as
in the instant case is to contravene the policy of the statute, since
there is nothing to prevent the plaintiff from trying another court
if he does not like the custody or other interlocutory orders of the
first. Meanwhile the ultimate status of the child has not been de-
termined and a showing of good cause or change in circumstances
will not be necessary since the nonsuit erases the proceedings of
the first court, including any orders requiring support of the child.
Our court in Cox v. Cox' held that in an action for absolute
divorce, the plaintiff could not take a voluntary nonsuit when the
defendant has filed an answer requesting custody of the child. The
opinion in the instant case made no reference to Cox, but presum-
ably the court would have distinguished the two cases on the grounds
that in Griffith there was no answer and, indeed, the defendant ad-
mitted in his testimony that his wife was a suitable custodian for
the children. This distinction may be more apparent than real. The
court in Cox and in other cases" has held that once jurisdiction is
invoked in a question of custody, the child becomes a ward of the
court and his welfare becomes of primary concern. Recognizing
the danger that the child, who has no one to represent his interests,
may become a pawn in the battle between his parents, the court is
sensitive to his well-being and becomes his champion.
It would seem that the basic policy considerations reflected in
the rule forbidding a voluntary nonsuit when the defendant requests
affirmative relief are present in a greater degree in a custody case.
A child, who unlike one of the parties cannot come back into court
in his own right, should have his custody determined in the original
action, subject only to a showing of changed circumstances as pro-
vided by statute. It should make no difference that there has been
no answer to the complaint, since it is the rights of the child that
are being protected.
In Caldwell v. Caldwell,' an action for divorce where custody
was not involved, our court said:
they occur. In a bitter controversy between separated parents over
the custody of children, one is usually dissatisfied with the award.
The aggrieved party, however, must appeal to the Supreme Court, or
must wait for a more favorable factual background in which to de-
mand another hearing by motion in the case.
Stanback v. Stanback, 266 N.C. 72, 76, 145 S.E.2d 332, 335 (1965).
1246 N.C. 528, 98 S.E.2d 879 (1957).
'E.g., Joyner v. Joyner, 256 N.C. 588, 591, 124 S.E.2d 724, 727 (1962).
p189 N.C. 805, 128 S.E. 329 (1925).
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The better rule seems to be that a motion by the plaintiff for
judgment dismissing his action for divorce upon a voluntary non-
suit will not be allowed by the court as a matter of right, but is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court, which will be
exercised in the interest not only of the plaintiff, but of the defen-
dant and the State. The State and defendant, each, have an inter-
est in the status of plaintiff and defendant, and the purpose of
an action for divorce is to change or alter this status.10
This position was labeled as dictum and the court reversed itself in
Scott v. Scott," a case cited as precedent for the decision in the
principal case. The Scott case did not involve custody, and even if
it be conceded that the court was justified in its conclusion that "in
the long view, we do not perceive that public policy requires that
divorce actions be excepted from the general rule with reference to
nonsuits,"' 2 the case furnishes 'no authority for a proceeding in-
volving custody. The court's jurisdiction to award custody is not
lost when a divorce is not granted under section 50-13,23 nor pre-
sumably when alimony pendente lite is denied under section 50-16.14
The plaintiff should not be allowed to destroy the court's jurisdic-
tion by taking a voluntary nonsuit as a matter of right. The parties
should be permitted to get out of court if a reconciliation is achieved
and therefore a voluntary nonsuit should not be strictly prohibited,
but when a question of custody is to be decided, the interest of the
state is considerable, and it is to be hoped that the judge will be
given discretion to deny the motion when the welfare of the child
warrants doing so. 5
JOHN L. W. GARROU
'
0 Id. at 812, 128 S.E. at 333.
1259 N.C. 642, 131 S.E.2d 478 (1963).
"Id. at 648, 131 S.E.2d at 482.
"Bunn v. Bunn 258 N.C. 445, 128 S.E.2d 792 (1963).
"See 3 LEE, note 3 supra, § 222, at 11 n.20. The language of N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-16 (Supp. 1965) suggests that the determination of custody
rights is not dependent on a favorable ruling on the request for alimony
without divorce.
" Of the cases found in other jurisdictions that dealt with the question,
the most nearly in point is Ford v. Superior Court, 340 P.2d 296, 171 Cal.
App. 2d 288 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959). There plaintiff and defendant were
divorced, and the suit was for custody of the child. The defendant filed
a demurrer to the complaint and a motion for an order to pay attorney's
fees and costs. Thereafter the plaintiff requested a dismissal of the action,
and the defendant moved the court to vacate the dismissal and was success-
ful. The defendant then filed an answer and a cross-complaint by which
she sought to establish a Nevada decree as a domestic judgment. The
court held that "when the complaint was filed, the child for whose benefit the
1966]
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Eminent Domain-Public Use in North Carolina
The nature and character of "public use" sufficient to justify an
exercise of the power of eminent domain has again been considered
by the North Carolina Supreme Court. In State Highway Comm'n
v. Batts1 the Highway Commission sought to exercise the power
of eminent domain over the lands of the defendant and of a Mrs.
Joyner to construct a cul-de-sac2 to serve three property owners
whose property did not abut a public road. There were four families
living on these properties. Three of the families were related to
the fourth family, that of Mr. W. H. Batts. The lower court,
sitting without a jury, held that the proposed road was for a public
use. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed saying the road
was for the private use of W. H. Batts and a few of his relatives
and thus denied the Highway Commission the right to exercise the
power of eminent domain."
A precise definition of public use is impracticable. In City of
Charlotte v. Heath4 the court said: "Perhaps none can be devised
which is not challengeable, since, with the progressive demands of
society and changing concepts of governmental function, new sub-
jects are constantly brought within the authority of eminent do-
main."5 The basic problem in defining public use is that the term
"use" has been interpreted as having two different meanings: "em-
action was commenced was brought under the protection of the court and
was in effect a party to the action and the petitioner as the plaintiff in the
action representing the child was in the same position as a guardian ad
litem and was without power to dismiss the action without the consent of
the court." Id. at 298, 171 Cal. App. 2d at 290. See also Evans v. Taylor,
128 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. Ct. App. 1939). There the trial court delayed ruling
on a motion for discontinuance in a habeas corpus proceeding for custody
until the defendant had filed an answer requesting affirmative relief. The
court held that the trial judge was authorized to refuse to act on the motion
until the answer had been filed. Stout v. Pate, 208 Ga. 768, 69 S.E.2d 576
(1952). In this case there was an entry of dismissal by the plaintiff before
the answer in a habeas corpus proceeding for custody. The court held the
dismissal improper. See also Collard v. McCormick, 162 Ga. 116, 132 S.E.
757 (1926); Ex parte Welsh, 93 N.J. Eq. 303, 116 Atl. 23 (1922); EX
parte Rich, 3 N.Y.2d 689 (App. Div. 1938); Commonwealth ex rel. Gimbel
v. Gimbel, 94 Pa. Super. 577 (1928); McClendon v. McClendon, 289 S.W.2d
640 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
1265 N.C. 346, 144 S.E.2d 126 (1965).
2 "A blind alley; a street which is open at one end only." BLAcx, LAW
DrCTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).8265 N.C. at 360, 144 S.E.2d at 136.
'226 N.C. 750, 40 S.E.2d 600 (1946).
r Id. at 755, 40 S.E.2d at 604.
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ployment" or "use by the public" and "advantage" or "public
benefit." 6 The "use by the public" test is considered a strict inter-
pretation7 while the "public advantage" test is considered a broad
interpretation of the term.'
The North Carolina Supreme Court apparently uses a combina-
tion of the two tests as it has not specifically adopted either one.
In Cozard v. Hardwood Co.,9 a lumber company wanted to con-
struct a railroad across an individual's land so that a large tract
of timber could be harvested. The lumber company pointed out
that new land would be open for cultivation, that new tanneries and
factories would be established in the area to utilize the byproducts
of the logging industry that would otherwise be wasted, that immi-
gration would occur to fill the available jobs, and that many other
benefits would accrue to the public.:' However, the lumber company
only wanted its trains to be able to use the proposed tracks. Even
though the public advantage would have been immense, the use by
the public would have been negligible. After weighing the consider-
ations of both tests, the court denied the company permission to
build the railroad. The court seemed to give great weight to whether
or not the public would have a full and unrestricted right to use
the way, which in turn would determine the public character of the
facility."
In Reed v. State Highway & Pub. Works Conm'n' 2 the court
permitted the Highway Commission to condemn property to con-
struct a road that would provide an outlet for five homes from the
top of a mountain to the county seat and also would serve as part
of a scenic highway. While the number of people actually using
the road would be limited, the court did envision some public benefit
because it would tend to promote tourism. The court felt having
scenic roads would induce tourists to come to an area and spend
:2 NIcHOLs, EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.2 (3d ed. 1963).
Id. § 7.2[1]. Thus if a sufficient number of people will use the subject
of the power of eminent domain, it will be a permitted public use.8Id. § 7.2[2]. Thus if people generally in the community or state will
benefit from the exercise of the power of eminent domain, regardless of
whether they use the subject the power is exercised upon, it will be a per-
mitted public use, i.e., if it will create a better economy or if the general
welfare will be improved, it is for the public advantage.139 N.C. 283, 51 S.E. 932 (1905).10 Id. at 290, 51 S.E. at 935.
11Id. at 288, 51 S.E. at 934.
12209 N.C. 648, 184 S.E. 513 (1936).
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the summer and put money into circulation, which would benefit
all the people in the area.13 The fact that more money is put into
circulation and thus a public benefit results, standing alone, should
be insufficient to qualify as a public use that would support condem-
nation of private property. However, when coupled with the fact
that it will be used by the public, though limited in number, the
condemnation is more reasonable. Thus it seems the court has used
a combination of both tests to support a public use in Reed.
In City of Charlotte v. Heath14 the court recognized that a pub-
lic convenience would constitute a public use when the public has a
legal right to make use of the convenience. 5 Seventeen families
were to be served by a sewer line extension. The court said: "The
public nature of the project cannot be made to depend on a numeri-
cal count of those to be served or the smallness or largeness of a
community."" While the number of the public actually using the
proposed sewer line was limited, there was some general public ad-
vantage in that odors and insect growth were controlled. Again
public advantage and use by the public tests were used in conjunc-
tion with each other and the condemnation was sustained.
Perhaps the Batts decision can be explained in that it failed one
if not both of these tests. The court apparently did not think there
would be any general public advantage because it felt "that any use
by, or any benefit for, the general public will be only incidental
and purely conjectural. . . ."" The number of the public that would
have actually used the road would have been limited since it would
have served only four families and would have been a dead-end
road also. But, the court did not discuss the right of the general
public to use the road that was considered in Cozard v. Hardwood
Co.' 8
Many courts declare that if the public has a right to use the
road, it is immaterial that some people will benefit from the road
more than others, or that only a few people will use the road, or
that one end does not terminate at a public place, or that it is very
'
3 Id. at 654, 184 S.E. at 516.
14226 N.C. 750, 40 S.E.2d 600 (1946).
' Id. at 755, 40 S.E.2d at 604.
1 Ibid.
7 265 N.C. at 360, 144 S.E.2d at 136.
1 139 N.C. 283, 51 S.E. 932 (1905).
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short in length."9 While usually the courts are concerned with a
landlocked party's right to reach a public road, some courts attach
importance to the right of the public to reach the landlocked party
in the event he is summoned as a witness or to sit on a jury.2" A
court recently recognized that a public road to a landlocked property
owner could be justified because it might be used by doctors, nurses,
ambulances, salesmen or farm organization representatives. 2 ' Nor
is the public road allowed only when there is no other means avail-
able for access to the landlocked property.1
2
Perhaps the court considered that the landlocked parties in Batts
had an adequate remedy under the cartway statute23 if they proved
such a way was necessary, reasonable and just. While the court
did not comment on this provision in its opinion, the appellant did
raise this issue on appeal. 24 Apparently weight was given to the
fact that all of the interested parties were related to one of the
property owners. Throughout the opinion the court referred to the
proposed road serving "W. H. Batts and a few of his relatives."
It should be immaterial that these families were related to each
other, but the court did not intimate it would have held otherwise
had they not been related.
The court made it clear it was not holding that the proposed
road was not for a public use merely because it was a cul-de-sac. 2
In effect the court overruled State v. M'Daniel,26 which had held
that a cul-de-sac that did not terminate at a public place was not a
public road.
" E.g., Sherman v. Buick, 32 Cal. 241, 255 (1867); Leach v. Manhart,
102 Colo. 129, 133, 77 P.2d 652, 653 (1938); Hightower v. Chattahoochee
Industrial R.R., 218 Ga. 122, 125, 126 S.E.2d 664, 666 (1962); Taylor v.
Wentz, 15 Ill. 2d 83, 89, 153 N.E.2d 812, 816 (1958); Law v. Neola
Elevator Co., 281 Ill. 143, 150, 117 N.E. 435, 437 (1917); Butte, A. &
Pac. Ry. v. Montana Union Ry., 16 Mont. 504, 523, 41 Pac. 232, 238 (1895) ;
Phillips v. Stockton, 270 S.W.2d 266, 270 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) ; Heninger
v. Peery, 102 Va. 896, 899, 47 S.E. 1013, 1014 (1904).
" E.g., Leach v. Manhart, supra note 19; Pagels v. Oaks, 64 Iowa 198,
203, 19 N.W. 905, 907 (1884); Johnson v. Supervisors of Clayton County,
61 Iowa 89, 91, 15 N.W. 856, 857 (1883).
" Tracey v. Preston, 114 Ohio App. 206, 181 N.E.2d 479 (1960).
" Denham v. County Comm'rs of Bristol, 108 Mass. 202 (1871). The
party seeking the public road already had two other accesses to public
roads.
k' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-69 (1964).
,Brief for Appellant, p. 13.
211265 N.C. at 357, 144 S.E.2d at 135.
" 53 N.C, 284 (1860).
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If the Batts decision holds that a cul-de-sac serving only four
families is not a road for a public use, it would seem the State
Highway Commission may encounter problems of using public
funds to maintain other dead-end roads on the Secondary Road
System that serve only a limited number of families. Any taxpayer
would have standing to bring suit to prevent misuse of agency
[State Highway Commission] powerY7 The court said: "To sus-
tain the proposed condemnation . . . under the facts and circum-
stances here would set a dangerous precedent for the expenditure
of public funds by the State Highway Commission .. .*"I How-
ever, there was not an expenditure of public funds under the facts
and circumstances here because the landlocked parties had given
the Highway Commission an indemnity bond to cover any damages
to the defendants' property. The only expenditure of funds would
be for the construction and maintenance of the road, not acquiring
the right of way.
Also in the light of the Batts decision, it seems that the State
Highway Commission will have to alter its administrative policy
of adding roads and streets to the Secondary Road System which
is maintained by the Commission. At the present time the Commis-
sion policy requirements are: "(2) Roads less than one mile in
length must have at least four occupied residences fronting the
road.... (4) There must be at least two individual property own-
ers on 'the road."29 The proposed road in Batts met both these
requirements.
HAROLD D. COLSTON
Evidence-Admissibility of Agent's Declaration Against His
Principal
The plaintiff's decedent in Branch v. Dempsey' was fatally in-
jured in a head-on collision with the defendant owner's truck being
operated by the defendant driver in the scope of his employment.2
", Stratford v. City of Greensboro, 124 N.C. 127, 32 S.E. 394 (1899).
28 265 N.C. at 360, 144 S.E.2d at 137.2 9N.C. STATE HIGHWAY COMM'N, SECONDARY ROADs 14.
'265 N.C. 733, 145 S.E.2d 395 (1965).
2The agency relationship between the owner and his driver was pre-
sumptively established by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-71.1(b) (Supp 1965), which
provides:
Proof of the registration of a motor vehicle in the name of any
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Somethne after the wreck, the driver told an investigating officer
that the truck stalled while he was attempting to make a left turn.'
When the plaintiff offered this officer's testimony on the issue of
the driver's negligence against both defendants, the trial judge in-
structed the jury that the declaration by the defendant driver was
to be considered only against him and not against the owner, and
at the close of the plaintiff's case, he entered a nonsuit in favor of
the owner.' The North Carolina Supreme Court in a four-to-three
decision5 affirmed.' The court held that the officer's testimony was
hearsay and inadmissible against the owner since the driver had no
authority to speak on his behalf.7 It further held that the defendant
owner could not be adjudged liable for the negligent acts of his
driver committed within the scope of his employment since the only
evidence of his driver's negligence was incompetent against him.8
The majority and dissenting opinions in this case enunciate almost
all the theories advanced with respect to the admissibility of a
driver's extrajudicial declaration against his principal and the neces-
sity for such admission where it is the only evidence offered on the
issue of a driver's negligence to establish his principal's liability.
It is a well established rule that where an agent has authority
to speak for his principal, his extrajudicial declarations are treated
"as if" made by the principal and admissible against the principal
under the admission of a party opponent exception to the hearsay
rule.9 The rationale is not based on any rule of evidence but is
person, firm, or corporation, shall for the purpose of any action be
prima facie evidence of ownership and that such motor vehicle was
then being operated by and under the control of a person for whose
conduct the owner was legally responsible, for the owner's benefit,
and within the course and scope of his employment.
'The investigating officer talked with the driver at the hospital where
the plaintiff's decedent was taken after the accident and later at the police
station. He testified to the driver's declaration but failed to state in which
of these conversations the statement was made. 265 N.C. at 738, 145 S.E.2d
at 399.
' Id. at 739, 145 S.E.2d at 400.
'Justice Parker, joined by Chief Justice Denny, dissented. Id. at 749,
145 S.E.2d at 406. Justice Sharp also dissented. Id. at 756, 145 S.E.2d at
411.
8 Id. at 746, 145 S.E.2d at 404.
" Ibid. The court reasoned that the North Carolina statute creating a
prima facie agency relationship between the registered owner of a motor
vehicle and the driver applies only when the vehicle is in operation and
not to what the driver says afterwards merely narrative of a past occurrence.8Ibid.
* STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 168 (1963).
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founded upon the substantive responsibility of the principal for the
acts of his agent committed within the scope of his authority.10 In
the situation where a driver makes a statement, the North Carolina"
and majority rule 2 is that the principal is not chargeable with the
declaration in the absence of proof that his driver had authority to
speak. Thus, a driver's statement to an investigating officer of how
the accident occurred is inadmissible against his principal. In
Branch, Justice Sharp dissented' and argued that every owner is
charged with contemplating the possibility of his driver's having an
accident; consequently, public policy demands that he extend his
driver's authority to include a narrative statement to an investigat-
ing officer. 14
It appears that the North Carolina Supreme Court could have
admitted such extrajudicial declaration against the principal on the
basis of other existing decisions. Under the res gestae exception
to the hearsay rule, 5 an agent's declaration is admissible against
his principal when made contemporaneously with the event com-
plained of or before any time has elapsed for reflection or fabrica-
tion that eliminates the "safeguard of trustworthiness."' 6 The
rationale for this exception is the inherent trustworthiness of the
declarant's statement, i.e., the circumstances under which it was
uttered makes it extremely unlikely that such declaration was fabri-
cated.' 7 Since it is just as unlikely under the circumstances that a
"04 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 1078 (3d ed. 1940).
" E.g., Hobbs v. Queen City Coach Co., 225 N.C. 323, 34 S.E.2d 211
(1945) (bus driver's admission of conduct). STANSBURY, op. cit. supra
note 9, § 169.
128 Am. JuR. 2D Automobiles § 968 (1963). See McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE
§ 244 (1954); 4 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 10, § 1078.1 3265 N.C. at 756, 145 S.E.2d at 411.
2, Id. at 765, 145 S.E.2d at 417. In Martin v. Savage Truck Line, 121
F. Supp. 417 (D.D.C. 1954), the court said:
To say, in these circumstances, that the owner of a motor truck may
constitute a person his agent for the purpose of the operation of
such truck over public streets and highways, and to say at the same
time that such operator is no longer the agent of such owner when
an accident occurs, for the purpose of truthfully relating the facts
concerning the occurrence to an investigating police officer on the
scene shortly thereafter, seems to me to erect an untenable fiction,
neither contemplated by the parties nor sanctioned by public policy.
Id. at 419. For other cases in accord, see Branch v. Dempsey, 265 N.C.
733, 756, 145 S.E.2d 395, 411 (1965) (Sharp, J., dissenting).





driver would fabricate a responsive statement to an investigating
officer that could subject him to civil liabilities and possible criminal
penalties and additionally might cause him to lose his job, a driver's
post rem admission of allegedly negligent conduct should be ac-
cepted as equally trustworthy.'" Thus, the court could admit such
declaration against the principal by logically extending the res gestae
exception as some courts have done' 9 or possibly by invoking
another limited exception to the hearsay rule.
In addition to the possible approach above, the court appears to
have recognized an exception to the rule excluding an agent's post
rem declaration. The plaintiff in Jones v. Raney Chevrolet Co.2"
was injured when the driver of the car in which he was riding lost
control because of defective brakes. In a suit against the defendant
car dealer who had recently sold this car to the driver, the plaintiff
offered in evidence an unauthorized statement made by the defen-
dant's foreman that he knew the brakes on this type of car were
defective but had not changed them before the sale."' The court
held the agent's statement admissible against the principal for the
limited purpose of imputing knowledge of the defective brakes to
him.22 In contrast to the situation where a driver admits his con-
duct in allegedly causing a wreck, Justice Sharp argued that this
distinction seemed illogical since, in both situations, the plaintiff is
attempting to establish the principal's liability by such evidence.23
Furthermore, in Jones the risk of the declaration being untrust-
worthy was far greater than in Branch since the declarant-foreman
was not an active tort-feasor.24 This distinction creates the addi-
tional problem of defining what is admissible for this limited pur-
pose. For example, if in Branch the driver had also told the in-
vestigating officer that the truck had stalled on several occasions,
would this have been admissible under the knowledge exception? It
"' Justice Sharp made this statement of trustworthiness as a general argu-
ment for admitting an agent's declaration "as if" made by his principal.
265 N.C. at 764-65, 145 S.E.2d at 417.
" E.g., Lucchesi v. Reynolds, 125 Wash. 352, 216 Pac. 12 (1923), where
the court said, "[T]o argue from one case to another on this question of
'time to devise or contrive' is to trifle with principle and to cumber the
records with unnecessary and unprofitable quibbles." Id. at 355, 216 Pac.
at 13.
20 217 N.C. 693, 9 S.E.2d 395 (1940).
" Id. at 695, 9 S.E.2d at 396.
22 Ibid.
2, 265 N.C. at 765, 145 S.E.2d at 417.2
' Ibid.
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would seem that the court could extend this post rem exception
to include a driver's post rem admission of conduct.
Apart from these alternatives for admitting a driver's extra-
judicial declaration against his principal, the ultimate question
arises: Is it necessary that evidence of an agent's negligence be
admissible against his principal to impose liability upon him under
respondeat superior? It is a well established rule of law that a
principal is substantively responsible for the acts of his agent com-
mitted within the scope of his employment.2" As Justice Parker
argued in his dissenting opinion,26 once the jury finds the tort-
feasor's liability upon evidence competent against him and the agency
relationship is established for that tortious act, the agent's liability
is imputed to the principal by operation of law since "to hold other-
wise would be to make a mockery of the law. . ,,." This approach
is substantively correct, but it creates a dilemma where the principal
is sued separately and the only evidence of his agent's negligence
is incompetent against him. Had the plaintiff in Branch sued the
owner without joining the driver as co-defendant, he could not have
introduced the driver's admission of allegedly negligent conduct
since the driver was not a party to the action.28 Thus, recognizing
that joinder was only a matter of convenience, a majority of the
court refused to apply respondeat superior in the Branch situation.29
Even though its rationale is plausible, the court enunciated a rule
that undermines the entire concept of a principal's substantive re-
sponsibility for the negligent acts of his agent, since it is now possi-
ble for a principal to escape liability even though his agent has
admitted and been held liable for his alleged negligent conduct.
Where there is other evidence of an agent's negligence in addi-
tion to his admission so that his principal cannot obtain a nonsuit,
a problem arises as to the effectiveness of a trial judge's instruction
to the jury on the issue of their respective liability. The judge will
have to charge the jury that they must not consider the agent's ad-
mission in deciding the principal's liability so that they must find
for the principal if the other evidence of the agent's negligence is
insufficient in their minds to establish the agent's negligence. It
" 35 Am. JUR. Master and Servant § 543 (1941).
2° 265 N.C. at 749, 145 S.E.2d at 406.
-" Id. at 751, 145 S.E.2d at 407, where justice Parker was quoting from
Grayson v. Williams, 256 F.2d 61, 68 (10th Cir. 1958).
28 265 N.C. at 741-42, 145 S.E.2d at 401.
20 Ibid.
1150 [Vol. 44
is unrealistic to say that a jury will not give added weight to this
other evidence of an agent's negligence in view of his admission.
Thus, the practical effect of rendering an agent's statement inad-
missible against his principal is insignificant where there is enough
other evidence of negligence to get the issue of his principal's liabili-
ty before the jury.
From an insurance standpoint, it may be immaterial in certain
instances whether a principal is granted a nonsuit. In the Branch
type situation involving motor vehicles, the ultimate result might
well be the same as if the owner had been adjudged liable unless
the verdict exceeds the policy's coverage, since the owner's motor
vehicle liability insurance policy would have included the driver as
an "insured" under its omnibus provision.3 ' However, in other
situations where a principal's insurance policy covers only his ac-
tions and those of his agents if he is legally liable,31 an injured
plaintiff would be relegated to seeking relief from a possibly un-
insured agent if his principal obtained a nonsuit under the Branch
rule. Thus, to provide adequate redress for a plaintiff injured by
an agent in the scope of his employment, the court should reconsider
its approach.
It appears that the North Carolina Supreme Court could have
either admitted an agent's admission against his principal or applied
the doctrine of respondeat superior without regard to the dilemma
appearing in successive actions. Should the court continue its harsh
approach, it is hoped that the legislature will provide appropriate
relief by making an agent's statement to an investigating officer
admissible against his principal.
COMANN P. CRAVER, JR.
"The National Standard Policy contains the following provision:
Definition of Insured. With respect to the insurance for bodily injury
liability and for property damage liability the unqualified word 'in-
sured' includes the named insured and also includes any person while
using the [motor vehicle] . . . provided the actual use of the [motor
vehicle] is by the named insured or with his permission....
GREGORY & KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 559 (1959). In
North Carolina, all motor vehicle owners must carry minimum liability
insurance coverage. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-309 (Supp. 1965). Even though
there is no requirement that such policies contain an omnibus provision,
most policies provide this encompassing provision.
" This is a general liability insurance policy carried by employers that
covers almost all types of liabilities except those arising from motor vehicle
operation. For a discussion of the various types of policies, see RIEGEL &
MILLER, INSURANCE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 669-726 (1959).
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Federal Jurisdiction-Removal of Civil Rights Cases-Fourth Circuit
Affirms Limitations
Subsection 1443(1) of the Judicial Code1 permits removal to
the federal district court of a case commenced in a state court when
a defendant "cannot enforce in the courts of such State a right
under any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens. .... -2
This provision has gained new importance because section 901 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 permits appellate review of a district
court order remanding such a case to the state court. Such review
was not previously available.
In Baines v. City of Danville,' the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed by a three-to-two decision
the remand of 105 civil rights cases, holding that the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment was not a "law providing
for the equal civil rights of citizens"4 and that the inability to en-
force the "law" must be shown to result from a state statute or
constitutional provision which, on its face, violates the provisions
of the federal constitution.5 The Fourth Circuit thus put itself in
conflict with holdings of the Second, Fifth and Ninth Circuits that
the equal protection clause was such a "law providing for the equal
civil rights of citizens"' and a further holding of the Fifth Circuit
-U.S.C. § 1443(1) (1964). For a more complete discussion of the
removal of civil rights cases and the origin, history and recent interpreta-
tions of § 1443 see Comment, 44 N.C.L. REv. 380 (1966). See also Amster-
dam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights:
Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court
Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 793, 805 (1965).
'28 U.S.C. § 1443(1) (1964).
'357 F.2d 756 (4th Cir.), affirmed without opinion, 34 U.S.L. Week
3425 (June 21, 1966). The United States Supreme Court decision was an-
nounced after this note was written. The petitioners alleged that they
were being prosecuted for demonstrating in the streets of Danville in pro-
test against customs and practices perpetuating racial segregation, that the
injunctive order [which they were charged with violating] is unconstitu-
tional for "making criminal" conduct which is constitutionally protected [by
the first and fourteenth amendments] and that the injunction is in violation
of their civil rights. Id. at 758.
'Id. at 764.5Id. at 765.
' Peacock v. City of Greenwood, 347 F.2d 679, 682, rev'd, 34 U.S.L.
Week 4572 (June 21, 1966); New York v. Galamison, 342 F.2d 255, 271
(2d Cir. 1965) (dictum); Steele v. Superior Court, 164 F.2d 781 (9th Cir.
1947) (dictum). The dissenting opinion in Baines relied upon these cases
for authority that the equal protection clause is a "law providing for equal
rights" within the meaning of the statute.
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that removal was justified in situations other than where the "law"
was rendered unenforceable by state statute or constitutional pro-
vision.7 The conflict is primarily one of statutory construction, and
this note will examine the opposing constructions as developed in
the majority and dissenting opinions in Baines.
I. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
In Baines the Fourth Circuit insisted that the petitioners' allega-
tions "that they were acting in aid of fourteenth amendment
rights . . ." furnished no basis for removal.' Section 1 of the
original civil rights removal act, the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
had enumerated rights which if denied made removal appropriate.
This law was re-enacted in 1870, and in the Revision of 1875 the
enumeration was taken out of the removal provision and placed
elsewhere in the Judicial Code.'" The court concluded that the re-
placement of the phrase "those rights enumerated in section 1"
with the language "all rights secured to him by any law providing
for the equal civil rights of citizens . . ." was not intended to extend
coverage in excess of those rights which had been previously enu-
merated in section 1, but that "the revisers understood that the
laws were not static and that the Congress in the future might
enact additional legislation . . . with an intention to expand the
removal rights."'" The statute was open-ended in that new laws
might come within its purview, but the fourteenth amendment was
not included for two reasons: it had been -passed by Congress and
ratified by the states in the period between the passage of the origi-
nal act and the re-enactment of 1870, and it was not a "law" in the
sense in which the word is used in the removal provision.'" The
court maintained the word "law" as used in the section refers only
to statutes providing for equal civil rights, and since the fourteenth
amendment is not a statute its inclusion was not intended.'3
A contrary conclusion in regard to the equal protection clause
was reached by the dissenting opinion. Also relying upon the scope
of the original removal act of 1866,14 it depended upon what it
"Peacock v. City of Greenwood, 347 F.2d 679, 682 (5th Cir. 1965).
' 357 F.2d at 764.
'Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
:oEv. STAT. § 641 (1875).
' 357 F.2d at 764.12 Id. at 763.
1 Id. at 764.
" 357 F.2d at 774.
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asserted was the "general understanding" of both the supporters
and opponents of the measure that the rights in section 1 were to
be given the broadest possible interpretation. 5 After the passage
of the original civil rights act, the dissenters observed, there was
some concern over its constitutionality, and the fourteenth amend-
ment, they concluded, was passed to insure the act's legality.
The enactment of the Equal Protection Clause, in language close-
ly paralleling section 1 of the 1866 statute, legitimated beyond
question Congress' attempt to protect the type of rights granted in
the statute, and there is no reason to think that the rights con-
templated by section 1 are of less breadth than those contem-
plated by the Equal Protection Clause.16
The dissenters thought that the adoption of the language
"'law[s] providing for equal civil rights' in the 1875 recodifica-
tion ...evidences the revisor's understanding of the broad view
taken by the 1866 Congress of the rights protected by removal"17
and that the section is thus not limited to "statutory" rights as the
majority contended.' s
The Supreme Court may decide whether the equal protec-
tion clause is a "law providing for equal civil rights" when ex-
amining the conflict between the circuit courts. 9 This determination
is not likely to increas6 or decrease removal litigation to any great
extent. Should it be decided that the clause is not such a law, a
petitioner can, without too much trouble, draft the removal petition
so as to base the claim upon a federal statute guaranteeing sub-
stantially the same substantive right.
II. WHAT PETITIONER MUST SHow To DEMONSTRATE
THAT HE CANNOT ENFORCE THE RIGHT
The early United States Supreme Court cases of Virginia v.
Rives20 and Kentucky v. Powers"' did not allow removal because
1 Ibid.
16 Id. at 775.
7 Id. at 777.
Ibid.
19 After this note was written the United States Supreme Court reversed
Peacock v. City of Greenwood, 34 U.S.L. Week 4572 (June 21, 1966), and
affirmed Rachel v. Georgia, 34 U.S.L. Week 4563 (June 21, 1966).
20 100 U.S. 313 (1880).
21201 U.S. 1 (1906). In both Rives and Powers the petitioners based
their right to remove on the allegation that a group to which they belonged
would be excluded from the jury that would try them in the state court.
The alleged exclusion, in each case, would not result from a state statute
but from a practice within the community.
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the petitioner could not satisfy the court that the protected right
would be denied in the state court.22 The Baines majority read
these cases as establishing the rule that a right must be denied by
a state statute or constitutional provision that is unconstitutional
on its face in order to remove to the federal court. It concluded,
furthermore, that the right to remove must be apparent before trial
and cannot be based "upon the supposition that during the course
of the trial or the sentencing, a protected right would be denied or
the defendant would find himself unable to enforce it."28 On the
other hand, the dissenting opinion maintained that the Rives-Powers
line of decisions has no application when removal is sought "on
assertions ... relating not to some future stage of the proceedings,
but to the very arrests and prosecutions which give rise to these
proceedings." 4 In this situation the Fifth Circuit had allowed re-
moval in Peacock v. City of Greenwood25 where the allegation was
that the arrests and prosecutions denied the petitioners "equal civil
rights,"28 that is, the right to demonstrate against the segregation
policies of the community.
The original act, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, contained a pro-
vision for post-judgment removal which was deleted by the Revision
of 1875.27 The majority in Baines maintained that this rendered the
act virtually unenforceable.28 "[T] he judiciary cannot restore what
the Congress struck from the statute or construe what remains to
approximate the congressional intention 'before it struck the most
important part of its earlier scheme."2 The dissenting opinion did
not agree. It maintained that the purpose of the original act was
to provide for removal other than post-judgment removal and that
the excision of the post-judgment removal provision did not amount
to "major surgery" as the majority maintains.30
Another argument adopted by the majority opinion in Baines
is that there must be "vertical unenforceability,"' that is, the peti-
tioner must show that the right would also be denied in the state
22 100 U.S. at 320; 201 U.S. at 31.
2' 357 F.2d at 765.
Id. at 784.
347 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1965) (removal allowed on facts almost identi-
cal to Baines).
Id. at 681.
REv. STAT. § 641 (1875).
28 357 F.2d at 768.
-1 Ibid.
80 Id. at 778.
81 Id. at 770.
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appellate courts. This argument was rejected by the dissenting
opinion, which insisted that even if this were true, when rights are
denied prior to trial by the arrests and prosecutions "vertical un-
enforceability" has no application and the question is mooted."
The dissent also relied upon the mood of the Thirty-ninth Con-
gress, which enacted the original Civil Rights Removal Act in 1866,
and the Eighty-ninth Congress, which enacted the provision for
appellate review in 1964. It maintained that the Eighty-ninth Con-
gress in providing for appellate review intended that federal courts
re-examine the restrictions on removal established by Rives and
Powers.3 But the majority disagreed, saying indications of this
were "minority expressions of an expectation of judicial reconsider-
ation of congressional intent ... not the equivalent of congressional
redefinition of its intention.""4
President Andrew Johnson, after once vetoing the original Civil
Rights Act of 1866, expressed concern over what he termed the
broad effect of the bill. In contrast, Senator Trumbell, the bill's
manager, in a speech to the Senate insisted that "there would be
no pretrial removal even in the face of a discriminatory state
statute. ' 35 The majority took Trumbell's remark to mean that Con-
"Id. at 787. The dissenting opinion points out that
after their removal petitions had been filed in the federal district court,
two of the present petitioners were tried in the Corporation Court of
Danville, fined, and sentenced to 45 to 90 days for their participation in
the demonstrations. The conduct of these two trials affords a striking
illustration of the treatment to be expected by these petitioners in the
state courts. Policemen were stationed at every corner of the room;
lawyers were searched on entering and leaving the courtroom; and
petitioners were required to appear in court from day to day for roll
call, although the prosecutor could have had no expectation of trying
more than a few of them on any one day. Thus any organized pro-
tests were effectively silenced and the defendants' ability to earn a
living impaired. Then, all the cases were transferred to various courts
throughout the state, some as far as 250 miles away.
The assumption that these Negroes' rights could be vindicated in
the state courts was dramatically undermined by a ruling that flatly
barred constitutional defenses to the charges against the demonstra-
tors. The presiding judge announced from the bench, prior to taking
of any evidence, that he would not permit any such defense to be
raised. By stripping appellants of any opportunity to show in the
record that their conduct was protected from state interference, this
prohibition shows a clear inability to enforce their rights in the local
tribunals.
Id. at 773-74.33 Id. at 788.
31 Id. at 762.
" CONG. GLonE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1759 (1866) [covering 1833-1873].
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gress never contemplated pretrial removal,"6 but the dissent main-
tained that the President was concerned only about the criminal
liability of the state court judges under the act 7 and that Senator
Trumbull was replying to Johnson in reference only to this aspect of
the statute. "The Senator did not say, as the majority would infer,
that these sections could not be brought into play by the action of
. . . sheriffs and policemen . . . prior to the court proceedings.""
Dissenting Judges Bell and Sobeloff would hold these cases re-
movable under subsection 1443 (1) if "they have been denied these
rights by state officials prior to trial .... -
Part of the reason for the wide divergence in the opinions can
be traced to the long period of time in which the problems remained
dormant because of the lack of appellate review and the futility of
attempting to reach conclusions about century-old congressional
mood or intent. There seems to be some merit to the argument
of the dissenters that the Eighty-ninth Congress meant for the fed-
eral courts to re-examine their position in regard to removal when
it passed the proviso for appellate review of an order to remand.
Whether or not this be the case, the conflict in the circuit courts
necessitates clear explanation of the Rives and Powers opinions by
a modern Court.
BILLY R. BARR
Securities Regulations-Civil Liability Under Section 17(a) of the
Securities Act and Rule 15cl-7 of the Exchange Act
In the expanding area of securities regulations, the Securities
Act of 19331 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,2 together
with the rules promulgated thereunder, have been used increasingly
as bases for finding civil liability for violations thereof. While
sections 11, 12(1), and 12(2) 3 of the Securities Act and sections
357 F.2d at 767.
, Section 2 of the original act of 1866, now 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1964),
provided that any state official who "shall subject or cause to be subjected
any inhabitant ... to the deprivation of any right secured or protected by
this act.., shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."
-8 357 F.2d at 783.
30 Id. at 773.
'48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bb (1964).
248 Stat. 881 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1964).
'48 Stat. 82, 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771 (1964).
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9(e), 16(b), 18, and 29(b) 4 of the Exchange Act expressly pro-
vide for civil remedies, liabilities in civil actions have been implied
under other sections and rules.5
A recent decision extended a civil remedy to yet another rule
under the Exchange Act. In Newkirk v. Hayden, Stone & Co.' a
federal district court allowed recovery of damages under section
17(a) of the Securities Act' and rule 15cl-7 8 promulgated under
section 15 (c) (1) of the Exchange Act.' Plaintiff, a school teacher,
had transferred his life savings to an account with defendant
brokerage house. McNutt, a salesman of defendant, was to trade
the account intending to make short-swing profits for plaintiff.
'48 Stat. 889, 896, 897, 903 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78p,
78r, 78cc (1964).
'J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (sections 14(a) and 27
of the Exchange Act); Goldenburg v. Bache & Co., 270 F.2d 675 (5th Cir.
1959) (section 7 of the Exchange Act); Standard Fruit & S.S. Co. v.
Midwest Stock Exch., 178 F. Supp. 669 (N.D. Ill. 1959) (section 12(f)
of the Exchange Act); Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y.
1949) (section 17(a) of the Securities Act); Hawkins v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Beane, 85 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Ark. 1949) (section
11(d) (2) of the Exchange Act and Rule 17a-5) ; Kardon v. National Gyp-
sum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act and Rule 10b-5). For a full discussion of expressed and implied civil
liabilities under the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, and the rules pursuant
thereto, see also Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities Based Upon Stock Exchange
Rules, 66 COLUM. L. Rzv. 12 (1966).
' CCH FED. SEc. L. REP,. 91,621. (S.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 1965).
48 Stat. 84-5 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1964). Section 17(a) of the
act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securi-
ties by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or
communications in interstate commerce or by the use of mails, direct-
ly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue state-
ment of a material fact or any omission to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
the purchaser.
'C.F.R. § 240.15cl-7 (1964) Section (a) provides:
The term "manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device, or con-
trivance", as used in section 15(c) of the act, is hereby defined to
include any act of any broker or dealer designed to effect with or for
any customer's account in respect to which such broker or dealer or
his agent or employee is vested with any discretionary power any
transactions of purchase or sale which are excessive in size or fre-
quency in view of the financial resources and character of such ac-
count.
.52 Stat. 1075 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(1) (1964).
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Plaintiff was not familiar with the sophisticated maneuvers used in
a trading account; therefore, he relied heavily on McNutt to man-
age the account in plaintiff's best interests. McNutt effected numer-
ous transactions in the account over a three-month period, generat-
ing 2,722.55 dollars in commissions and causing capital losses of
2,245.57 dollars. In view of the fact that the account when opened
contained a net equity of 8,439.65 dollars, the court held such
heavy trading to be excessive and awarded damages equal to the
amount of commissions charged.
Rule 15cl-7 is violated only where the account is discretionary.
In finding the plaintiff's account to be discretionary, the court did
not restrict itself to the formality of requiring "prior written au-
thorization" by the customer.10 Instead, the court applied a more
practical test by looking to the customer's naivete and the degree of
reliance placed upon McNutt's advice. Such a position is in line
with decisions rendered by the SEC."
The court in the principal case appeared to have little difficulty
in finding an abuse of discretion in the actions of the salesman. The
court rested its holding on the unusually large amount of commis-
sions generated, the total value of the transactions (158,000 dol-
lars) that took place in the three-month period, and the proportion
of the salesman's total commissions represented by this single ac-
count (seventeen per cent). This reasoning is consistent with hold-
ings of the Commission in cases dealing with churning-excessive
trading-of customers' accounts.' 2
" N.Y. Stock Exch. Rule 408, CCH N.Y. STOCK EXCH. GUIDE 2408. A
salesman has discretionary power over a customer's account where "the
prior written authorization of the customer has been received." Where such
authorization is given, a salesman may trade the account for the customer's
benefit without receiving specific orders from the customer.
" The Commission in Norris & Hirshberg, Inc., 21 S.E.C. 865, 870
(1946), held that an account was discretionary when a broker-dealer could
"dominate the choice of investment and the timing and frequency of trans-
actions... ." In E. H. Rollins & Sons, Inc., 18 S.E.C. 347, 380 (1945),
the Commission declared that in regard to discretionary accounts the signifi-
cant determination involves the status between the broker-dealer and the
customer. In Behel, Johnsen & Co., 26 S.E.C. 163, 168 (1947), no express
discretionary power was conferred on the dealer; however, the Commission
found the registrant guilty of churning accounts of its customers. The
Commission pointed out that the registrant occupied a position of trust in
respect to its customers and should have managed their accounts with their
best interest as a guide.
"E.g., Shearson, Hammill & Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 77,306
(1965); Reynolds & Co., 39 S.E.C. 902 (1960); Walter S. Grubbs, 28
S.E.C. 323 (1948).
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Although the traditional remedies for violations of section 17(a)
of the Securities Act and rule 15c1-7 have been administrative sanc-
tions imposed by the SEC,' 3 the court allowed recovery of damages.
It is not entirely clear whether the court based civil liability on a
violation of section 17(a) or rule 15cl-7 or both. The general
fraud provisions of section 17(a) have been relied upon under
somewhat different circumstances to attach civil liability.14 At the
same time, no cases have been reported prior to Newkirk in which
rule 15cl-7 was premised as a basis for recovery of damages.
Nevertheless, it is submitted that the provisions of rule 15cl-7 that
specifically prohibit churning are more directly applicable than the
general fraud provisions of section 17(a)."5
Although there is no express provision for civil liability under
rule 15cl-7, the decision implying such liability is in keeping with
a trend begun in 1946 in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.'" There
the court allowed recovery of damages for a violation of rule
10b-5.' The federal district court based its holding on two theories:
(1) common-law tort liability as a result of violation of a statute, 8
and (2) the implication of the wording of section 29(b) of the
Exchange Act. 9 The former has particular applicability in New-
kirk. Traditionally, courts have allowed recovery of damages for
injuries resulting from violations of statutory enactments.20 A
1 Reynolds & Co., 39 S.E.C. 902 (1960) (suspension of registrant and
Reynolds & Co. from membership in the National Association of Securities
Dealers for thirty days); Behel, Johnsen & Co., 26 S.E.C. 163 (1947)
(revocation of registration of registrant and expulsion from membership
in the National Association of Securities Dealers).
" E.g., Pfeffer v. Cressaty, 223 F. Supp. 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). (Action
to recover damages for fraudulent misstatements and omissions of material
facts in connection with the sale of stock); Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp.
869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
1 Compare sections quoted in notes 7 and 8 supra.
0 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
17 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1964).8 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
19 Id. at 514. 48 Stat. 903 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 78cc(b)
(1964).
"0 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 286, comment d (1965), discussing
the situation where a criminal statute does not provide expressly for civil
liability, states in part:
[T]he court is free, in making its own judicial rules, to adopt and
apply to the negligence action the standard of conduct provided by
such a criminal enactment or regulation. . . . The decision to adopt
the standard [of conduct] is purely a judicial one, for the court to
make.... On the same basis, the court may adopt the standard of
conduct laid down by an administrative regulation.
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member of a class for whose protection a criminal statute or regula-
tion was designed may sue for damages caused by a breach of such
law.2 The dominating purpose of the Exchange Act and the rules
promulgated thereunder is to provide protection for investors. 2
Certainly, a customer whose account has been excessively traded
falls within the class of persons to be protected by rule 15cl-7 and
the violation of the rule by the salesman constitutes activity from
which investors are protected.
Another premise upon which civil liability can be argued is
found in the jurisdictional section of the Exchange Act.23 That
section states that the federal district courts "shall have exclusive
jurisdiction ... of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to
enforce any liability or duty created by this title or the rules and
regulations thereunder."24 Such language would seem to imply that
Congress had civil suits for damages in mind when this section was
written.2
5
A final argument for civil liability was made by the court in
Newkirk. Under section 15A(b) (4) of the Exchange Act, the SEC
is empowered to bar a broker from membership in the National
Association of Securities Dealers for violations of the Act.26 It
would seem that allowing recovery of damages in a private action
would constitute a less drastic result and might be preferable in
some situations.
The principal argument posed against the extension of civil
liability is the maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, i.e.,
since Congress neglected to make express provisions for civil liabil-
ity, it intended that there be none. This doctrine was severely
limited as a rule of construction in SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing
21Id. at § 286; Comment, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1134-35 (1950).
" 14 U. CmI. L. REv. 471, 474-75 (1947); Comment, 59 YALE L.J. 1120,
1133 (1950). The author of the former note suggests that
each section of the several federal securities acts in which certain
conduct is made unlawful, and in which no exclusive remedy is pro-
vided, might become the basis of civil actions of the type under dis-
cussion, provided the section is designed for the protection of in-
vestors.
14 U. CHI. L. REv. at 478.
'348 Stat. 902 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964).
"'48 Stat. at 902-03; 15 U.S.C. at § 78aa. (Emphasis added.)
"B Lowenfels, supra note 5, at 18-19.
52 Stat. 1070 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b) (4) (1964).
* Comment, 59 YALE: L.J. 1120, 1133 & n.68 (1950).
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Corp., 8 where the Court stated that the rule must be "subordinated
to the doctrine that courts will construe the details of an act in con-
formity with its dominating general purpose .. ."I Since the
dominating purpose of the Exchange Act is to protect investors, 80
and since section 28(a) of the act provides that remedies created
by the act shall be in addition to those available in law or equity,,"
it would seem that expressio unius est exclusio alterius has little or
no applicability to a construction of the Exchange Act.
The court in Newkirk, while allowing liability for damages in
a civil action, left several questions open for later clarification. For
example, to what extent does a heavy loss in an account influence
the court in its finding of an abuse of discretion? It would seem
that at least some attention should be directed toward the general
market trend during the period, since a broker-dealer should not be
made to bear the burden of errors of judgment. To hold otherwise
would allow the court to take advantage of hindsight in second-
guessing the broker-dealer. At the same time, should the court take
notice of the caliber of securities traded in a discretionary account?
If so, then possibly the measure of damages should go beyond the
commissions earned when it is shown that the particular securities
traded were highly speculative and of doubtful value. Assuming
commissions earned to be the correct measure of damages, would a
recovery be allowed where an account, shown to have been exces-
sively traded, has yielded a net profit? Although a case involving
such a situation would be unlikely to arise, it must be remembered
that the commissions charged still represent a reduction in the equity
of the account. Where a reckless and willful disregard for the
customer's interests is displayed by a broker-dealer while churning
an account, should the court allow a recovery of punitive dam-
ages ?"2 While the decision in Newkirk seems to be in line with the
prevailing trend of the courts, the traditional application of tort
liability for statutory violations, and the dominating purpose of the
Exchange Act, it is evident that further decisions will be necessary
"320 U.S. 344 (1943).
'
8 Id. at 350.
o See note 22 supra.
8148 Stat. 903 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (1964).22An award of punitive damages would be highly unlikely since § 28 of
the Exchange Act expressly prohibits a recovery under the act in excess
of actual damages sustained. 48 Stat. 903 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78bb(a) (1964).
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to delineate the scope of and grounds for civil liability under rule
15cl-7.
CHARLES E. ELROD, JR.
Taxation-Charitable Deductions-Bequest for Benefit of Employees
The majority shareholder of a corporation made a bequest of
forty per cent of his residuary estate to a testamentary trust to pro-
vide pension payments-to the employees of the corporation. Em-
ployees employed prior to, or at the time of, decedent's death who
retired after twenty-five years of service were to receive monthly
pension payments of not more than 125 dollars.' Yearly trust in-
come in excess of that needed for pension payments was to be paid
over to an employees' trust fund created by the corporation in 1946
for pension purposes. Upon the death of the last surviving em-
ployee-beneficiary, the trustees of the testamentary trust were to
terminate it by paying 2,000 dollars to each of three named hospitals
and the remainder of the income and corpus to the employees' trust
fund. If the employees' trust fund was not in existence, the income
and corpus was to be divided equally among the three hospitals.
After the Commissioner of Internal Revenue refused to allow
the decedent's bequest to the trust as a charitable deduction, the
decedent's estate paid the asserted estate tax deficiency and sued in
a federal district court for a refund. The district court,' relying on
an earlier Third Circuit decision,' held that the bequest was chari-
table and qualified for a deduction under section 812(d) of the
1939 Internal Revenue Code (the predecessor of section 2055 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954). The court found that suffi-
cient public benefit flowed from the trusts to make them charitable,
the beneficiaries of the trusts were ascertainable, and the discretion
vested in the trustees was limited to disbursements for charitable
purposes. On appeal, in Watson v. United States4 a divided Third
Circuit reversed and held that the testamentary trust was not chari-
table. The majority of the court found that the trust benefited the
'The exact amount was to be determined by subtracting from $125 the
amount of Social Security benefits and corporate pension payments received
by an employee. Corporate officers and directors were not to receive pension
payments.
'Watson v. United States, 63-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 90, 379 (D.N.J. 1963).
' Gimbel v. Comm'r, 54 F.2d 780 (3d Cir. 1931).
' 355 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1965).
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corporation as well as the employees, represented compensation to
the employees, and was an ordinary pension trust which Congress
distinguished from charitable organizations by sections 401(a),
501(a) and 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
The court prefaced its reasoning with the statement, "We are not
here dealing with an impoverished class."' The court also held that
a New Jersey Superior Court's holding that the testamentary trust
was charitable" was not binding in a federal tax determination.
A concurring opinion underscored the majority's holding that
local definitions of charity are not binding in federal tax determina-
tions. A dissenting judge, taking an opposite view of the effect of
local law, expressed the opinion that the finding of the New Jersey
Superior Court was binding and precluded independent considera-
tion of the issue in the tax case. Another dissenting judge would
have affirmed on the reasoning and findings of the district court.
Prior to the Watson decision, it was generally believed that gifts
and bequests for the benefit of employees could result in charitable
deductions under the federal income and estate taxes. A long line
of cases had held that gifts providing retirement or welfare benefits
to employees were in the public interest and should be encouraged.7
The majority in Watson refused to follow these precedents and
indicated that such gifts and bequests are no longer charitable in the
Third Circuit.
In applying section 812(d) the Watson court divided on two
points: the effect of local law and the characterization of employee
pension trusts.
rId. at 271.
'Passaic-Clifton Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Essex
County C458-55, April 22, 1957. The court held that both the testamentary
and the employees' trusts were charitable and therefore not subject to the
New Jersey Rule Against Perpetuities. In an unrelated action, Watson v.
Brower, 24 N.J. 210, 131 A.2d 512 (1957), the New Jersey Supreme Court,
in ruling on the use of the word "retire" in the testamentary trust, noted
that the trust was intended to benefit the corporation as well as the employ-
ees.7 eHarrison v. Barker Annuity Fund, 90 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1937); Gimbel
v. Comm'r, 54 F.2d 780 (3d Cir. 1931); Eagan v. Comm'r, 43
F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1930); Mutual Aid & Benefit Ass'n v. Comm'r, 42
F.2d 619 (3d Cir. 1930); Estate of Leonard 0. Carlson, 21 T.C. 291 (1953);
T.J. Moss Tie Co., 18 T.C. 188 (1952), petition to review docketed and dis-
mnissed on notion of petitioner and consent of respondent, 201 F.2d 512 (8th
Cir. 1953); Estate of Lillian D. Wald, 13 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 855 (1944);
Estate of Carolyn E. Gray, 2 T.C. 97 (1943); Proctor Patterson, 34 B.T.A.
689 (1936); John R. Sibley, 16 B.T.A. 915 (1929).
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I. EFFECT OF LOCAL LAW
The role of local law in federal tax litigation has been kept at
a minimum in an endeavor to achieve nationwide uniformity in
federal taxation. The Supreme Court set forth the guidelines in
Burnet v. Harmel' when it declared that the Internal Revenue Code
should "be interpreted so as to give a uniform application to a
nationwide scheme of taxation. ' Following this idea, the Court in
Lyeth v. Hoey'0 held that property that an heir received under a will
compromise was acquired by "inheritance," as that term is used in
the income tax, and was therefore exempt from the income tax de-
spite the fact that under the local state law the heir acquired the
property by a contract with the legatee named in the decedent's will.
The Court said:
Congress establishes its own criteria and the state law may con-
trol only when the federal taxing act by express language or
necessary implication makes its operation dependent upon state
law .... There is no such expression or necessary implication
in this instance. Whether what an heir receives from the estate
of his ancestor through the compromise of his contest of his
ancestor's will should be regarded as within the exemption from
the federal tax should not be decided in one way in the case of
an heir in Pennsylvania or Minnesota and in another way in the
case of an heir in Massachusetts or New York, according to the
differing views of the state courts. We think that it was the in-
tention of Congress in establishing this exemption to provide a
uniform rule."
Although the federal estate tax exempts gifts to charity, it does
not define "charitable."' 12 It would be possible to determine whether
a bequest was charitable by recourse to the state law governing the
bequest, but this would mean that a bequest by a decedent domiciled
in one state might be charitable and deductible for purposes of the
federal estate tax, while an identical bequest by a decedent domiciled
in another state would not be charitable and deductible. In other
words, this would lead to the lack of uniformity that the Supreme
-287 U.S. 103 (1932).
Old. at 110.
10305 U.S. 188 (1938).
Id. at 194.
LOWNDES & KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIrT TAxEs 352 (2d ed.
1962); 4 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL GIFrT AND ESTATE TAXATION 345
(1959).
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Court sought to avoid in Lyeth v. Hoey. The majority of the court
in the Watson case may have acted properly in refusing to be bound
by state decisions holding the trust charitable. The term "chari-
table" in a federal tax statute may like "inheritance" in the federal
income tax be a term that should be defined by a uniform federal
definition. It seems apparent, however, that if the federal courts
are not going to be bound by the law of a particular state in defining
the term "charitable," they should not eschew the common law
entirely. There are basic common-law conceptions about what are
charitable purposes that might well be used as the foundation for
a uniform federal tax definition of charitable. If the majority in
the Watson case derived its decisions from any such general princi-
ples, it failed to articulate clearly either the principles or the nexus
between them and its conclusion.
II. EMPLOYEE TRUSTS
The Watson decision rests primarily upon a finding that Con-
gress did not intend for employee pension trusts to be charitable
organizations within the meaning of the Code. Apparently the court
reasoned that Congress by expressly providing for the tax treat-
ment of pension trusts in sections 401(a) and 501 (a) excluded em-
ployees' pension trusts from charitable organizations under section
501(c) (3). This finding was based in part on Revenue Ruling
56-138,"8 which the majority found to be on all fours with the facts
in Watson. In that ruling a corporation sought to deduct as chari-
table contributions payments to a trust organized and operated by
the corporation to provide pensions to retired employees and benefits
to certain employees who were to be selected by an executive com-
mittee. The Commissioner ruled that trusts organized primarily for
the purpose of paying pensions to retired employees were not orga-
nized exclusively for charitable purposes within the meaning of sec-
tion 501(c) (3) and were, therefore, not entitled to an income tax
exemption under section 501(a). Section 401(a), as well as
Revenue Ruling 56-138, deals specifically with one type of pension
trusts-pension trusts created and funded by a corporate employer.
If such a trust meets the many requirements of section 401, it re-
ceives favorable tax treatment from other sections of the Code.14
13 1956-1 CuM. BULL. 202.
' Generally, §§ 402 and 403 provide that amounts contributed to quali-
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Such trusts are distinguishable from charitable organizations. Sec-
tion 401 is in no way concerned with pension trusts created and
funded by nonemployers. The section has no relevancy to a bequest
in trust for the retirement of employees. It is highly improbable
that Congress intended the section to have any effect whatever on
the tax status of a bequest similar to the one in Watson. Whether
or not a gift to an employees' trust is charitable would appear to
depend upon the circumstances surrounding the gift. Corporate con-
tributions to an employees' trust created by the corporation for the
primary benefit of its officer-stockholders might well be viewed dif-
ferently than a bequest by a disinterested philanthropist to a trust
to provide modest retirement benefits for the impecunious employees
of a depressed industry.
The Watson decision was also grounded on findings that the
beneficiaries of the trust were not impoverished and the bequest was
not charitably motivated. It is doubtful that the Third Circuit in-
tended to limit the recipients of charitable giving to the impover-
ished. It is well established that those of modest means as well as
paupers are proper objects of charitable trusts. 5 Indeed, a means
test is not a necessary ingredient of a charitable trust. Relief of
poverty is but one of several charitable purposes recognized by the
law.16
Apparently the court in Watson felt that the fact that the
decedent had been the majority shareholder of the corporation estab-
lished a lasting employer-employee relationship between him and
the employees that survived his death. On the basis of this relation-
ship the majority found that the bequest was intended to and did
benefit both the employees and the corporation. In attributing
selfish designs to the decedent, the majority overturned the finding
of the district court that he was charitably motivated.
fled pension plans by employers will not be taxed to the employees
until distributed pursuant to the plan. Employers are allowed, within pre-
scribed limits, an immediate deduction from gross income for contributions
to qualified pension plans under § 404.
"Bowditch v. Attorney Gen., 241 Mass. 168, 134 N.E. 796 (1922);
Gibson v. Frye Institute, 137 Tenn. 452, 193 S.W. 1059 (1916);
New England Sanitarium v. Inhabitants of Stoneham, 205 Mass. 335, 91
N.E. 385 (1910); Godfrey v. Hutchins, 28 R.I. 517, 68 Atl. 317 (1907);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 374, comment g (1959); BOGERT,
TRUSTS 145 (4th ed. 1963); 4 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 374.11 (2d ed. 1956).
" See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS §§ 368-74 (1959);
BOGERT, TRUSTS §§ 57-64 (4th ed. 1963); 4 ScoTT, TRUSTS §§ 368-74 (2d
ed. 1956).
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Prior cases consistently had held that organizations dedicated
to the well-being of employees could be charitable for tax purposes. 17
Gifts and bequests for the retirement or welfare of employees were
deemed to be in the public interest and were to be encouraged.18
The courts did not deny charitable deductions because of selfish
motives of the donor, the lack of need of some of the benefited
employees, or the promised benefits inducing employees to work
longer and harder. 9
Scott, Bogert and the Restatement of Trusts indicate that trusts
for the aid and relief of employees can be charitable.2 ' Bogert states
that employee pension trusts can be charitable,21 but comment
37 5 (g) of the Restatement, without citing authority, flatly asserts
that employee pension trusts are not charitable.
Although the weight of authority is stacked against the Watson
decision, much of the authority is a product of the depression years.
Perhaps the tax status of employee pension trusts should be re-
examined in light of existing social and economic conditions. Cer-
tainly with the emergence of Social Security, corporate pension
plans, and other forms of old age assistance such as Medicare, the
reasons for bestowing tax benefits to encourage private assistance
to the elderly are not as obvious as they were thirty years ago. The
court would have been on firmer legal footing if it had based its
decision on the noncharitable aspects of the employees' trust fund.
This trust was to receive unascertainable yearly pour-overs of in-
come from the testamentary trust and the remainder of the corpus
and income of the trust on its termination. The employees' trust
fund was amendable by collective bargaining, made its trustees sub-
ject to the instructions of the board of directors of the corporation
and was funded by the corporation. Indeed, it would appear to be
exactly the type of trust that section 401 (a) would distinguish from
charitable organizations. If this trust was not organized for chari-
table purposes,2 2 an unascertainable amount of the bequest to the
'7 See note 7 supra.
18 See 1 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GirT TAXATION 645-47, 650 (1942).
1 Harrison v. Barker Annuity Fund, 90 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1937).
0 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 375, comment g (1957); BOGERT,
TRUSTS 166 (4th ed. 1963); 4 SCOTT, TRUSTS 2711 (2d ed. 1956).
21 BOGERT, TRUSTS § 61, at 166 (4th ed. 1963).
"0 The district court found that the employees' trust fund was charitable,
Watson v. United States, 63-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 90,379 (D.N.J. 1963), relying
in part on Passaic-Clifton Natl Bank & Trust Co., Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
Essex County C458-55, April 22, 1957, which held that the employees' trust
PARENT-CHILD IMMUNITY
testamentary trust was not to be used exclusively for charitable
purposes, and clearly the deduction should not be allowed.
It is doubtful that the Watson case stands for the proposition
that a gift to a trust to provide retirement benefits for employees
cannot be charitable for federal tax purposes. The deductibility of
such gifts appears to depend upon the circumstances surrounding
the gift, such as the persons benefited by the trust, the nature and
extent of their benefits, the relation between the donor and the
beneficiaries of the trust and any possible advantages accruing to
the donor from the gift to the trust.
WILLIAM S. LOWNDES
Torts-Parent-Child Immunity
In First Union Nat'l Bank v. Hackney' the North Carolina Su-
preme Court held that a parent's common-law immunity to tort
claims brought by his unemancipated minor children' does not apply
to prevent recovery where a wrongful death action is brought by
the administrator of one parent against the estate of the other
parent, for the benefit of the children.
In Hackney the parents of four minor children were killed when
the family car ran off a highway and hit a tree. The administrator
of the mother's estate brought a wrongful death action against the
estate of the father based on his alleged negligence in losing con-
trol of the vehicle. The defendant asserted (1) that the children
were the real parties in interest as plaintiffs since any recovery in
the action would go to them as sole distributees of their mother;
fund was charitable for purposes of the New Jersey Rule Against Perpetui-
ties.
'266 N.C. 17, 145 S.E.2d 352 (1965).
Parent-child immunity to negligence claims of each other was an inno-
vation of American courts. The first precedent for the rule was Hewlett
v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891), where the court reasoned that:
The peace of society, and of the families composing society, and
a sound public policy, designed to subserve the repose of families and
the best interests of society, forbid to the minor child a right to appear
in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for personal in-juries suffered at the hands of the parent.
Id. at 711, 9 So. at 887.
"Parental authority" and the "security of the home" were two of the
policy reasons which convinced a majority of the North Carolina court to
adopt the parent-child immunity rule in Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577,
118 S.E. 12 (1923).
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(2) that the children were the real parties defendant as sole legatees
under their father's will, and since the children were both plaintiffs
and defendants in the action, the suit would be futile; and (3) that
the children should not be permitted recovery from the estate of a
parent under North Carolina's wrongful death statute because of
the parent's immunity to negligence claims brought by his unemanci-
pated minor children. This note will be limited primarily to the
impact of Hackney upon the doctrine of parent-child tort immuni-
ty, and the other questions raised by the case will be referred to
only briefly.
In disposing of the first defense, the court held, on the basis of
existing authority, that a wife has the right to sue her husband
and recover damages for personal injuries inflicted by his actionable
negligence ;8 that if such injuries cause her death, her personal repre-
sentative can maintain a wrongful death action against her husband
or his estate;4 and that in such action the persons entitled to the
recovery (here, the children) are not the real parties in interest.5
With respect to defendant's contention that the children were the
real parties in interest as defendants because they were the bene-
ficiaries of their father's estate, the court answered that there was
no showing that any of the general distributable assets of their
father's estate would be required to pay any judgment plaintiff
might recover. It took judicial notice that "automobile liability in-
surance is a fact of present day life"6 and said that absent an allega-
8 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-10, -10.1 (Supp. 1965); Roberts v. Roberts,
185 N.C. 566, 118 S.E. 9 (1923).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-173 (Supp. 1965); King v. Gates, 231 N.C. 537,
57 S.E.2d 765 (1950).
' The court said the children were not the real parties in interest as
plaintiffs within the meaning of that term as used in N.C. GEN. STAT. §
1-57 (1953), that they had no right of action for the death of their mother
under authority of Howell v. Board of Comm'rs, 121 N.C. 362, 28 S.E. 362
(1897), and that the right of action vested in their mother's personal repre-
sentative, Graves v. Welborn, 260 N.C. 688, 133 S.E.2d 761 (1963). In
distinguishing the wrongful death cases of Davenport v. Patrick, 227 N.C.
686, 44 S.E.2d 203 (1947), and In the Matter of Estate of Ives, 248 N.C.
176, 102 S.E.2d 807 (1958), the court said these cases were based on the
proposition that no person will be permitted to profit from his own wrong-
doing. It reasoned that the basic principle on which Davenport and Ives
were decided was inapplicable in the instant case since there was no allega-
tion that the children were in any way responsible for their mother's death.
8266 N.C. at 22, 145 S.E.2d at 357. The court said:
Automobile liability insurance is a fact of present day life which
defendant may not ignore. It is a matter of common knowledge that
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tion that the father did not have liability insurance sufficient to
safeguard the general assets of his estate in the event of a judgment
against the estate, "it does not appear that use of any of the general
distributable assets . . . would be required to pay, in whole or in
part, such judgment."7 Thus the children were not shown to be the
real parties defendant.
In sustaining the striking of the third defense, the court noted
that the present action did not involve the right of an unemanci-
pated minor to sue the parent because of injuries to such child
caused by the parent's actionable negligence. It stated that this ac-
tion was brought by the administrator of the wife's estate to recover
for her wrongful death and therefore the doctrine of parent-child
tort immunity was inapplicable in the context of this case." As an
alternate ground for decision, however, the court said that since
both the mother and father were dead, there was no parent-child
relationship that would be disturbed by the suit.9 "In this factual
situation," the court added, "according to the weight of authority
and sound reason, the immunity doctrine has no application."'"
North Carolina is in accord with the majority of jurisdictions
in refusing to permit tort actions between parents and their un-
emancipated minor children." Parent-child suits are permitted when
millions of car owners purchase automobile liability insurance. G.S. §
20-309 requires every owner of a motor vehicle, as a prerequisite to
the registration thereof to show "proof of financial responsibility"
in the manner prescribed by G.S. Chapter 20, Article 9A.
A liability policy purchased by the husband-father would consti-
tute a valuable asset. During his lifetime, it would protect him in
respect of his personal liability and preserve his general estate from
depletion; and, upon his death, such policy would constitute a valuable
asset of his estate and safeguard the general assets of his estate for
distribution to the beneficiaries.
Id. at 22-23, 145 S.E.2d at 357.
The instant case is one of a very limited number of North Carolina
cases in which the presence of liability insurance was a determinative factor.
Another such case is In the Matter of Estate of Miles, 262 N.C. 647, 138
S.E.2d 487 (1964), where the court ruled that an automobile liability in-
surance policy was enough of an unadministered asset of a decedent's
estate to justify reopening such estate to permit a wrongful death action to
be brought against the administratrix, c.t.a., of the estate.
7 266 N.C. at 23, 145 S.E.2d at 357.8 Id. at 24, 145 S.E.2d at 358.
"Id. at 27, 145 S.E.2d at 360.
0 Ibid.
11 See 3 LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW § 248 (3d ed. 1963) [here-
inafter cited as LEE].
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the cause of action is based on contract 12 or on a property right"8
but are not permitted when the action is based on a personal injury,
whether such injury was caused by negligence 4 or by a willful or
malicious act.'" The immunity that the parent has from suit by the
minor children in personal injury cases arises from a disability to
sue and not from a lack of violated duty.' 6 The immunity is said
to be cased upon a public policy to protect family harmony and
parental discipline.
1 7
In recent years there has been a growing judicial inclination to
find the immunity doctrine inapplicable where there is no family
relationship, harmony, or parental authority or discipline to be pre-
served.' Until Hackney the North Carolina Supreme Court had
steadfastly adhered to the traditional view,'9 paying little heed to
the maxim that where the reason for a rule ceases, the rule itself
" See 39 AM. JuR. Parties §§ 88-92 (1942); HARPER, PROBLEMS OF THE
FAMILY 565 (1952); 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 8.11 (1956); PECK,
PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 124 (3d ed. 1930); PROSSER, TORTS §
101 (3d ed. 1963); 4 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS § 267 (1936).
"The court said in Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 586, 118 S.E. 12,
16 (1923) (dictum), "The right of a minor child to bring an action against
its parent in respect to the latter's dealing with its property is unques-
tioned. .. ."
"Redding v. Redding, 235 N.C. 638, 70 S.E.2d 676 (1952); Small v.
Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923); see Lewis v. Farm Bureau
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 243 N.C. 55, 89 S.E.2d 788 (1955); Henson v. Thomas,
231 N.C. 173, 56 S.E.2d 432 (1949); Wright v. Wright, 229 N.C. 503, 50
S.E.2d 540 (1948) ; Goldsmith v. Samet, 201 N.C. 574, 160 S.E. 835 (1931);
29 N.C.L. REv. 214 (1951); 11 N.C.L. REv. 352 (1933).
"5 There has been a noticeable trend in recent decisions of other juris-
dictions to allow actions for personal injury to a child where such injury
resulted from willful or malicious misconduct, but North Carolina has not
yet joined this trend although inferences of a desire to do so can be
gathered from a number of decisions. See Lewis v. Farm Bureau Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 243 N.C. 55, 89 S.E.2d 788 (1955); Redding v. Redding,
235 N.C. 638, 640, 70 S.E.2d 676, 677 (1952); Goldsmith v. Samet, 201
N.C. 574, 160 S.E. 835 (1931). As to the trend in other jurisdictions,
see JACOBS & GOEBEL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS 945
(4th ed. 1961); 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 8.11 (1956); PROSSER, TORTS
§ 101 (2d ed. 1955); McCurdy, Torts Between Parent and Child, 5 VILL.
L. REv. 521, 529-34 (1960); 29 N.C.L. REV. 214 (1951); 35 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 467 (1960); 26 Mo. L. REV. 152, 208-09 (1961).
1 Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Ati. 905 (1930).
Gillikin v. Burbage, 263 N.C. 317, 139 S.E.2d 753 (1965).
Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 423, 427 (1951).
19 See, e.g., Cox v. Shaw, 263 N.C. 361, 139 S.E.2d 676 (1965), where
the administrator of a mother was not permitted to sue the estate of her
unemancipated minor son for damages for her wrongful death caused by the
son's negligence. Although both mother and son were dead and there was
no family relationship to be disturbed, the immunity doctrine was still held
applicable.
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Hackney was an action by the administrator of a deceased parent
against the estate of a deceased parent, with recovery going to the
children. While it does not fall squarely within any of the cate-
gories outlined, it has implications for classes (2) through (7),
for if Hackney shows an intention by the court to disregard the
immunity rule in all cases where there is no relationship to be given
immunity protection, then immunity should not be a bar to actions
in classes (2) through (7).
Hackney was not an ideal vehicle for the court to use in an-
nouncing an intention to disregard the immunity rule in cases where
there is no relationship to be given immunity protection. It was not
a case of an unemancipated minor suing the estate of a deceased
parent for the parent's negligent injury of the child. Such a case
would have presented the question in a more clean-cut fashion.
Hackney was one step removed. The immunity doctrine was urged
defensively in an attempt to deny recovery to children in a wrong-
ful death suit brought by the administrator of one deceased parent
against the estate of the other. This raised an issue of statutory
construction of the wrongful death statute, which the court resolved
by saying that the immunity doctrine should not be read into the
statute in this fact situation. The fact that Hackney was such a
difficult case in which to crave out an exception to the immunity
rule is perhaps an indication of the court's desire to apply the excep-
tion across the board, in all cases where there is no relationship to
be protected. However, this interpretation may be too broad, since
the court in Hackney did not indicate disfavor for any of its earlier
decisions where the immunity doctrine was applied even though
there was no relationship to be protected.2"
There also remains to be resolved the impact of Hackney upon
a line of decisions holding that the administrator of an unemanci-
pated minor child killed by his parent's negligence has no cause of
action against the parent for wrongful death.27 Hackney logically
points the way to overturning this line of decisions, since the same
" Among its earlier decisions was one decided only eleven months before
Hackney, the case of Cox v. Shaw, 263 N.C. 361, 139 S.E.2d 676 (1965).
The court there held that the administrator of a mother may not sue the
estate of her unemancipated minor son for her wrongful death caused by
the son's negligence.
27 Capps v. Smith, 263 N.C. 120, 139 S.E.2d 19 (1964); Lewis v. Farm
Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 243 N.C. 55, 89 S.E.2d 788 (1955); Gold-
smith v. Samet, 201 N.C. 574, 160 S.E. 835 (1931).
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should cease. In Hackney, however, the court took an important
first step toward the modern approach. The court examined cases
from jurisdictions that have taken a new approach to the problem,
found their logic convincing, and held that since the policy reasons
on which the immunity doctrine rests did not apply to the factual
situation under consideration in Hackney, the immunity doctrine
itself should not apply. Authorities which the court found to be
persuasive include decisions from Tennessee,20 New Hampshire,2
Missouri,2 New Jersey,2 3 Pennsylvania,24 and Louisiana.25
Before Hackney, the parent's immunity from negligence actions
brought by his children conceivably could have extended to the fol-
lowing classes of cases: (1) actions by a living child against a
living parent; (2) actions by a living child against the estate of a
deceased parent; (3) survival actions by the administrator of a
deceased child against a living parent; (4) survival actions by the
administrator of a deceased child against the estate of a deceased
parent; (5) wrongful death actions by the administrator of a de-
ceased child against a living parent; (6) wrongful death actions
by the administrator of a deceased child against the estate of a
deceased parent; and (7) actions by a child against a divorced
parent, or against a parent whose own action has caused a break-
down of the family unit.
20 Brown v. Selby, 206 Tenn. 71, 332 S.W.2d 166 (1960), where the
court said the immunity rule is based solely upon the public policy of
preserving domestic peace and tranquility in the family, and since the father
in the case at hand had destroyed that peace by murdering the mother,
the immunity rule should not be applied.
21 Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Atl. 905 (1930), where the court
said the immunity exists only where a suit might disturb the family relations.
22 Brennecki v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1960), where the court
said:
The doctrine of intrafamily immunity from such suits expires upon
the death of the person protected and does not extend to the decedent's
estate for the reason that death terminates the family relationship
and there is no longer in existence a relationship within the reason-
able contemplation of the doctrine.
Id. at 73.
2 Palcsey v. Tepper, 71 N.J. Super. 294, 176 A.2d 818 (1962), where the
court said, "It is self-evident that if the family relationship no longer
exists, having been dissolved by death, then the public policy consideration
which supports the rule of immunity likewise no longer exists." Id. at 297,
176 A.2d at 819.
2, Davis v. Smith, 126 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. Pa. 1954), holding that the
immunity of a living parent from suit by an unemancipated child was a
personal defense that died with the father.
2" Ruiz v. Clancy, 182 La. 935, 162 So. 734 (1935).
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reason for not reading the immunity into the wrongful death statute
in Hackney could have been applied there. In none of these cases
was there a family relationship that would have been harmed, and
the only thing that prevented recovery was a literal and seemingly
erroneous interpretation of North Carolina's wrongful death statute,
which in pertinent part provides:
When the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act,
neglect or default of another, such as would, if the injured party
had lived, have entitled him to an action for damages therefor,
the person or corporation that would have been so liable.., shall
be liable to an action for damages, to be brought by the executor,
administrator or collector of the decedent .... 28
The court has denied recovery in this line of cases by reading
the parent-child immunity doctrine into the wrongful death statute,
saying that the child could not have maintained a suit against its
parent had it lived and therefore the terms of the wrongful death
statute preclude recovery.2 The court would not be varying the
terms or intent of the statute by applying its newly created exception
to the immunity rule in cases where the child was killed by the
parent's negligence. North Carolina's wrongful death statute was
enacted twenty-two years before the doctrine of parent-child tort
immunity came into existence'0 and fifty-four years before North
Carolina judicially adopted the immunity." It is a fundamental ten-
et of statutory construction that every statute is to be interpreted in
the light of the common law as it was understood at the time of its
enactment.3 2 At the time of this statute's enactment there was no
parent-child tort immunity to prevent a child from suing its parent.
Thus the emphasized portion of the statute quoted above did not
28N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-173 (Supp. 1965). (Emphasis added.)
= See cases cited note 27 supra.
"North Carolina's wrongful death statute was enacted by the General
Assembly of 1868-69. N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 113, §§ 70-72 (1869). It was
a successor to England's Lord Campbell's Act, which in 1846 created the
first statutory right of action for wrongful death. The Fatal Accidents Act,
1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93, §§ 1-6. The doctrine of parent-child tort immunity
came into existence twenty-two years after passage of North Carolina's
wrongful death act in the case of Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885(1891). See Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Atl. 905 (1930), for
research indicating there was no such immunity prior to Hewlett v. George.
" North Carolina adopted the immunity doctrine in Small v. Morrison,
185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923).
" State v. Emery, 224 N.C. 581, 31 S.E.2d 858 (1944); State v. Mitchell,
202 N.C. 439, 163 S.E. 581 (1932).
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operate at the time of its enactment to prevent the administrator of
a child from suing for the child's wrongful death and should not
operate in such a manner now, especially if the court is not going
to apply the immunity rule wherever there is no longer any reason
for its application. It still remains to be seen, however, whether the
court will logically extend Hackney to overturn this line of decisions.
A number of writers have urged that either the courts or the
legislatures of the several states should abolish parent-child tort
immunity33 in light of "the ever-increasing criticism of the general
rule' 34 and the growing number of exceptions to it. Examining
the genesis of the rule in 1930, Chief Justice Peaslee of the New
Hampshire Supreme Court said the immunity has "not infrequent-
ly been advocated with rhetoric rather than by reason"8 during
the course of its evolution. Certainly "family harmony" alone is
not an adequate reason for permitting a wrong without a remedy in
the parent-child negligence area.
North Carolina was one of the leaders in abolishment of hus-
band-wife tort immunity.3 6 While founded on a different theory,87
this immunity was also supported by the same "family harmony"
argument that is said to be an adequate ground for retaining the
parent-child immunity. No family disharmony of serious propor-
tion has resulted from abolishment of the former immunity. There
is nothing to prevent one minor child from suing his minor brother
or sister in tort.38 Yet surely as much family disharmony would
result from this type of action as would result from a suit by a
child against a parent. The same "family disharmony" argument
could be used to support a rule forbidding suits between parent and
child in respect to contract and property rights, but North Caro-
lina and the majority of jurisdictions permit such suits. It has
been argued that permitting children to maintain suits against their
parents where liability insurance is involved will lead to wholesale
collusion and fraud.3 9 However, the same argument could be made
8 See 3 LEE § 248 n.232; 43 N.C.L. Rav. 932 (1965).
"3 LEE § 248, at 177.
Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 354, 150 At. 905, 906 (1930).
"See 2 LEE § 211.
'
T Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 632 (1955). "At common law, a husband and
wife were one, and that one was the husband; a tort by one spouse against
the person or character of the other gave rise to no cause of action in
favor of the injured spouse." Id. at 634.
" See 3 LEE § 248, at 178.
"See Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 423, 436 n.7 (1951).
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with respect to actions between husband and wife; yet these actions
are permitted.4" In short, the present immunity rule and its excep-
tions result in cases difficult to determine with any degree of fair-
ness and lead in many cases to injustice. It has been suggested that
the simplest way to abolish parent-child tort immunity is to enact
a statute doing so. At least one writer has gone so far as to
suggest that legislation is the only way.4 However, it should be
remembered that the immunity was a creature of the courts,42 and
what the courts have created they can destroy.
TH OMAS J. BOLCH
Workmen's Compensation-Average Weekly Wage-Combination of
Wages
Barnhardt had been working during the days for National Cash
Register Company, at an average weekly wage of 68 dollars, and
during the evenings for Yellow Cab Company, at an average week-
ly wage of 26 dollars. He sustained a compensable injury while
working for Yellow Cab. In Barnhardt v. Yellow Cab Co.' the
North Carolina Supreme Court held that it was error for the Work-
men's Compensation Commission to have combined the wages earned
from both employers in fixing the compensation at 37.50 dollars per
week (the maximum) and that the compensation should have been
limited to 16.14 dollars per week, sixty per cent of the average
wage earned from Yellow Cab.
North Carolina's Workmen's Compensation Act provides that
an employee is to be compensated for sixty per cent of his average
weekly wage, up to a maximum of 37.50 dollars per week, for a
period not exceeding 400 weeks.2 Average weekly wage is defined
as the average of the employee's wages earned over a period of a
year in the employment in which he was working at the time of
the injury.3 When the employment is casual or for a shorter period
than a year, the statute authorizes consideration of the average
weekly wage of employees in the same class of employment or an
Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 354, 150 At. 905, 906 (1930).
41 See Castellucci v. Castellucci, 188 A.2d 467, 469 (R.I. 1963).
42 See note 2 supra.
'266 N.C. 419, 146 S.E.2d 479 (1966).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-29 (1965).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(5) (1965).
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averaging of the wages of the injured employee over the shorter
period of time, provided the results are fair and just to both parties.4
If because of exceptional reasons these methods would be unfair to
either party, other methods may be used "as would most nearly
approximate the amount the employee would be earning were it not
for the injury."'
Since the statute contains no express authorization for combina-
tion of wages, the court said it would be exceeding the limits of
judicial interpretation to allow it.6 Furthermore, the court read the
statute as allowing consideration of only those wages earned in the
employment "in which the employee was injured."7 The actual
language of the statute directs consideration of the wages in the
employment "in which the employee was working at the time of the
injury."8 It does not seem that this language necessarily restricts
the consideration to wages earned from the employment at the very
moment of the injury. If a specific limitation had been intended, the
legislature could have said simply that the compensation should be
sixty per cent of the wages earned from the employer liable for the
compensation. Since the statute twice directs results fair and just
to both parties 9 and allows the use of methods that would most
nearly approximate the amount the employee would be earning were
it not for the injury,'0 the statute ought to be interpreted to allow
a combination of wages where it is necessary in order to obtain
fair results.
The statute directs that compensation awarded to a volunteer
fireman is to be based on the average weekly wage in the employ-
ment in which the volunteer principally earned his livelihood." The
court viewed this provision as evidence of legislative intent not to
allow any combination of wages.' 2 The court may have reached
this conclusion on either of two grounds. It might have thought
this provision to be directed at the situation where a volunteer is
working for two employers in addition to his service as a volunteer
and legislative intent thus to be specifically to limit the basis of
' Ibid.
5 Ibid.
o 266 N.C. at 429, 146 S.E.2d at 486.
266 N.C. at 428, 146 S.E.2d at 485.8 N.C. GEIN. STAT. § 97-2(5) (1965). (Emphasis added.)
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.12266 N,C. at 428, 146 S.E.2d at 485.
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compensation to the wages earned from one of those employers, that
is, the one from whom the volunteer principally earns his liveli-
hood. But it seems strange that the legislature would have antici-
pated and dealt with this particular case of concurrent employment
while leaving so much ambiguity in the other sections. On the
other hand, the court might have thought that the legislature classi-
fies the service as a volunteer as an employment and that wages
from only the employment in which the volunteer principally earned
his livelihood should be considered in computing his compensation.
However, a volunteer fireman ordinarily receives no wages in that
capacity, so ordinarily there would be no problem of combination.
Since volunteer firemen are not included in the definition of "em-
ployee"'" and the methods for computation of average weekly wage
refer to "employees,"' 4 the legislature could have thought this sec-
tion necessary to provide a basis of compensation for such volun-
teers who are given the right to compensation elsewhere in the
General Statutes.' 5
The problem of computation of average weekly wage where
there is concurrent employment (employment at two jobs with two
employers) has been resolved in three ways in jurisdictions. Some
courts have allowed consideration of. only those wages earned in the
employment in which the injury occurred.' Others have held that
wages may be combined to the extent that such wages are earned in
related or similar employment 7 but that no such combination is
permitted where the employments are unrelated or dissimilar.'
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(2) (1965).
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(5) (1965).
"5N.C. GEN. STAT. § 69-25.8 (1965).
"' Walters v. Greenland Drilling Co., 184 Kan. 157, 334 P.2d 394 (1959);
Black Star Coal Co. v. Hall, 257 Ky. 481, 78 S.W.2d 343 (1935); Stephens
v. Catalano, 7 So. 2d 380 (La. 1940); Crower v. Baltimore United Butchers
Ass'n, 206 Md. 606, 175 A.2d 7 (1961); Buehler v. University of Mich.,
227 Mich. 648, 270 N.W. 171 (1936); Knight v. Cohen, 56 N.J. Super.
516, 153 A.2d 334, aff'd, 32 N.J. 497, 161 A.2d 473 (1959); De Asis v.
Fram Corp., 78 R.I. 249, 81 A.2d 280 (1951).
17 St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Idov, 88 Ga. App. 697, 77 S.E.2d 327
(1953) (retail salesman for three different employers); Texas Employers'
Ins. Ass'n v. Hamilton, 95 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) (common
laborer in highway construction and other construction work); Banberger
Elec. R.R. v. Industrial Comm'n, 59 Utah 257, 203 Pac. 345 (1921) (elec-
trician for railroad company and for power company).
18 Murphy & Sons v. Gibbs 137 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1962) (restaurant
employee and operator of invoice producing machine); Welding & Iron
Works v. Renton, 145 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 1962) (truck driver and shipping
clerk); Harris Meat & Produce Co. v. Brown, 177 Okla. 317, 59 P.2d 280
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Still other courts have reasoned that the policy of compensation re-
quires a determination of average weekly wage based on all the
employee's wages from all employers at the time of the injury."
In Massachusetts where earlier court decisions had not allowed
the combination of wages, 20 the statute was amended to provide
expressly for combination.21 Other states now have similar pro-
visions.' The federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Com-
pensation Act23 has been interpreted to allow a combination of
wages.24 As early as 1906 the English statute allowed this combi-
nation. 5
The policy question in Barnhardt is simple. Should an employee
be compensated for his actual loss of wages, although not all of
his wages are earned in the employment in which he was injured?
The Court said it seemed reasonable that the legislature would
relate the compensation to the wages paid by the employer in
whose employment the injury occurred. 20 If the over-all policy of
the act is to compensate the employee for at least a portion of all
pecuniary loss occasioned by a compensable injury, whether such
(1936) (machine repairman and bookkeeper); Graham v. Glouschester
Furniture Co., 169 Va. 505, 194 S.E. 814 (1938) (steeplejack and mechanic).
"Wells v. Industrial Comm'n, 63 Ariz. 264, 161 P.2d 113 (1945);
Western Metal Supply Co. v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 407, 156 Pac. 491 (1916);
Baily v. Farr, 66 N.M. 162, 344 P.2d 173 (1959).
The North Carolina court discussed McCummings v. Anderson Theatre
Co., 225 S.C. 187, 81 S.E.2d 348 (1954), where the court affirmed an award
based on wages from all employers. But the South Carolina court expressly
stated that since no other method was offered on appeal its decision did
not constitute authority for computation of average weekly wage by con-
sideration of wages earned in other employment.
"°Quebec's Case, 247 Mass. 80, 141 N.E. 582 (1923); King's Case,
234 Mass. 137, 125 N.E. 153 (1919); Marvin's Case, 234 Mass. 145, 125
N.E. 154 (1919).
1 MASs. ANN. LAws ch. 152, § 1(1) (1965). "In case the injured em-
ployee is employed in the concurrent service of more than one insured
employer or self insurer, his total earnings from the several insured em-
ployers or self insurers shall be considered in determining his average weekly
wage." Note that the wages from only insured employers or self-insurers
may be considered. The same limitation has been established by court de-
cision in Kansas. Walton v. Electric Serv. Co., 121 Kan. 480, 247 Pac.
846 (1926). The present Kansas rule does not allow any combination of
wages in cases of concurrent employment. Walters v. Greenland Drilling
Co., 184 Kan. 157, 334 P.2d 394 (1959).
2 CAit. LABOR CODE § 4453; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 2(2) (1)
(1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 482 (Supp. 1965).
2262 Stat. 603 (1948), 33 U.S.C. § 910 (1964).
" Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Britton, 233 F.2d 699 (D.D.C. 1956).5 Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 58, § 13.
26266 N.C. at 427, 146 S.E.2d at 485.
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loss be in the form of medical expenses or wages lost,2 7 it should
not matter where the wages are earned. At least one court has
acknowledged this to be the policy of workmen's compensation."'
The court thought increased compensation resulting from allow-
ing a combination of wages would be unfair to the employer and
his insurance carrier because insurance premiums are based on the
amount of wages paid by the employer. 9 If a combination of wages
is allowed the increased cost would be borne in the same manner
as increased cost of medical treatment,"0 and the final result would
be a shifting of the loss to the industry as a whole and its custom-
ers, and not to the individual employer or his insurance carrier.31
Although the employer of a part-time employee would pay a smaller
premium than he would if the same employee were full-time, 32 com-
" See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-25 (1965), which authorizes compensation
for medical expenses without regard to the amount of wages earned; N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 97-25 (1965), which fixes the compensation for loss of wages
of North Carolina National Guardsmen at the maximum of $37.50 without
regard to actual wages earned; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2 (1965), which
provides that veteran trainees are entitled to consideration of subsistence
allowances paid by the United States Government in computing their aver-
age weekly wage and that volunteer firemen are entitled to consideration
of their average weekly wage in their principal employment for calculation
of compensation.
" See State ex rel. Munding v. Industrial Comm'n, 92 Ohio St. 435, 11
N.E. 299 (1915): "[T]he theory upon which compensation law is based
(which is now generally accepted) is that each time an employee is killed
or injured there is an economic loss which must be made up or compensated
in some way . . . that . . . this economic loss should be borne by the
industry .... " Id. at 450, 11 N.E. at 303.2D266 N.C. at 427, 146 S.E.2d at 485.
0 Premiums are determined by multiplying each $100 of the employer's
annual payroll by the basic rate for his industry classification over a three-
year period. The basic rate is determined by reference to the incurred
losses in the classification over the same period. Payments for loss of wages
as well as payments for medical expenses are included in the incurred-loss
factor. An increase in either type of payment would result in an increase
in the incurred losses. Assuming the premiums remained constant, an in-
crease in the basic rate would be required. See REEDE, ADEQUACy OF WORK-
MEN'S COMPENSATION 239 (1947).
8 See note 30 supra. The adjustment would be made in the basic rate
which is applicable to all firms in the industry classification. Assuming the
employer's payroll remained constant, his only increase would be in the
basic rate so that it would be shared by the industry as a whole.
2Part-time employment means that the employer's annual payroll would
be smaller. Therefore, when it is multiplied by the basic rate for his classi-
fication his total premium would be smaller than it would have been if the
same employee had been employed full-time. The smaller premium is paid
because there is less exposure to the risk that any compensation will have
to be paid. The same principle would be applicable in the case of compensa-
tion for loss of wages. The smaller premium would be paid because of
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pensation for medical treatment for the employee would not be
limited because of the part-time employment. 3 For purposes of
premium computation, wages merely measure the exposure to the
risk of compensation. In so far as actual compensation is con-
cerned, wages measure the pecuniary loss to the employee. Since
the loss of wages earned in other employment is just as much a
part of the pecuniary loss as medical expenses and loss of wages
earned in the employment in which the injury occurred, such wages
should be considered in computing the average weekly wage. In
any event the maximum that the employee will recover is 37.50
dollars per week,34 so there appears no valid reason for denying
compensation at least for the allowable percentage of all wages
earned immediately prior to the injury.
In 1940 only 26.4 per cent of the estimated wage loss in North
Carolina was compensated.35 In 1952 the percentage fell to 22.1.80
Though there have been increases in the maximum allowable com-
pensation since 1952,37 it is apparent that even today the statute
places much of the loss on the employee. In June 1964, the average
weekly wage in manufacturing in North Carolina was 72.10 dol-
lars."8 Sixty per cent of this would be 43.26 dollars, but the actual
compensation is limited to the maximum of 37.50 dollars per week,
leaving 34.60 dollars uncompensated. Of course employees earning
above-average wages would incur a larger uncompensated loss while
those earning below-average wages would incur a smaller uncom-
pensated loss.
The court recognized the injustice in the application of the
statute in Barnhardt, but concluded that the remedy required legis-
less exposure to the possibility that the compensation would have to be
paid at all, not because the possible compensation payments would be ex-
pected to be smaller. See REEDE, ADEQUACY OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
239 (1947).
"3 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-25 (1965). No distinction is made between
part-time employees and full-time employees for purposes of compensation
for medical expenses.
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-29 (1965).
" From a theoretical computation of Professor Arthur H. Reede as
reported in SOMERs & SOMERS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 81 (1954).
Ibid.
The maximum weekly payment was increased from $24 to $30 in
1951, N.C. Sess. Laws 1951, ch. 70, § 1; from $30 to $32.50 in 1955, N.C.
Sess. Laws 1955, ch. 1026, § 5; from $32.50 to $35 in 1957, N.C. Sess.
Laws 1957, ch. 1217, § 1; and from $35 to $37.50 in 1963, N.C. Sess. Laws
1963, ch. 604, § 1.
" N.C. DEP'T OF LABOR, BIENNIAL REPORT 8 (1964).
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lative action.3 9 The legislature should amend the act to allow a
combination of wages where there is concurrent employment.
40
Until this is done the interpretation in Barnhardt increases the
pecuniary loss falling on the employee, contrary to what appears
to be the basic policy of the act.
41
JERRY M. TRAmmELL
266 N.C. at 428, 146 S.E.2d at 485.
, It is suggested that the following provision be inserted between the
third and fourth paragraphs of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(5) (1965): "If the
employee were working under concurrent contracts with two or more em-
ployers immediately prior to the accident, his wages from all such employers
shall be considered in computing his average weekly wage.
41 Indicating its continued concern over the result, the court has applied
the rule announced in Barnzhardt in a later case. Joyner v. Carey Oil Co.,
266 N.C. 519, 146 S.E.2d 447 (1966).
